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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides a detailed and easy-to read overview of the railway liberalisation in Belgium 
and the three neighbouring countries. The European Union's liberalisation Directives are often 
complex and are implemented in very specific ways in the different Member States. The analysis 
goes into some detail about the Commission's underlying motives and economic theories for letting 
network industries, which had previously been regarded as natural monopolies, convert into 
competitive enterprises with the separation of infrastructure from operations. 
 
The study takes a look at the impact of the European rail liberalisation Directives in Belgium and its 
neighbouring countries - France, Germany and the Netherlands. There are considerable variations 
in the way in which the Directives are applied. It is reflected in the way in which the separation of 
the infrastructure and the transport services within the railway companies was carried out, and in 
the degree of opening of the market in freight and passenger transport.  
 
The analysis shows that the dominance of the former monopolists in the different Member States 
means that private rail operators face major obstacles. The financial analysis of the railway 
companies reveals wide variations in economic performance. The combination of better balance 
sheet figures and a bigger domestic market means that some major players in Europe are 
financially better off, giving them superiority over the smaller railway companies. This raises the 
question whether these circumstances will ultimately lead to distortion of competition. 
 
 
JEL classification: D23, D40, H20, L14 and L92. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This research paper falls within the scope of the Microeconomic Analysis Service project providing 
a description and explanation of reforms to the network industries. The European Union's 
liberalisation Directives are often complex and can be implemented in very specific ways in the 
different Member States. As a result, it is not always easy for the policy-maker or other interested 
parties to get a clear or accurate understanding. The analysis here endeavours to fill in this 
shortcoming by providing a detailed and easy-to read overview of railway liberalisation in Belgium 
and the three neighbouring countries. It also goes into some detail about the European 
Commission's underlying motives and economic theories for letting network industries, which had 
previously been regarded as natural monopolies, convert into competitive enterprises. 
 
In the first part of the study, the theoretical framework surrounding the liberalisation of the rail 
sector is outlined for the non-specialised reader. First of all, the paper sums up the reasons behind 
the European policy decision and then it looks into the objectives hoped to be achieved by opening 
up the rail market to competition. It then goes on to give an overview of the background legislation, 
listing all the different EU Directives concerning liberalisation of the railways. A third chapter 
explains a few aspects of the economic theory of liberalisation of the network industries along with 
the potential advantages and disadvantages. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief 
review or introduction of the relevant economic theory surrounding concepts such as natural 
monopolies, cost curves, free markets, transaction costs, etc. 
 
The second part takes a look at the impact of the European rail liberalisation Directives in Belgium 
and its neighbouring countries - France, Germany and the Netherlands. In each case, an overview 
is given of the history of their domestic rail reforms in the light of the initial position, the gradual 
reforms and the current situation. Developments on the national rail markets both for goods and 
passenger transport are then outlined, followed by an examination whether rail liberalisation has 
already had a positive influence or not on the performance of the railways. Finally, on the basis of a 
financial analysis of data from the annual accounts of the various rail companies, the study 
ascertains whether particular developments regarding subsidies, financial debt, corporate revenue 
and costs can be linked to the market reforms.  
 
It should be pointed out that this study is intended for a wide, non-specialised public. It endeavours 
to explain all concepts involved in the socio-economic debate on liberalisation of the railways 
without however defending any particular stance.    
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1. REASONS FOR AND OBJECTIVES OF RAILWAY REFORM 
1. 1. REASONS BEHIND THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS 
1.1.1. THE DECLINE OF RAIL TRANSPORT 
 
For more than 30 years now, rail transport has seen its market share constantly declining in 
comparison with the other modes of transport, both for freight and passenger transports. Even in 
absolute terms, at a time when the transport sector as a whole was growing, rail transport was 
standing still, or even contracting in some cases. 
 
Charts 1 and 2 show respectively how freight and passenger transport evolved, by mode, between 
1970 and 2000, while charts 3 and 4 illustrate the trends in terms of market share for each mode of 
transport. 
 
As far as freight is concerned, the boom in road and maritime transport can be noted immediately, 
with their respective growth rates of 170% and 169% in the space of 30 years, while growth of all 
five modes over the same period doubled (+116%). This development is in sharp contrast to that 
for rail transport which declined by 11% during this time. So, it is hardly surprising to note that the 
railways lost over half their market share in just three decades, down from 20% in 1970 to just over 
8% in 2000. 
 
Chart 1:  Performance of freight transport 
  by mode in the EU-15, 1970-2000, 
  in billion tonne-kilometres 
 
 
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical 
pocketbook 2004. 
Notes:   Road: transport on national territory. 
  Sea: intra-EU traffic, including domestic traffic. 
Chart 2:  Performance of passenger 
  transport by mode in the EU15, 
  1970-2000, in billion passenger-
  kilometres 
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical 
pocketbook 2004. 
Note: Air: domestic flights plus intra-EU15 flights. 
 
 
   
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
1970 1980 1990 2000
Passenger cars (left-hand scale)
Buses & Coaches (right-hand scale)
Air (right-hand scale)
Rail (right-hand scale)
Tram & Metro (right-hand scale)
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1970 1980 1990 2000
Road Sea
Rail Inland waterways
Pipelines 
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  3
Chart 3:   Freight transport modal split in the EU15, 1970-2000, in % 
 
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical pocketbook 2004. 
Notes:   Road: transport on national territory. 
  Sea: intra-EU traffic, including domestic traffic. 
 
Chart 4:   Passenger transport modal split in the EU15, 1970-2000, in % 
 
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical pocketbook 2004. 
Note: Air: domestic flights plus intra-EU15 flights. 
 
The railways' performance in passenger transport hardly fares any better, even though rail 
transport grew fairly steadily in absolute terms over the last 30 years of the 20
th century (+39%). 
This growth rate is nevertheless very low when compared with that for road transport which had 
more than doubled over this period (+142%). But the passenger transport sector has also been 
marked by the exponential growth of air transport, which had expanded from 33 billion passenger-
kilometres in 1970 to 284 billion passenger-kilometres by the year 2000, which is an increase of as 
much as 761%. This huge growth enabled this sector to edge much closer to rail transport which 
registered 304 billion passenger-kilometres in the year 2000. Moreover, by 2008, the aeroplane 
was the second most popular mode of passenger transport after the car in the EU27, having thus 
overtaken not only the train but also bus and coach travel (EC, 2010). So, it is mainly thanks to 
planes and cars that the passenger transport sector as a whole was able to post a growth rate of 
128% in 30 years. The increasing importance of these sectors also contributed to bringing down 
the railways' market share from 10.4% in 1970 to 6.3% in 2000, not such a sharp decline as in 
freight, but nonetheless still just as worrying. 
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1.1.2. THE REASONS FOR THIS DECLINE 
 
There are many reasons for the decline in rail transport (summarised in table 1). Some of them are 
exogenous to rail transport, but others are to be found within the sector itself. The European 
Commission (1996) gives an overview of them in its White Paper on revitalising the railways.  
 
Table 1: Reasons for the decline of rail transport 
Exogenous reasons  - Transformation of other industries 
x  From huge-stock-based to just-in-time 
production processes 
x  From low value/high volume to high 
value/small volume products 
- Policies and investment favouring road over rail 
Endogenous reasons  - Limited attention to customer care 
- Weak reliability and punctuality of shipments 
- Limited flexibility in transhipments 
- Fragmented cross-border services with delays at 
frontiers (lack of interoperability) 
- Absence of cross-border cabotage 
- Lack of service integrators for optimised logistical 
chains  
- Traffic priorities allocated to passengers (unclear 
slot allocation management) 
- Lack of one-stop shop in path allocation, cargo 
tracing and handling 
- Lack of competition 
- Non-transparent cost structure on international 
corridors 
- Insufficient infrastructure capacity and quality 
(especially for high-speed passenger transport 
and combined goods transport on international 
routes) 
- Poorly defined public service obligations and 
compensation received ex post 
Source: Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans (2004, p. 4) and Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004, p. 4). 
 
As shown in the previous point, one of the main causes of the decline of rail transport is the rapid 
expansion of other modes of transport such as air and road transport. The expansion of the 
aviation sector has probably been facilitated by the emergence of "low-cost" airlines, while the road 
transport sector has benefited from more democratic vehicle prices. The increasing use made of 
road transport has led to the development of road networks, thus creating a virtuous circle for this 
mode of transport. Moreover, road transport is generally considered to be less costly than rail. 
However, the external costs of transport, such as congestion, pollution and accidents, are 
frequently higher for road transport than for rail and are not taken into account in the price paid by 
individual users. Competitive conditions therefore favour road transport, to the detriment of, inter 
alia, the railways. 
 
Another exogenous reason for the decline of the railways lies in the transformation of some 
industries. The traditional heavy industries, whose output was transported by rail have declined in 
importance (EC, 1996, p. 9). The European economy has effectively gradually been transformed 
from an industrial one to a service economy. Furthermore, within industry, there has been 
widespread adoption of "just-in-time" production processes, which require more flexible sourcing 
and, therefore, adaptable means of transport (Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans, 2004, p. 3). The  
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railways have not been able to adapt to these developments and have not found new outlets for 
goods transport to make up for this loss.  
 
The decline of the railways is also attributable to the rail sector itself. It is still organised on national 
bases while the transport needs of both passengers and goods are becoming increasingly 
internationalised. The absence of a genuine internal rail market prevents the existence of freely 
moving transnational rail transport services, something which on the other hand is available by 
road. 
 
According to the European Commission (1996, p. 10), management of the railways is also largely 
responsible for their decline. Rail companies, which generally tend to be State monopolies, have 
not always been managed with a view to ensuring profitability and efficiency. Investment in the 
railways have often been inadequate or badly targeted. Governments have compensated for losses 
with huge subsidies devoid of any precise objectives. 
 
Lastly, rail infrastructure has not been adapted to the expansion of traffic, while at the same time 
motorway networks were developing, something which exacerbated the imbalances between these 
two modes of transport. 
 
1.2. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS 
The problems facing the railways prompted the Commission to reform the rail transport sector. The 
reform aims to revitalise rail so as to make this transport mode as attractive as the others for users 
and thus try to reverse the negative trend of its modal market share. It comprises three main 
objectives, which are interdependent: 
 
x  Creating a genuine internal rail market 
x  Improving the efficiency of rail companies 
x  Fostering a policy of sustainable mobility 
 
The intention to create an internal market for transport via a common transport policy was already 
set out in the European Community's founding Treaty, signed in Rome in 1957. The aim of this 
policy is "the promotion throughout the Community of a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social 
protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States" (EC, 1992, p. 13). 
 
As far as rail transport is concerned, it should be noted that this internal market has still not 
materialised.  Numerous regulatory, technical and administrative barriers are still preventing a 
European rail network from being set up. The Commission wants to open up national markets and 
break down these barriers in order to improve both integration and interoperability of the Member 
States' networks. According to the Commission (2001, p. 34), it is over long distances that the rail 
market has the most promising growth potential. A trans-European network would therefore help 
make the railways more attractive in comparison to other modes of transport. But that also involves 
an overhaul of infrastructure, a large part of which was designed in the 19th century, from a 
national, or even regional, perspective by devoting international train paths to freight transport, 
which has fallen victim to policies that tend to give priority to passenger trains. 
 
As mentioned in the previous point, the Commission feels that the rail sector is not efficient and 
profitable enough because its firms are cut off from market forces. The Commission wished to turn 
rail companies into "normal businesses, that endeavour to satisfy their customers' requirements in 
the knowledge that, if they fail to do so, some one else will and they will lose the business" (EC, 
1996, p. 6). According to the Commission, opening the sector up to competition is the best way to 
improve efficiency on the railways and to modernise the services offered to rail users. Furthermore,  
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this policy must enable State subsidies to be scaled back or even scrapped altogether so as to 
relieve the strain on the Member States' budgets. 
 
Chart 5:   CO2 emissions by sector in the EU27 (shares of total CO2 emissions in 2007) 
   
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical pocketbook 2010. 
 
Chart 6:   Changes in CO2 emissions by sector in the EU27, 1990-2007 
 
Source: EU Energy and Transport in Figures Statistical pocketbook 2010. 
 
Last but not least, the reform seeks to promote sustainable mobility. The strong growth of both 
passenger and goods transport has brought mobility problems (congestion, delays, etc.) and 
pollution. As chart 5 shows, in 2007, the transport sector was responsible for 23.1% of carbon 
dioxide emissions in the EU27 and this is the only sector to have seen an upward trend in its CO2 
emissions since 1990 (chart 6). Consequently, the Commission wants to see a rebalancing of the 
different modes of transport. In this context, the railways have an important role to play, by virtue of 
their relatively low environmental impact in comparison to road transport, for instance1. The 
objective is for more long-distance road journeys and short-haul trips (less than 400 km) by 
aeroplane to be made by train (EC, 2003). The goods haulage sector also needs to make wider 
use of the railways rather than the roads. According to the Commission, better user-charging to 
                                                   
1   The share of the rail sector in total CO2 emissions of the transport sector was only 0.6% in the EU27 in 
the year 2007, if indirect emissions due to electricity consumption are excluded. By way of comparison, 
the road transport sector's share was 70.9% (EC, 2010). 
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recover costs and an improvement of connections between transport networks should also 
contribute to this modal rebalancing. 
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2. THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR RAIL LIBERALISATION 
Since the end of the Second World War, the rail sector has been running out of steam. Its market 
share is falling in relation to other modes of transport (especially road transport) despite its 
environmental and safety credentials, to name but two. Moreover, this sector is characterised by 
national markets, the presence of a traditional monopolistic operator controlling the infrastructure 
and its operational aspects, as well as major State subsidies which, in the European Commission's 
view, do not encourage efficiency. It was on these grounds that the EU executive decided to 
gradually reform the rail sector. 
 
2.1. THE FIRST DIRECTIVES 
Directive 91/440/EC, adopted in July 1991, was the first major legislative milestone in this reform. 
This Directive requires rail companies' management to be independent from the State as well as 
the running of transport services to be separated from the rail infrastructure management, at least by 
unbundling their accounts. It also requires rail companies to be restored to a sound financial 
standing. For this purpose, a separate debt write-off service can be set up within their accounting 
framework. 
 
Furthermore, the Directive authorises rail companies to form "international groupings" with rail 
companies from other Member States intended for cross-border transport of passengers or goods. 
Under the terms of the Directive, rail companies must give other Member States’ railway operators 
access to their infrastructure for the operation of international combined goods transport services 
and allow international groupings access for the provision of international transport services. 
 
This Directive, which came into force on 1 January 1993, ushered in the very first form of market 
opening. However, it still leaves a great deal of power in the hands of the traditional operators, 
since a foreign rail company needs their cooperation to form an international grouping. 
 
In June 1995, Directives 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC padded out Directive 91/440/EC with a view to 
guaranteeing the effective application of rail infrastructure. The first Directive lays down the 
conditions for granting licences to rail companies while the second governs the allocation of 
network capacity to operators and the infrastructure user fees. Directive 95/19/EC stipulates that 
priority in rail infrastructure allocation should be given inter alia to rail services of general interest 
and that rail companies providing these services may receive compensation from the State. 
 
In July 1996, the Council adopted Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European 
high-speed rail system. 
 
2.2. THE FIRST RAILWAY PACKAGE 
In July 1996, the Commission put together, in the form of a White Paper2, a strategy for revitalising 
the Community’s railways. This strategy consists of continuing the reforms undertaken through 
Directive 91/440/EC (restoring sound finances, market opening, integration of national systems). 
The Commission also pointed out in its White Paper that Directive 91/440/EC had not been fully 
applied by all Member States. 
 
Using the White Paper as a basis, the European Parliament and the Council adopted, in February 
2001 a triple series of Directives that make up the first rail package (also referred to as the 
infrastructure package). According to the Commission, the objective of this reform is to boost 
competition, create better international freight transport and use the rail infrastructure more 
efficiently. 
 
                                                   
2   COM(96)  421.  
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Directive 2001/12/EC amends Directive 91/440/EC. It enables an individual operator to obtain 
access to the rail network of other Member States with a view to supplying all types of international 
freight service (no longer combined transport of goods). During a transitional period, these new 
measures solely concern the main European railway routes, which make up what is called the 
trans-European rail freight network, but from 15 March 2008 on wards th ey apply to th e wh ole EU 
network.  The Directive stipulates that the basic functions for guaranteeing fair and non-
discriminatory access to the infrastructure are confined to cases where companies that do not 
supply rail services themselves.  
 
In addition, the Directive requires a clear distinction for accounting purposes between passenger 
transport and freight transport and steps up the requirement for unbundling of accounts between 
train operators and rail infrastructure managers by making it compulsory to publish separate 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Furthermore, funds paid for activities relating to the 
provision of passenger transport services as public-service remits must be shown separately in the 
relevant accounts and may not be transferred to activities relating to the provision of other transport 
services or any other business. The Member States were given until 15 March 2003 to transpose 
this Directive into national law. 
 
Directive 2001/13/EC amends Directive 95/18/C on the granting of licences. 
 
Directive 2001/14/EC replaced Directive 95/19/EC. It sets out the principles and procedures to 
follow for fixing and levying the rail infrastructure user charges and for the allocation of capacity on 
this infrastructure for both passenger transport and freight. Under this new Directive, the minimum 
access charges levied for the service infrastructure must be set at the cost that is directly incurred 
as a result of operating the train service. This cost may include various elements listed in the 
Directive. 
 
Just like Directive 95/19/EC, Directive 2001/14/EC permits the Member States to give priority to rail 
services of general public interest and to compensate suppliers of these services. The Directive 
stipulates that the infrastructure capacity allocation procedure may not be carried out by an 
infrastructure manager that also acts as an operator for this infrastructure. The Directive calls for 
the establishment of an independent regulatory body to oversee these procedures. And, finally, it 
requires rail companies to obtain a safety certificate granted by the Member States. 
 
In parallel with the first rail package, the Parliament and Council adopted, in March 2001, Directive 
2001/16/EC on the interoperability of the conventional trans-European rail system. 
 
2.3. THE SECOND RAILWAY PACKAGE 
In September 2001, the Commission published a new White Paper on European transport policy 
for 20103. In this paper, the EU executive mainly seeks to revitalise the railways by making rail 
transport an integral part of the Internal Market, by optimising use of infrastructure and by 
modernising services. The Commission also sought to strengthen the link between the different 
modes of transport and incorporate infrastructure costs into the price paid by users. Its White Paper 
pointed up the importance of a quality public (passenger) transport service and recalled that state 
aid to companies carrying out these missions of general economic interest are permitted, as long 
as they respect competition rules. This White Paper was to serve as the basis for the second 
railway package. 
 
This second series was adopted in 2004. Its goal was to create an integrated European rail area at 
both the legal and technical level. It contains three Directives, a Regulation and a 
Recommendation. 
 
                                                   
3   COM(2001)  370.  
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Directive 2004/49/EC (the Railway Safety Directive) aimed to develop a joint approach to safety 
matters on the European Union’s railways. It incorporates into a single document the various safety 
prescriptions that featured in Directives 95/18/EC and 2001/14/EC, while adding some new 
elements. It determines the procedure to be followed for granting safety certificates that every rail 
company must have before it can operate on the European network. This piece of legislation also 
sets the requirements that infrastructure managers must meet in order to be approved in terms of 
safety. It was updated by Directive 2008/110/EC. 
 
Directive 2004/50/EC amends Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC on the interoperability of trans-
European high-speed and conventional rail systems, respectively. It harmonises and clarifies 
interoperability requirements. Directive 2008/57/EC then consolidated these Directives within a 
single text while adding some new, mostly technical, amendments. In October 2009, Annex VII of 
Directive 2008/57/EC was amended by Directive 2009/131/EC. 
 
Directive 2004/51/EC amends Directive 91/440/EC. It brought forward to 1 January 2006 the 
opening of the Member States’ whole network for international rail freight services. Moreover, from 
1 January 2007 onwards, the Directive grants rail companies access rights for all kinds of rail 
freight services (no longer just international services) on the whole EU network. 
 
Regulation 881/2004 establishes the European Railway Agency whose main role is to make a 
technical contribution to the integration of the European railway area by improving the 
interoperability of the different networks and developing a common approach to safety on the 
European rail system. It was amended by Regulation 1135/2008. 
 
Finally, the second railway package includes a Recommendation aimed at the accession of the 
European Community to the Convention on International Carriage by Rail (COTIF). 
 
2.4. THE THIRD RAILWAY PACKAGE 
In 2006, the Commission carried out a review of the 2001 White Paper4 which notably concluded 
that there was a need to sharpen the railways’ competitive edge and reinforce their integration as 
well as to encourage environmentally friendly transport. Following this review, the Parliament and 
the Council adopted, in 2007, the third railway package with the objective of opening up to 
competition international passenger transport in the European Union in 2010. This third package 
comprises two Directives and a Regulation. 
 
Directive 2007/58/EC amends Directives 91/440/EC and 2001/14/EC. It provides for the opening 
up of the international passenger transport market by 1 January 2010. The right of access to the 
network applies to all stations located along an international transport route, including stations in 
the same Member State. The Directive therefore allows cabotage, that is, stopping off and picking 
up passengers on an international journey in several stations within the same country. The 
Directive nevertheless does not concern rail companies that make only one transit journey on 
European Union territory. The Member States where international passenger transport by train 
accounts for more than half of the turnover earned by their rail companies from carrying 
passengers were given extra time – until 1 January 2012 to open up their networks to competition. 
In addition, the Directive provides for an assessment by the Commission, for 31 December 2012 at 
the latest, of the measures designed to open up the network for international passenger transport 
and, if necessary, proposals for further rail network liberalisation. 
 
Directive 2007/59/EC harmonises the conditions and procedures for the certification of train drivers 
operating locomotives and trains on the railway system in the Community. 
 
Regulation 1371/2007 determines rail passengers’ rights and obligations. For example, it creates a 
system of compensation in the case of train delays, rules to follow for guaranteeing access for 
                                                   
4   COM(2006)  314.  
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disabled travellers and the procedures for the handling of complaints. This Regulation came into 
force on 3 December 2009. 
 
Alongside the third railway package, and in line with the 2001 White Paper’s recommendations, the 
Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services 
by rail and by road. This Regulation sets out the conditions under which compensation or exclusive 
rights may be granted by the competent authorities to rail companies for the provision of services of 
general interest. 
 
2.5. LATER DEVELOPMENTS 
In December 2008, the Commission tabled a proposal for a Regulation designed to make rail 
freight more competitive5. In doing so, it noted how far behind integration of rail transport had fallen 
in comparison to air and road transport while meeting sustainable mobility requirements. It felt that 
the establishment of international rail corridors giving priority to freight would make a substantial 
contribution to improving competitiveness of the railways. This Regulation was adopted by the 
Parliament and the Council in September 20106. Most notably, it compiled a list of rail freight 
corridors that should make it possible to link up Europe’s main industrial regions by November 
2015. The Regulation calls for closer cooperation between infrastructure managers at the operating 
level as well as setting up one-stop shops for loaders. 
 
The year 2009 saw the ten-year period covered by the 2001 White Paper draw to an end, so the 
Commission started the process that was to culminate in the publication, in 2010, of a new White 
Paper on the future of transport. This was finally published in March 2011 (see below). In June 
2009, the Commission set out its vision for the future of transport7 and put it out to public 
consultation. It main aim was to promote the development of sustainable mobility. On the legislative 
front, the Commission regards the completion of the Internal Market and strict application of 
competition rules as absolutely essential. It feels that new market-opening rules associated with 
effective application of the legislation in force are of particular importance for the rail sector. In this 
White Paper, the EU executive also envisaged the establishment of transnational infrastructure 
operators in order to guarantee full third-party access to infrastructures. Moreover, it wants to 
further develop the legislative framework so as to ensure fair and equal competition conditions and 
also to make sure that safety and security standards, working conditions and consumer rights are 
not sacrificed, with particular attention being paid to people with reduced mobility and those with 
specific needs.  
 
The Commission’s 2006 report on the implementation of the first railway package8 noted an 
unfavourable trend on the railways in recent years, in particular a decline in the railway’s modal 
share in comparison to other modes of transport between 1995 and 2004 for the carriage of both 
goods and passengers. It attributes this poor performance to bad transposition and incorrect 
implementation of the first railway package. As a result, the Commission announced that it 
intended to overhaul this legislative package in order to simplify, clarify and modernise the rules 
applicable to the rail sector. On 17 September 2010, it adopted a proposal to reform the first 
railway package bringing together the three Directives from this package and their later 
amendments in one single text, while adding further modifications. The reform proposal seeks to 
boost competition on the rail transport market, give more power to national regulators and improve 
the framework for investment in the rail sector9. The proposed overhaul calls for clarification of 
account unbundling and the existing provisions on independence of infrastructure operators 
without, however, involving any major change to the content. It nevertheless stipulates that public 
                                                   
5   COM(2008)  852. 
6   Regulation (EU) N° 913/2010 of 22 September 2010. 
7   COM(2009)  279. 
8   COM(2006)  189. 
9   European Commission (2010), "Commission sets out measures to improve rail services", press release 
IP/10/1139, 17 September.  
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funds paid out to a rail operator for its public service transport missions should be mentioned 
separately for each public service contract. The proposal also requires operators of services 
indispensable for access to the rail infrastructure (stations, ports, locomotive maintenance sheds, 
etc.), and for electricity and fuel supply to be kept independent from rail transport operators. As 
regards the relationship between the Member States and their traditional rail company, the 
proposal for a Directive stipulates that if the State is a shareholder, it may not be given more rights 
in the management of the rail company than shareholders in ordinary private companies under the 
national company law currently in force. Management contracts concluded between the State and 
the rail company must be of a general nature and may not interfere with specific corporate 
decisions.  
 
In its first reading on 16 November 2011, the European Parliament approved an amended version 
of the reform proposal, which requires neither full unbundling between the infrastructure manager 
and the rail operator nor liberalisation of national passenger traffic. However, the Parliament asked 
the Commission to come forward with a proposal, by 31 December 2012 at the latest, for a 
Directive setting out provisions on the separation of infrastructure management and transport 
operations, as well as a proposal seeking to open up the internal rail passenger transport market.  
 
The text adopted by the Parliament was then sent on to the EU Council of Transport Ministers 
which endorsed a political agreement on it on 12 December 2011, thus officially launching the 
second reading with the Parliament. 
 
Alongside the reform proposal, the Commission published a Communication10 presenting its 
strategy with a view to further boosting the development of the single European railway area and 
setting out complementary initiatives that it could take in the coming five years. Among these 
initiatives is a cost-benefit analysis of opening up the internal passenger transport market to 
competition which the Commission intended to propose in 2011 and then an initiative to be adopted 
by 2012 at the latest to expand the opening of the network, as provided for under Directive 
2007/58/EC. However, the Communication does not mention any date for opening up the internal 
passenger travel market to. The Commission also intends to look into the possibility of tightening 
up the requirements for institutional unbundling between network managers and rail operators. It 
plans to launch a consultation based on this Communication, so as to give interested parties a 
chance to air their views. 
 
In March 2011, the Commission published its White Paper on European transport policy11. In this 
paper, it confirms its desire to encourage the emergence of multinational and multimodal operators. 
Pointing out that is on the internal rail services market where there is still the most evidence of 
bottlenecks, the Commission set as a priority action to break down any technical, administrative 
and legal barriers that are still preventing entry to national markets in order to create a single 
European railway area without frontiers. Without giving any precise date, it said it intended to 
ensure,  inter alia, the "structural" separation of infrastructure management from provision of 
services, something that could put an end to holding-company structures. 
 
On the other hand, in a bid to contribute towards the objective of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport, the White Paper puts forward ambitious targets for transport of 
passengers and goods by rail. Above all, the Commission recommends a tripling the length of high-
speed rail network by the year 2030 and hopes that, by 2050, the bulk of medium-haul passenger 
transport will be by train. As for goods transport, it has set a target of shifting 30% of road cargo 
over distances of more than 300 kilometres over to the railways or inland waterways by 2030 and 
50% by 2050, thanks partly to putting multimodal freight corridors in place. 
 
                                                   
10   COM(2010) 475. 
11   COM(2011) 144.  
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The Commission also hopes to have reached by 2020 full and compulsory internalisation of 
external transport costs. In the case of rail transport, that comprises most notably noise, pollution 
and wear-and-tear costs. 
 
2.6. SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN FORCE 
The diagram below summarises the main elements of the European legislative framework for rail 
liberalisation currently in force and shows, in a nutshell, how it has developed. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of the European legislative framework for rail liberalisation 
 
 
Source: NBB. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. DEFINITION OF A NETWORK INDUSTRY 
There is no single unambiguous and widely accepted definition of a network industry because the 
population of so-called network industries is heterogeneous and the distinction from other types of 
industry not always clear. The fact that the railways, electricity or postal services belong to the 
network industries is not being contested. But the distributive trades or insurance sector are never 
labelled as network industries, even though they exhibit similar characteristics. 
 
The simplest definition of a network lies in a number of points that are linked up to each other in 
order to transport along the way flows of energy (electricity or gas), information (sound, images or 
data) or goods (water, freight or passengers). A typical feature is that goods and/or services are 
provided to end users through the use of a network infrastructure which links the upstream supply 
with downstream customers. The emphasis here is on the network which in the case of the 
railways is a transport network (rail infrastructure).  
 
Within such a network industry, at least two vertical levels can be distinguished, on the one hand 
there are activities involving installation or construction, maintenance and management of the 
network infrastructure itself and, on the other hand, there is the downstream business of provision 
of services to the end user. In the case of the railways, this involves the supply of train services. In 
a vertically integrated firm, both activities are carried out by the same producer. The activities can 
also be provided under a vertically disintegrated structure where the firm that is responsible for the 
infrastructure is not active in the downstream business. Mixtures of the two are also possible: a 
vertically integrated firm which allows competition in the downstream activity or several vertically 
integrated enterprises that compete with each other. 
 
3.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF A NETWORK INDUSTRY 
A network industry has a number of basic characteristics related to the presence of an 
infrastructure and which distinguish it from the other sectors. These features have an influence on 
the way in which a network industry can be organised.  
 
A first characteristic is the presence of externalities. These are undesirable side effects of a 
transaction, decision or action taken by a market party in the course of which no account is taken of 
its influence on another market party that is not concerned by the decision-making process. 
Externalities are positive or negative effects that are not included in the cost price of a good or a 
service. A positive network externality arises when the utility of one user depends on the total 
number of connected users. This mainly applies to communication networks (such as the 
telephone or an online social network) where each additional user raises the value of the system 
for all users already present (or connected). Then again, a negative network externality occurs 
when aggregate demand, which is the result of the various individual decisions of the end users, 
overloads the system to such an extent that supply cannot keep up with demand, as a result of 
which the balance of the system is disrupted. In the case of the railways, this happens during peak 
hours when demand largely exceeds available capacity so people are faced with overcrowded 
trains. 
 
Within a network industry, the infrastructure is necessary equipment and a supplementary 
production factor that downstream services must allow end users to access. Train operators 
inevitably need tracks to be able to supply transport services. The extent to which the equipment is 
regarded as necessary depends heavily on the local outlook. It is of course quite possible to bridge 
certain distances in places where there are no rail tracks by means of other modes of transport (by 
bus, for instance).  
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The development of a network requires huge prior investment in well-defined assets with a long 
lifespan. These investments in a network infrastructure go hand in hand with "sunk costs", that is, 
costs which cannot be cashed in for other purposes. High fixed costs, as a result of which it is not 
efficient to duplicate a network, and the much lower variable costs associated with the provision of 
services over the network lead to considerable economies of scale in network industries. 
Economies of scale play an important role in the rail industry in particular because the proportion of 
fixed costs here is noticeably higher than in other network industries. This makes it especially 
difficult to generate competition within a network industry.  
 
In addition, network industries also enjoy economies of scope which arise on account of the joint 
supply of two services being provided at a lower cost than when each service is offered separately. 
In the case of the railways, the economies of scope frequently refer to the combined supply of 
freight and passenger transport within one single enterprise. Providing various types of services on 
a common network enables the marginal costs of adding an extra service to be kept much lower. 
But economies of scope can also arise between freight and passenger transport on the one hand 
and maintenance of the railway infrastructure on the other hand. These economies of scope can be 
explained simply by the fact that integrated decisions lead to more efficient results than decisions 
that are taken separately and without consultation.  
 
Alongside economies of scale and scope, networks, and the rail industry in particular, are subject 
to "diseconomies of density". This phenomenon is related to both the infrastructure and the rolling 
stock. Diseconomies of density come into play when average costs rise faster than the revenues 
when increasing use is made of the network. Increasing demand for transport means that greater 
use will be made of both the infrastructure and the rolling stock as a result of which average costs 
tend to rise. This is perfectly possible up to a certain level where diseconomies of density arise. 
The ideal level of use for the infrastructure mainly depends on the various characteristics of the 
rolling stock (number of carriages, average speed, etc.). The presence of economies of density in 
the rail industry has a negative influence on the feasibility of allowing competition in this sector. 
Even when the network's infrastructure is thrown open to competition and rival train operators can 
make use of it, the operator that has a "first mover advantage" will probably also be able to 
preserve this advantage by setting its fares/rates at a specific level and possibly adjusting them so 
that the development of further competition is hindered (Pittman 2005).  
 
Finally, services of general economic interest are provided by network industries. These differ from 
other services because of the existence of public interests regarding quality, accessibility and 
security of supply. These are services where a public interest is involved and which are either 
supplied through the market and in conditions of competition or not.  
 
Furthermore, network industries that perform well bring economic, social and ecological progress. 
Well-functioning railways provide a solution for congestion and environmental problems on the 
roads. Generally speaking, governments do not leave services of general economic interest 
exclusively at the mercy of market forces and endeavour to regulate and control them to a certain 
extent.  
 
3.3. NETWORK INDUSTRIES AND NATURAL MONOPOLIES 
As mentioned above, network infrastructure requires particularly high setting-up and maintenance 
costs. Owing to these high fixed costs, doubling the size or the disintegration of a network industry 
is not usually economical. It reduces the flexibility of the system and hinders the exploitation of 
economies of scale. So, natural monopolies also form an essential part of network industries. 
 
Before broaching the characteristics of a natural monopoly, a monopoly itself needs to be 
discussed. A pure monopoly is a market form where only one single enterprise sells to many 
potential customers. There are no good substitution opportunities for buyers so, in the short term, 
no new company can undermine the monopoly. Since the monopolist is not at the mercy of  
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influence from competing firms, he has a certain market power that allows him to set his prices 
higher than the marginal cost12. Because of the monopolist's profit-maximising behaviour, 
consumers are charged a higher price and a lower production level is supplied. This price-setting 
enables a transfer of wealth from the consumer to the producer as a result of which a certain group 
of consumers are excluded because they cannot afford the (artificially) higher price. Furthermore, a 
monopolist makes inefficient use of his means of production because he limits his supply. A 
situation of this kind is called allocative inefficiency and is illustrated in chart 7. 
 
Chart 7   Allocative inefficiency with a monopoly 
 
 
For simplicity, it is assumed that constant average costs are the same as the marginal cost 
(AC=MC). The monopolist who wants to maximise his profits sells quantity Pm for a price Qm. With 
this output, the monopolist's marginal revenue (MR) is equal to the marginal cost (MC). The 
producer surplus is equal to PmBCPc, the consumer surplus to APmB and the total wealth equal to 
APcCB. In a markt where there is perfect competition, the allocative optimum lies in D with quantity 
Qc for price Pc. The total wealth is equal to the consumer surplus APcD and the producer surplus is 
nil owing to the competition. In this way, the loss of wealth that occurs with a monopoly (namely 
BCD or the deadweight loss) is prevented. 
 
Besides the "deadweight loss", additional losses can arise because, in the absence of competition, 
the monopolist is less inclined to work efficiently and control costs. The term "x-inefficiency" 
(Liebenstein, 1966) indicates the internal waste that occurs when a firm acquires a monopoly and 
is consequently no longer put under pressure to contain its costs to a competitive minimum. This 
can result from paying too much for inputs, the wrong combination of factors of production (e.g. too 
many or too few workers) or the waste of resources (De Bondt, 2006). A monopolist has less 
motivation to bring down production costs through innovation so the long-run average cost curve is 
higher. 
 
A natural monopoly is the market form where one single firm can produce the entire market supply 
at lower unit cost than can a combination of several firms. When a firm has a long-run average cost 
                                                   
12   On a market where there is perfect competition, the market price is equal to the marginal cost.  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  17
curve (LRAC) that remains on a downward path regardless of the size of market demand (see 
chart 8), one refers to a permanent natural monopoly (Viscusi, Harrington et al., 2005). This is the 
case for network industries that enjoy economies of scale through the high fixed cost of investment 
in the infrastructure which means that they can always produce at the lowest cost.  
 
Chart 8   Cost curve of a permanent natural monopoly 
 
 
A temporary natural monopoly has a long-run average cost curve that declines until cut-off point q' 
only to become constant from then on (see chart 9). This can arise when demand rises sharply so 
that the initial fixed costs become negligible and only marginal costs are the determining factor. In 
this way, a situation of a natural monopoly with demand VV develops into a market with perfect 
competition where demand V'V' applies.  
 
Another possibility is that the cost curve changes through technological innovations that cause the 
natural monopoly to disappear by itself. This is what happened in the telecommunications sector, 
which until the end of the 1980s was regarded as a natural monopoly. The fixed network 
infrastructure costs were so high that it was more efficient to let all telecommunications services  be 
supplied by just one company. From the beginning of the 1990s, a significant change has occurred 
in the telecommunications sector which can be entirely attributed to technological developments 
(switchover from analogue to digital telecommunications technology, mobile technology, increasing 
speed of computer processors and network). This has enabled a sharp fall in the cost of supplying 
these services and led to a huge increase in demand for telecommunications services. Both 
developments have put an end to the natural monopoly in  the telecommunications sector . 
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Chart 9   Cost curve of a temporary natural monopoly 
   
 
 
The definition of a natural monopoly was introduced by William J. Baumol (1977). In his view, 
economies of scale on their own are not sufficient to speak of a natural monopoly and the only 
necessary, but also adequate, condition is the presence of a subadditive cost function. This means 
that all possible output combinations can always be produced at the lowest cost by one single firm. 
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Economies of scale are not indispensable for a firm with only one single product on the market, but 
they are enough to able to refer to it as a natural monopoly. This is illustrated in chart 10 where the 
average costs (AC) of a firm decrease until cut-off point Q' only to start rising again from then on. 
As a result, this firm reaps economies of scale for all possible production volumes that come to less 
than Q' and the cost function is subadditive. On the same chart, the average cost curve for two 
firms (AC2) is also plotted. Production volume Q* at the intersection between AC and AC2 is the 
maximum output that one single firm can produce at the lowest cost. The cost function is 
subadditive for all possible output combinations smaller than Q*. Despite the firm reaping no 
economies of scale for production volumes between Q' and Q*, from a cost perspective it is most 
economical for just one firm to do the supplying. 
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Chart 10  Subadditivity  
 
 
In the case of firms that have several products on the market, economies of scale are neither 
indispensable nor sufficient to have a subadditive cost function. The reason for this is that when 
several goods and/or services are produced/provided in one and the same firm, the different 
outputs are mutually interdependent. The subadditivity is then determined entirely through 
economies of scope. Disadvantages of scope can even cancel out economies of scale so that no 
subadditivity occurs.  
 
Network industries are not just a natural monopoly on account of their economies of scale, but 
more particularly through technical reasons that obstruct competition within their domain: 
management of the network, the heavy investment and coordination between infrastructure and 
provision of services to the customer. The natural monopoly is more a result of the conditions 
associated with the management and maintenance of a unique network infrastructure than just 
because of the economies of scale it can reap. Competition within a network industry is 
consequently no obvious matter. 
 
3.4. REFORM OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
 
Taking the economic characteristics of network industries as a basis, the natural monopoly seems 
to be the only possible form of organisation. Yet, this organisational form is not regarded as optimal 
and the absence of competition makes it difficult to encourage efficiency and productivity within the 
network industry. In order to tackle these inefficiencies, there is a need for adequate regulation and 
this is where the government must intervene. For some network industries (i.e. electricity, 
telecommunication, the railways, water), a government will often opt for providing the production 
itself by means of a state enterprise. In this way, the management of the public enterprise can 
automatically look after the public interest. Critics of state enterprises point out that the 
management can come under potential political influence. Typical of such circumstances are 
decisions which are aimed at short-term vote winning and giving preference to political partners 
(Rothengatter, 2010). Such concern, together with an initiative from the European Union, that 
heavily subsidised monopolies do not fit in with an integrated European market, has resulted in  
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political support for liberalisation. There are also quite a few technological developments that lie 
behind the reform of specific network industries.  
 
3.5. VERTICAL STRUCTURE 
European legislation has resulted in thorough reform within the network industries. In cases where 
a network industry had originally operated under the form of a de jure monopoly, the enforcement 
of a vertical division between the network management and the provision of customer services was 
recommended. The reason for splitting up the operational section's infrastructure is to attain a 
liberalised market and a more competitive network industry. 
 
However, network industries are traditionally vertically integrated so that they can reap substantial 
economies of scale and scope through lower transaction costs. The term transaction costs was 
introduced by Ronald Coase (1937), who noted that a sound explanation for the existence of an 
enterprise was lacking. His answer was that there are considerable transaction costs attached to 
use of market mechanisms: costs for obtaining information (prospecting), communication 
(bargaining) and processing information (decision-making). In his view, the explanation behind the 
creation of economic institutions (i.e. ownership, the market, the firm, and also the State or the law) 
lay in attempts to reduce transaction costs. 
 
When a product has to be manufactured entirely through market transactions, each owner of a 
production factor should have entered into a contract with one or more of the other owners. And for 
each contract, the prices must be worked out, negotiations must be pursued and arrangements 
made. In each case, this must be repeated for every production process. The associated 
transaction costs can nevertheless be limited by concluding just one contract with one single firm, 
as a result of which there is no longer any need to conclude separate contracts with other 
production factor owners. The entrepreneur provides the necessary coordination and works out 
whether the costs of coordination within the firm are lower than the transaction costs of outsourcing 
to the market. A firm's existence is explained as a solution for avoiding costs linked to the price 
mechanism. 
 
In the context of transaction cost economics, Oliver Williamson (1985) developed a model with 
which he can specify the optimal size or boundaries of a firm which can then ensure that the sum of 
production- and transaction costs is kept to a minimum. When a firm makes a transaction within its 
own boundaries by means of bureaucratic control and coordination, it is said to have a "hierarchical 
internal structure" (which brings with it vertical integration). A firm that carries out transactions 
outside its own boundaries by means of market coordination and outsourcing has a "market 
structure" (which brings with it vertical disintegration). Transaction costs are determined by the 
decision to execute a production process within or outside an enterprise and, because of this, are 
relevant for the extent to which a firm is vertically integrated. 
 
According to Williamson, production- and transaction costs are mainly influenced by the presence 
of transaction-specific investments13. By this, he means tailor-made investment for one particular 
purpose that can only be shifted with difficulty and for which no alternative use is possible. When 
there are no transaction-specific investments at all in a firm, it is more advantageous to make use 
                                                   
13  Williamson (1985) identifies four reasons for the presence of transaction-specific investment: site 
specificities, physical asset specificity, dedicated assets and human asset specificity. Site specificities 
refer to the decision by a supplier and a customer to set up their business activities close to each other. 
Physical asset specificity relates to investment in particular goods or facilities that only have limited value 
outside the transaction context. Dedicated assets refer to general investment made by a supplier with 
which it is hoped that a substantial volume of transactions with a particular client can be carried out. 
Human asset specificity denotes very specific skills that an individual can acquire by working for a 
particular firm.  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  21
of the market as far as consecutive production stages are concerned. The greater the increase in 
transaction-specific investments, the more preference should be given to internal organisation.  
 
In order to prove this, it is assumed that, in an initial phase, a firm has constant production and no 
economies of scale or scope at all. This firm's choice between internal production (where ȕ(k) = 
management costs using internal organisation) or buying through the market (where M(k)  = 
management costs using market organisation) is determined entirely by production cost control and 
the possibility of interim adjustments in the event of difficulties. The market allows tighter control of 
production costs but, with an increasing degree of dependence between both parties, it prevents 
the possibility of making adjustments. This latter fact is a direct consequence of the change in 
relationship with increased transaction-linked investments (where k is a measure of the degree of 
transaction-linked investments). This is illustrated in chart 11 where ¨G corresponds to the 
difference between ȕ(k) and M(k). When the level of transaction-specific investments comes to 
more than the value ݇ ത, preference is given to internal production because, in these circumstances, 
there is a high degree of mutual dependence. 
 
Chart 11  Management and production costs  
 
Source: Williamson, 1985. 
 
In a second phase, the impact of economies of scale and scope is recognised as a result of which 
differences in production costs are taken into account too. For the sake of convenience, constant 
production is assumed. The difference between production costs associated with internal 
production (which involves vertical integration) and costs associated with procurement on the 
market of the same product (which involves vertical separation) are defined as ¨C (see chart 3). 
When ¨C is expressed as a function of the transaction-specific investments (k), it can be assumed 
that ¨C remains positive but decreases because the impact of economies of scale and scope 
between firms declines as the transaction-specific investments increase. In cases where particular 
goods or services are virtually unique (k is very high), not a single aggregate benefit can be reaped 
by outsourcing production and ¨C will be close to the asymptotic zero value. 
 
Consequently, the vertical sum ¨G + ¨C makes it possible to determine the optimum level of 
transaction-specific investments at which the differences in production and transaction costs are  
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minimal. For all levels of transaction-specific investments that lie to the left of value ݇ ෠, vertical 
separation is the most advantageous, while to the right of this value the preference would be for 
vertical integration or in-house production. However, there is no simple answer to the question 
whereabouts the network industries lie with regard to value ݇ ෠.  
 
In order to answer the question of which organisation model allows as low transaction costs as 
possible and as much competition as possible, transaction costs must be able to be quantified. 
This is an arduous process and most models only make it possible to give an indirect indication of 
total transaction costs (Allen, 2006). Besides, very little systematic work on measuring transaction 
costs in the rail sector has been done. Merkert demonstrates in his study for the first time that this 
calculation is indeed possible for the rail sector (Merkert, 2010). He developed a methodology that 
enables total production costs to be distinguished from total transaction costs for both train 
operators and firm(s) responsible for the infrastructure in a given country. With this methodology, 
he makes a distinction between production elements and transaction elements in a firm's staff 
costs. The most important variable is the cost price of management and administrative staff (so-
called "transaction jobs") employed by train operators or companies in charge of the train 
infrastructure. This involves personnel not directly concerned by operational activities (e.g. train 
drivers or maintenance staff) but belonging to the financial, marketing, human resources or similar 
divisions. In Merkert's study, transaction costs are calculated on the basis of annual accounts data 
from each train operator and infrastructure company in three European countries (Great Britain, 
Sweden and Germany). Because different currencies are used in these countries, the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) method is applied so that the figures can be compared with each other. To be 
able to estimate the magnitude of these costs for all firms within one country, the transaction costs 
per firm are added up and extrapolated to the full market by scaling up the results to the total 
number of train-kilometres14 travelled. Table 2 reproduces the results of the sample under study. 
 
Table 2   Results of the transaction cost model 
 
Country 
 
Total  
staff 
FTE 
 
Total 
staff 
(mill. 
tkm15) 
 
Mgmt16 
and 
admin. 
staff 
 
Mgmt and 
admin.  
staff (mill. 
tkm) 
 
Mgmt 
 
Mgmt 
(mill. tkm) 
 
TC17 (mill. 
PPP €) 
 
TC  
(per 
tkm) 
 
% TC in 
relation 
to total 
cost 
Great 
Britain 
90,260  184.79  18,634  38.15  242.4  0.50  13,682.02  2.80  9.26 
Germany 
 
110,815  110.19  13,252  13.08  178.1  0.18  838  0.83  4.12 
Sweden 
 
14,749  112.89  4,622.8  35.38  104  0.80  244.51  1.87  10.63 
Source: Merkert, 2010. 
 
From this comparison, it appears that the level of transaction costs in relation to total operating 
costs is relatively limited both in the case of fully vertically disintegrated rail companies (as is the 
case for the British and Swedish railways) and for rail enterprises that operate in the form of a 
holding company (such as the German railways). On average, transaction costs come to 10% of 
total operating costs18. Although the total level of transaction costs is relatively low, there are major 
                                                   
14  Train-kilometres correspond to a distance travelled by a train in kilometres. This measurement unit is 
used for both goods transport and passenger transport. 
15   Train-kilometre (tkm) 
16   Management (Mgmt) 
17   Transaction costs (TC) are expressed in million PPP euro for the financial year 2006-2007. 
18  This appears to be an upper limit. Another research paper on the British railways written by Merkert 
concludes that transaction costs come to a maximum of 4.7% of total operating costs (Merkert, 2010). In 
Belgium, the chairman of the NMBS Holding Jannie Haek informed the board of directors at the end of 
February 2011 that the vertical break-up of the NMBS corresponds to €50 to100 million of additional costs 
on a yearly basis for IT, communication and legal services, among other things. This amount of 
transaction costs is equivalent to around 1% of the NMBS group's running costs.  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  23
differences depending on the degree of vertical integration within a company (the infrastructure and 
operational services completely separated, specific functions hived off to a separate entity such as 
slot allocation or infrastructure user charging, the holding-company model). Full vertical 
disintegration tends to drive the transaction costs up. When looking at the different European rail 
operators, one can see that the Germain rail operators, and in particular Deutsche Bahn, have the 
lowest transaction costs per train-kilometre and the best ratio of transaction costs to operating 
costs.  
 
It is worth noting that, on the British railways, transaction costs were initially very high immediately 
after the railways were opened up to competition and infrastructure and rail operators split up 
completely (Merkert, 2010). In the following years, transaction costs per train-kilometre declined as 
the learning effect came into play and confidence increased between the various parties. After the 
fatal train crash in Hatfield19, transaction costs went up again to a much greater extent than 
operating costs. As a result of the accident, a lot of extra staff were taken on by all train operators 
and employed in non-operational functions. Furthermore, the results must be a little nuanced since 
one has no idea as to how the quality of the services offered will evolve (in terms of punctuality, 
frequency, safety, etc.). 
 
3.6.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE RAIL 
INDUSTRY 
The literature carries a heated debate about the optimal vertical structure of a network industry 
(Ksoll 2004, Preston 2002, Pittman 2001, Seabright 2003). In the context of this study, a number of 
advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration in the rail industry are discussed.  
 
3.6.1.  ADVANTAGES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
The railways are a complex organisation where coordination is essential because there is strong 
technological dependence between the infrastructure and operational decisions. This includes not 
just capacity allocation in the long term, management of safety measures, coordination of 
scheduling, and investment planning but also day-to-day operational decisions such as train length 
and speed, number of stops, size and type of vehicle. Within a vertically integrated organisation, 
these processes can be managed at much lower transaction costs than with two separate 
enterprises. Integration not only simplifies the operational coordination but also enables faster 
decision-making during disruptions and disputes. It ensures that the operational process does not 
constantly have to go hand in hand with legal considerations and contractual negotiations. 
 
Besides higher transaction costs, vertical separation can also be a source of less efficient 
investment decisions. Investment in the rail industry is characterised by long run-in-, application- 
and write-off periods. Moreover, it is highly capital-intensive and destined for a specific purpose. 
Owing to this, the costs of such investment cannot be recovered when the contract between two 
separated firms is terminated. There is in fact not another single party that has a stake in this 
investement. Since the risk is high for the firm that takes the initiative to go into a transaction-
specific investment, a "hold-up" problem arises (Buehler et al., 2002, Ivaldi 2005). The investor is 
vulnerable to the behaviour of the buyer who can put pressure on him to lower his price. Fear of 
this kind of scenario can cause companies to delay investment. One possible solution lies in 
drawing up lengthy and for the most part impracticable long-term contracts between both parties or 
through vertical integration. 
 
An infrastructure and an operational division integrated within one single enterprise strengthens 
employees' sense of identifying with a full system (Ksoll 2004). This has a positive influence on 
                                                   
19   The train crash in Hatfield on 17 October 2000 exposed the shortcomings of the privatised infrastructure 
company Railtrack as well as the lack of regulatory supervision. The cause of the accident was put down 
to rolling contact fatigue that the company had known about beforehand.  
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various levels of the enterprise; it strengthens cooperation between different functions and ensures 
a thorough knowledge of all aspects within the railways, consistent safety- and quality control and 
an overall awareness as regards obsolescence and maintenance. This not only ensures better 
safety and quality standards but also exerts downward pressure on maintenance costs. Vertical 
separation has a weakening effect on the business culture. This can be illustrated by the case of 
British Rail (BR) which was fully privatised in 1993 and split up into more than a hundred different 
firms. Before privatisation, the prevailing business culture at BR was one in which safety was 
regarded as of utmost importance. The last train disaster as a result of a broken track dates back to 
1967 when BR was still in charge of the network (Murray 2001). After liberalisation, Railtrack20 was 
responsible for monitoring compliance with safety rules by all other companies in the railway 
industry. Railtrack appeared to be in a very awkward position because safety was controlled by 
laborious procedures and standards that were open to interpretation. Moreover, Railtrack had no 
real authority to enforce the standards that it had to monitor (Wolmar 2001). So, the liberalisation of 
the British railways also coincided with a series of train disasters (Southall (1997), Ladbroke Grove 
(1999), Hatfield (2000) and Potter's Bar (2002)21) in which a clear causal link with the splitting up of 
the network industry could be found. 
 
3.6.2.  DISADVANTAGES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
Bringing the whole production chain under the umbrella of one sole firm gives the integrated 
enterprise the possibility of putting competitors at a disadvantage where access to the 
infrastructure is concerned. Such anti-competitive behaviour can manifest itself in various different 
forms, ranging from withholding necessary information and charging excessive access fees to 
setting up complicated procedures for granting permits for access to the tracks. Splitting up an 
integrated enterprise into an independent transport and infrastructure concern must ensure that 
suppliers and buyers are put on an equal footing. This ensures an increasing degree of 
competition. In promoting vertical separation in order to bring market forces into play within a 
network industry, there is one important question to be asked and that is whether the infrastructure 
firm can or cannot compete and consequently whether it can remain vertically integrated. When the 
infrastructure company offers transport services and in this way competes with firms that are trying 
to gain access to the infrastructure it manages, it actually has a motive for abusing its dominant 
position and limiting this access. According to the OECD (OECD, 2005), experience with liberalised 
network industries has shown that it is often very difficult for regulators and/or anti-trust authorities 
to keep discriminatory behaviour under control22. In Europe's view, full vertical separation where 
the infrastructure firm is not allowed to supply operational services as well offers the most potential 
                                                   
20   Railtrack is the company that owns the railways infrastructure and is responsible for its maintenance and 
further development. In exchange for fee, Railtrack grants access rights to the tracks and leases out 
stations and depots to the rail operators on a long-term basis.  
21   The Southall and Ladbroke Grove train crashes were deemed to have resulted from the splitting-up of 
responsibilities for safety, from poor training and sloppy procedures during the first few years of 
liberalisation. The direct cause of the Hatfield disaster was metal fatigue on the track as a result of the 
liberalisation of the management and the breaking-up of responsibilities for safety. This train disaster was 
the immediate cause of the decision to shut down Railtrack Plc. which was then replaced by Network Rail 
(a private enterprise that was financed by commercial banks with a State guarantee instead of private 
investors via a stock market listing). And lastly, the Potter's Bar was found to have been caused by the 
outsourcing of infrastructure maintenance. 
22  Several competition authorities in Europe have received complaints from new entrants to the railways 
about discriminatory behaviour by the former monopolist (OECD, 2005). In February 2003, the German 
anti-trust authority began an inquiry into Deutsche Bahn's refusal to include in its systems information on 
scheduling and pricing from a competing passenger transport operator (Connex). In its turn, the Italian 
competition authority expressed its concern in a parliamentary opinion over discriminatory practices with 
respect to gaining access to stations, depots and maintenance services. And in Sweden, the competition 
authority in 1996 took legal action against Stätens Järnvägar (SJ) because of the extent to which it 
applied low prices for certain regional services where revenues were not sufficient to cover average 
marginal costs in an attempt to drive a rival private company (BK Tag, a private enterprise owned by the 
KarlssonGruppen) out of the market.  
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to achieve completely free competition. Certain counter-measures such as applying a uniform fare-
setting system or the political threat to switch over to a full vertical separation of the former 
monopolist (not just the principle of unbundled accounting but an infrastructure manager that is 
completely independent from a legal, organisational and institutional point of view) can contain 
discriminatory behaviour (Ksoll, 2004).  
 
The integration of infrastructure and the provision of services affords very little transparency when it 
comes to the cost price for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure and the 
infrastructure capacity allocation. This makes it possible to have cross-subsidisation whereby the 
loss-making activities are financed by the profitable business. For the railways, this means, for 
example, that passengers who use a profitable route subsidise those on loss-making routes. The 
price charged in the profitable segment is too high and in the subsidised segment it is too low, 
something which leads to allocative inefficiency. The number of passengers who are treated 
unfairly because they must pay too much for the profitable route will be higher than the number of 
passengers who can be gained for the loss-making route. The reason for this is that the cost per 
extra passenger on the profitable route is lower than the cost per additional passenger on the loss-
making route (Birch, Arup et al.,1998). In addition, cross-subsidisation leads to "cream skimming" 
whereby with market opening, a new entrant will only gear itself towards that part of the market 
where production costs are lowest and profits highest. By doing so, the vertically integrated firm 
can get into difficulty by taking on a section of the market that was intended to be able to bear the 
costs of the loss-making segments.   
 
The organisational structure of an enterprise has a clear impact on the intensity of performance-
based incentives and the type of contract law that is applied when concluding deals (Williamson, 
1991). Generally speaking, weaker performance incentives are associated with a transaction that is 
concluded inside an integrated enterprise than is the case with free market transactions. Indeed, 
when concluding outside contracts, much more attention is paid to profitability and result-based 
rewards than with internal transactions. In the latter case, an atmosphere of tolerance and patience 
prevails, which must be a plus point for cooperation. In comparison with the free market, incentives 
within an integrated enterprise are rather limited and have no direct influence on pay. Market 
transactions are subject to classic contract law where the identity of the various parties is irrelevant 
and the individual transactions are set out very clearly. Furthermore, when a dispute arises over 
the price or when losses are incurred as a result of delays, disruptions or the quality delivered, it is 
almost always decided to refer the case to court. In an integrated enterprise, the dispute has to be 
settled internally by the parties concerned. When applied to the liberalised railways, this means for 
example that a train operator can let the service level agreement be enforced by the law courts. 
However, when the infrastructure is a sub-division of an integrated enterprise, the focus of those in 
charge can extend not so much to punctual provision of services as to towards personal interests 
such as career and internal status, for instance (Ksoll, 2004). 
 
Vertical separation and the opening of the rail market to free and fair competition should eventually 
lead to a better provision of services at lower prices and with increasing customer satisfaction. 
Whether liberalisation really does bring advantages for the consumer is obviously not fully 
measurable and is something that is hard to prove. An inquiry into customer satisfaction among 
travellers in the Netherlands reveals that the general customer opinion has been improving over 
the years. In 2005, 67% of passengers gave a score of 7 or more as a general opinion of the 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen and, by 2010, this figure had risen to 75% of all travellers surveyed 
(Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer, 2010). Upon closer inspection, most components of general 
customer opinion (information and safety, comfort, punctuality and connections) seem to get a 
better appreciation than the "fare" component that in 2010 came down to its 2005 level (opinion of 
the price component: 6.0). According to economic theory, competition necessarily leads to a more 
efficient allocation of resources and therefore to a lower price, which does not turn out to be the 
case in reality. In the United Kingdom, where liberalisation of the railways is the furthest advanced, 
fares rise faster than inflation on an annual basis (see chart 12). Commuters pay one of the highest  
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season-ticket prices in Europe23. The government permits an annual change in fares to the price 
index figure plus 3%. Due to this mechanism, the price of a train ticket in 2012 costs 8% more than 
in the previous year24. Furthermore, this is just an average which gives train operators the flexibility 
to let fares for specific rail routes rise even further with a maximum of 5% above the price index. In 
the past, on some railway lines fares have been raised by 10% or 11%. In Germany, too, the rise in 
Deutsche Bahn AG's revenue is mainly attributed to an increase in rail fares and to a much lesser 
extent to the growth in passenger numbers. A German consumer organisation has carried out an 
analysis of a tariff system that was introduced in December 2002 and shown that this has led to 
drastic price increases for the vast majority of travellers (Link H., 2003). 
 
Chart 12  Index of rail fares in the United Kingdom (1987=100)  
 
Source: Reuters EcoWin. 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical overview shows that the liberalisation of the railways is no simple matter. On 
balance, it can even be hard to prove whether breaking up the vertically integrated enterprise is 
actually advantageous. Merkert's calculations suggest that, all in all, the transaction costs in the 
case of a split-up company turn out better than expected, but, for one thing, the assessment was 
only made for a few countries and, for another, they are all very different.  
 
Moreover, there is no hint of any potential quality loss/gain for the consumer. To put it briefly, 
despite extensive theoretical research, it has not yet been proved in practice that the consumer 
surplus increases or decreases when the vertical (monopolistic) enterprise is split up.  
   
                                                   
23   The Guardian (2010), "Rail fares could rise by 10% following latest inflation figures", 17 August. 
24   The Guardian (2011), "Inflation could push up rail season tickets by 8%", 16 August.  
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4. THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS IN BELGIUM 
4.1. REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCUMBENT RAILWAY COMPANY  
4.1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
In Belgium, the incumbent national railway company, Société nationale des Chemins de fer belges 
(SNCB), has undergone significant changes in recent years, chiefly in response to European 
Directives. 
 
In 1991, SNCB/NMBS, which until then had been a State-run company, became an autonomous 
public enterprise with the passage of the Law of 21 March 1991 reforming certain public 
businesses and became a limited liability company under public law (société anonyme de droit 
public). The law granted SNCB managerial autonomy vis-à-vis the government for those of its 
activities not considered public services. With this law, Belgium thus sought to anticipate a portion 
of the requirements of Directive 91/440/EC of July 1991. Public service obligations are defined in a 
management contract between SNCB and the State for a 3- to 5-year period; the contract is 
evaluated annually. These obligations include ensuring a minimum level of passenger service for 
the entire domestic rail network; acquiring, building, maintaining, managing and operating the rail 
infrastructure; investing in rolling stock; and a public service obligation to meet the needs of the 
nation (notably in matters of defence). These obligations are paired with goals that are regularly 
evaluated, and penalties may be imposed if the goals are not met. The management contract also 
determines the subsidies paid by the State as compensation for public service activities. In 
addition, the law requires SNCB to keep separate accounts for its public service activities and its 
other business activities. Since passage of the Law of 22 March 2002, amending the Law of 21 
March 1991, SNCB has also been required to keep separate accounts for each business segment. 
 
On 1 January 2005, SNCB was split into three distinct entities, each with equal standing in terms of 
authority: Infrabel, SNCB and SNCB-Holding25. Each of these entities is an autonomous public 
enterprise with the status of limited liability company under public law (société anonyme de droit 
public). Figure 2, which presents the structure and ownership of the group, shows that the three 
constituent companies are almost entirely owned by the Belgian State, either directly or indirectly. 
Only the Holding company, for historical reasons26, has a few private shareholders who own 
around 0.1% of voting rights, but whose ownership of share capital is insignificant27. 
 
As autonomous public enterprises, each of the three companies individually reaches a multi-year 
management contract with the State, as the unified SNCB did previously. These contracts contain 
goals to be met in a variety of areas, such as growth, safety, service quality, intermodality, 
accessibility, respect for the environment, and investment. These goals are reviewed at least once 
a year by a working group made up of representatives of the company, the relevant government 
ministries, and the General Directorate of Land transportation of the Federal Government Service 
Mobility and Transports Utility. If the goals are not met, the company must determine the reasons 
for the shortfall and inform the State what steps will be taken to correct the problem. Infrabel’s 
operating subsidy is adjusted upwards or downwards each year according to a formula in its 
management contract and depending on its performance in terms of punctuality28. 
                                                   
25   In addition to these three entities, the Railway Infrastructure Fund (RIF) was set up to house a portion of 
SNCB’s historical debt (see section 4.2.3). 
26   When it was created, SNCB-Holding took over the company number of the formerly unified SNCB. The 
Holding company is thus the official “successor” of the old SNCB, which explains the continued presence 
of shareholders in its capital. 
27   There are discrepancies regarding data on the voting rights of Holding company minority shareholders. 
The SNCB-Holding 2009 annual report (2010, p. 4) cites voting rights of 0.1% held by the private 
shareholders, whereas a report by the SNCB Group (2010, p. 62) indicates that 0.01% of voting rights are 
held by “holders of participation certificates”. 
28   Article 74 of the 2008-2012 management contract.  
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Figure 2:   Structure and share ownership of the SNCB Group 
 
Source: adapted from SNCB-Holding (2010, p. 4). 
 
Infrabel is the company that manages the railway infrastructure. In this capacity, it is responsible for 
the management, upkeep, replacement and development of railway infrastructure, as well as for 
management of the systems for the regulation and safety of this infrastructure. Infrabel is also in 
change of granting licences and train path user rights to Belgian and foreign rail operators, and for 
invoicing and collecting the associated payments. All of Infrabel’s activities are public service 
obligations (Infrabel, 2008, p. 12; Court of Audit, 2008, p. 32, p. 56)29. 
 
The new SNCB is the rail operator. It performs both public service activities and commercial 
activities. Its public service activities include principally domestic passenger transport and the 
acquisition, construction and maintenance of rolling stock for passenger transport. Its other 
activities, such as international passenger transport and freight transport, are commercial activities. 
SNCB is organised into separate divisions for domestic passenger transport (SNCB Mobility), 
international passenger transport (SNCB Europe), and freight transport (SNCB Logistics). On 
1 February 2011, SNCB Logistics became an autonomous rail operator, taking the form of a private 
limited liability company owned 93.14% by SNCB and 6.86% by SNCB-Holding. SNCB Logistics 
relies upon SNCB for certain services, such as train station operations, train driving, and equipment 
maintenance30. According to the European Commission, which authorised the deal in 2010, this 
restructuring will lead to a substantial reduction in the capacity of SNCB’s freight activities31. 
 
SNCB-Holding is the parent company of Infrabel and SNCB. It owns 100% of SNCB’s capital and 
93.6% of Infrabel’s capital (the rest is owned by the State, which nevertheless has 80% of voting 
rights plus one vote). It performs almost entirely public service activities. These include ownership 
and management of its stakes in the capital of Infrabel and SNCB, ensuring railway safety and 
security, and the acquisition, construction, maintenance and management of most of Belgium’s 
                                                   
29   Details of the public service obligations of the three group companies are listed in Table 5 below. 
30   Lloyd (2011), "NMBS Logistics uit de startblokken", 2 February. 
31   European Commission (2010), "State aid: Commission approves restructuring of SNCB's freight 
activities", Press Release IP/10/615, 26 May. 
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Ministry of Public Enterprises 
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Holding company 
Limited company under public 
law 
SNCB 
Rail operator 
Limited company under public 
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Infrabel 
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Private 
shareholders  C: 100% 
V: 99.9% 
C: 100% 
V: 100% 
C: 93.6% 
V: 20% - 1 vote 
C: 6.4% 
V: 80% + 1 vote 
V: 0.1% 
C: capital 
V: voting rights  
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train stations32, as well as the conservation of historical properties related to railway operation. 
Furthermore, the Holding company is in charge of coordinating efforts among the three group 
companies related notably to investments and IT networks. SNCB-Holding is also the employer for 
all group personnel, which it provides to its subsidiaries. In 2010, the Holding company employed 
36,500 staff (full-time equivalent), of which 54% worked for the operator, SNCB (chart 13). In 
addition to its public service activities, the Holding company performs certain commercial activities, 
such as leasing land and buildings, and managing concessions awarded in the railway sector 
(Court of Audit, 2008, p. 62). 
 
Chart 13:   Change in the number of SNCB Group workers (FTE) and allocation by company 
    following  the  restructuring  (percentages) 
 
Source: SNCB-Holding annual reports. 
Note: “Other” workers include seconded employees and the personnel of the group health insurance provider. 
 
SNCB’s new structure was not unanimously accepted. In 2004, the Council of State issued an 
opinion in which it held that the new structure, as envisaged, would not correspond to the EU 
Directives33. In March 2008, an external study on the SNCB Group’s operations, carried out at the 
request of the then Minister for Public Enterprises, Inge Vervotte, recommended a clarification of 
the group’s structure and governance model, among other things34. In January 2011, Minister 
Vervotte declared that the SNCB Group’s structure should be revised35 and that the structure and 
coordination among the three group entities contributed significantly to the poor punctuality 
performances in 201036. On 28 June 2011, following a series of network incidents in the preceding 
days37, the Minister announced that she would begin discussions in September aimed at reforming 
the Group’s structure. While acknowledging that statements by SNCB were overly defensive, she 
said that she believed that the Belgian railways’ principal problem was network saturation38. 
 
The restructuring has also been criticized within the SNCB Group. In February 2011, Jannie Haek, 
chairman of the SNCB Holding, said that splitting SNCB into three entities was costing the group 
                                                   
32  SNCB-Holding manages 37 major Belgian train stations, representing 70% of the clientele. SNCB 
manages 94 smaller stations, while Infrabel is responsible for 414 stopping points where no tickets are 
sold (L'Echo online, 2010, "Gare du Nord: cinq ans de travaux", 19 May, p. 2). 
33   Le Vif online (2008), "La SNCB dans le collimateur de l'Europe", 11 July. 
34   Le Soir online (2008), "Une structure à clarifier", 14 mai. 
35   "Toespraak minister Vervotte op nieuwjaarsreceptie NMBS-Holding", 21 January 2011, 
http://www.ingevervotte.be. 
36   "Réaction d'Inge Vervotte sur les chiffres de ponctualité", 25 January 2011, http://www.ingevervotte.be. 
37  On 27 June, rolling stock and infrastructure malfunctions left thousands of passengers stranded for 
several hours. Additional malfunctions occurred the following day. 
38   De Standaard (2001), "Vervotte wil structuur NMBS-Groep aanpakken", 29 June, p. 5. 
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€50-100 million every year due to the increased cost of IT services, communications and legal 
services, but that the break-up had not increased competition on the network. Furthermore, 
according to the group’s Strategy and Coordination Director, Alex Migom, the SNCB break-up was 
one of the principal causes of the drop in punctuality after 2005 due to a dispersal of passenger 
traffic expertise across multiple divisions and multiple companies39. Note that this estimate of €50-
100  million in annual transaction costs represents around 1% of the SNCB Group’s annual 
operating costs (see below). 
 
The railway group’s structure is also an issue at the European level. Along with Germany, Italy, 
Austria and Poland, Belgium is one of the few Member States to have opted for a holding company 
model40. In 2007, the European Commission asked Belgium for more details regarding SNCB’s 
reorganisation and, when the Belgium government’s responses were deemed inadequate, sent it 
formal notice on 26 June 2008. In the view of the Commission, Belgium had not completely and 
correctly transposed the Directives from the first railway package. It criticised notably the lack of 
institutional independence for “essential functions” (granting licences to rail companies, allocating 
train paths, infrastructure pricing and controlling the performance of public service obligations). In 
its August 2008 response to the Commission, Belgium indicated that a legislative initiative would be 
taken to fix the problem41.  
 
Seeing that the situation was not progressing adequately, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion 
to Belgium regarding, among other things, this same point: the fact that the existing structure did 
not provide the infrastructure manager with sufficient independence from the operator and the 
holding company42. According to the director of the Belgian railways regulatory department, the 
Commission appears to want to use infringement proceedings to make Member States dismantle 
the holding company model without formally requiring such in a Directive43. In March 2010, the 
Belgian government responded by approving, by Royal Decree, a change in the bylaws of 
Infrabel44. Under the new bylaws, individuals are not allowed to serve on the board of directors or 
the executive committee of Infrabel if they hold a position at SNCB, SNCB-Holding, or another 
railway company. 
 
In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the implementation of the first 
railway package45. In this Resolution, the Parliament denounced the fact that 22 Member States, 
including Belgium, had still not completely transposed the Directives from the first railway package 
and urged the Commission to take immediate legal action against the Member States in question. 
The Commission responded, referring 13 Member States to the European Court of Justice for 
inadequate implementation of the first railway package, notably a lack of independence for the 
infrastructure manager46. The group of 13 included France, Germany and Spain, but not Belgium. 
Thus, it appears that Belgium’s transposition of the first railway package was satisfactory in the 
eyes of the Commission.  
 
                                                   
39   De Standaard (2011), "Splitsing spoorwegen kost alleen maar geld", 27 April, p. 44. 
40  European Commission (2009, p. 19), Commission staff working document accompanying document to 
the report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on monitoring development 
of the rail market, SEC(2009) 1687. 
41   Schouppe, E., (2008), "La mise en demeure de la Commission européenne relative au premier paquet 
ferroviaire", 26 August, accessible at http://www.etienneschouppe.be/index.php?id=80&L=1. 
42  European Commission (2009), "Commission warns Member States over lack of implementation of the 
'first rail package'”, press release IP/09/1438, 8 October. 
43   De Tijd (2009), "Spoorliberalisering scoort goed", 10 October, p. 5. 
44  Royal Decree of 15 March 2010. 
45  European Parliament Committee on Transport and Tourism (2010), "Adoptions in plenary 14-17 June 
2010, Strasbourg", TraNNews no. 70, 23 June. 
46  European Commission (2010), "Rail services: Commission legal action against 13 Member States for 
failing to fully implement first railway package", press release IP/10/807, 24 June.  
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On 17 September 2010, the Commission adopted a proposal to overhaul the first railway 
package47 (see section 2). The proposal did not condemn the holding company model, despite the 
reservations expressed by the then European Commissioner for Transport Siim Kallas. Mr Kallas 
had stated in July 2010 that the Commission had problems with the corporate structure of 
Deutsche Bahn (which, like SNCB, has a holding company model) because, in his opinion, it did 
not guarantee the independence of the DB Netz infrastructure manager vis-à-vis the other 
subsidiaries within the holding company48. The press release49 issued by the Commission at the 
time of the overhaul proposal, however, said that it plans to look into the possibility of strengthening 
the requirements for institutional separation between infrastructure managers and railway 
operators. Thus, the holding company model could be called into question in the future. 
 
4.1.2. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BELGIAN RAIL MARKET 
 
In Belgium, the rail market has opened up progressively, nudged along by the various EU 
Directives targeting the sector (Table 3). The rail freight market was completely liberalised on 
1 January 2007; by contrast, with respect to passengers, only the international passenger transport 
market has been liberalised, since 1 January 2010. 
 
Table 3:   Belgian rail market liberalisation 
 
Date 
 
Market liberalisation 
 
Belgian legal basis 
 
European legal basis 
1997  x International groupings including a 
Belgian railway company for providing 
international transport services (freight 
and passengers) 
x International combined transport of 
goods 
RD of 5/2/1997  Directive 91/440/EC 
15/03/2003  International freight transport on the 
Trans-European network 
RD of 12/3/2003  Directive 2001/12/EC 
01/01/2006  International freight transport on the entire 
European rail network 
Law of 4/12/2006  Directive 2004/51/EC 
01/01/2007  All freight,  including  domestic  Law of 4/12/2006  Directive 2004/51/EC 
01/01/2010  International  passenger  transport  RD of 19/5/2009  Directive 2007/58/EC 
Source: NBB. 
 
To operate in the Belgian market, a railway company must meet several conditions50. To begin 
with, it must be recognised as a railway company, which means it must have a railway licence. 
These licences are valid throughout the European Union. In Belgium, licences are granted by the 
Mobility Ministry (in practice, by the Directorate for Rail Transport of the Directorate General for 
Road Transport). Then, the railway company must have a safety certificate issued by the national 
safety authority (in Belgium, the Department for Railway Safety and Interoperability). This 
certificate contains two parts: a general part (Part A) valid throughout the European Union, and a 
specific part (Part B) valid in the Member State. Furthermore, the railway company must have rail 
capacity (train paths) allocated by Infrabel's Rail Access Directorate. Lastly, to ensure efficient use 
of the network, the railway company must sign a user agreement with the Rail Access Directorate. 
The national railway regulator, whose creation is mandated by the first railway package (see 
section 2.2), is the Regulatory Service for Railway Transport and for Brussels Airport Operations, 
created in 2004. It is under the direct administrative authority of the Minister (or Secretary of State) 
for Mobility, but the minister does not exert direct line authority over the regulator. 
 
Until 2003, SNCB was the only rail operator active in Belgium. In 2004, one year after the 
liberalisation of international freight on the Trans-European network, Dillen & Le Jeune Cargo 
                                                   
47   COM(2010) 475. 
48   Le Lloyd (2010), "'Le secteur ferroviaire doit renoncer à ses privilèges''', 22 July, p. 12. 
49   COM(2010) 474. 
50   Website of the Regulatory Service for Railway Transport and for Brussels Airport Operations, accessible 
at http://www.regul.be/fr/content/march%C3%A9-0.  
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(DLC, now Crossrail) became the first rail operator to challenge the incumbent operator 
(Descheemaecker, 2010). Since then, other operators have entered the Belgian market. 
 
At 1 January 2011, in addition to SNCB, Belgium counted 13 recognised rail operators, all 
operating in freight transport, with the exception of Eurostar. However, this does not mean that 
there are that many players in the Belgian market, because not every company with a licence to 
operate in Belgium is actually active there, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:   Railway companies with a licence to operate on the Belgian network (at 01/01/2011) 
 
Company 
 
Safety 
certificate 
 
Actually 
operating on 
the Belgian 
network 
 
Shareholders 
 
Nationality 
SNCB  yes  yes  Belgian State  BE 
Crossrail Benelux  yes  yes  Crossrail AG (100%), but 
with private Belgain 
shareholders 
CH/BE 
Captrain Benelux*  yes  yes  SNCF (French State)  FR 
Trainsport AG  yes  yes  Two private shareholders 
(50%) and Rurtalbahn GmbH 
(50%)  
BE/DE 
ERS Railways  yes  yes  AP Möller - Maersk Group  DK 
Eurostar 
International Ltd 
yes  yes**  SNCB, SNCF and L&C 
Railways 
BE/FR/UK 
Euro Cargo Rail  yes  no  Deutsche Bahn AG  DE 
Railtraxx  yes  no  Private  BE 
DB Schenker Rail 
Nederland 
yes  yes  Deutsche Bahn AG  DE 
Rail Feeding  yes  yes  Genesee & Wyoming Inc  US 
SNCB Logistics  yes  yes***  SNCB and SNCB-Holding***  BE 
ACTS Nederland  no  no  Husa Capital  NL 
CFL Cargo  no  no  Joint venture between CFL 
(Luxembourg State) and 
Arcelor Mittal 
LU 
CMI Traction  no  no  Cockerill Maintenance & 
Ingénierie 
BE 
Source: FPS Economy (2010), Railway regulator. 
*   Since January 2010, Captrain Benelux has comprised the freight subsidiaries of SNCF operating in Benelux (SNCF Fret 
Benelux, Veolia Cargo Belgium, Veolia Nederland and ITL Benelux). 
**   Since 1 September 2010, Eurostar has been a standalone railway company (see below). 
***  Since 1 February 2011, SNCB Logistics has been an autonomous rail operator owned 93.14% by the SNCB and 6.86% 
by SNCB-Holding. 
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4.1.2.1. Freight 
 
Rail is the third most widely used transport method for freight in Belgium, far behind road haulage 
and just after river transport. In 2009, 12.5% of goods were transported by rail, compared with 
12.9% in 1996 (chart 14), a year in which rail was the second most widely used transport mode. 
Subsequently, volumes transported by rail stagnated until 2003, whereas inland waterway transport 
grew briskly, doing a better job than rail transport of taking volumes away from road transport, 
which has been declining steadily since 2001 (chart 15). 
 
Chart 14:   Breakdown of freight transport modes in Belgium (percentages based on tonne- 
kilometres) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
Chart 15:   Freight transport trends in Belgium (index based on tkm, 1995 = 100) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
Note: statistical change in 2000 for road. 
 
From 2004, one year after the start of the market liberalisation process, rail transport of goods 
began to experience strong growth which culminated in 2007, a year in which transport volumes 
represented 9.3 billion tonne-kilometres; volumes then plunged in 2009 due to the economic crisis. 
The year 2007 also saw the first significant volumes transported by new entrants, at 1.1 billion 
tonne-kilometres, or 12% of the market (chart 16). The volumes transported by alternative 
operators did not contract by as much as those transported by the incumbent operator (-16% 
against -33% between 2007 and 2009), which allowed them to boost their market share to 14.7% in 
2009 (in tkm). 
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Chart 16:   SNCB freight traffic (tkm bn) and market share trends (percentages based on tkm) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011), SNCB annual reports, own calculations. 
 
Despite the drop in its market share, SNCB remains by far the dominant player. Chart 17 shows 
the trend in market share among the various railway freight operators active in Belgium based on 
train-kilometres. In 2010, the incumbent operator held 88.2% of the market. The two biggest 
alternative operators in terms of market share were Crossrail (6.3% in 2010) and Captrain (4.3% in 
2010). 
 
Chart 17:   Railway freight market share in Belgium (based on royalties paid for actual train- 
kilometres travelled) 
 
Source:   The Regulatory Service for Railway Transport and for Brussels Airport Operations (2009), and its website for 2009 
and 2010 data. 
Note:  In January 2010, SNCF Fret Benelux, Veolia Cargo and R4Chem, all three subsidiaries of the SNCF, were combined 
under the name Captrain. 
 
Some perspective is needed on the current importance of new rail operator entrants. Not all of the 
companies authorised to operate on the Belgian network actually do so, and most active 
companies have a very modest market share. Some are only active in niche segments of the 
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freight market. For example, the Trainsport company operates almost exclusively on the Aix-la-
Chapelle to Antwerp line. The Rail Feeding company operates in Belgium only along short 
distances to and from the port of Antwerp51. 
 
According to the FPS Economy (2010), the market share of the incumbent operator in Belgium52 is 
comparable to that of the incumbent operator in France (90%), where liberalisation began at the 
same time as in Belgium53. By contrast, it is higher than that of the incumbent operator in 
neighbouring countries, where the liberalisation process began much earlier, such as the 
Netherlands (75%), Germany (78%) and the UK (55.8%). 
 
Crossrail and Captrain, SNCB’s biggest rivals in terms of market share, are international railway 
companies with subsidiaries in several European countries. As shown in table 7, Crossrail Benelux 
and Captrain actually belong to Crossrail AG and SNCF respectively. Crossrail AG focuses on the 
Alpine corridor, linking Belgium and the Netherlands to Italy via Germany and Switzerland. SNCF is 
Europe’s second-largest freight transporter54 and has locomotives operating in France, Spain, 
Benelux, Germany and Italy, among others55. On 17 April 2010, DB Schenker Rail Nederland 
operated its first train on the Belgian network (Infrabel, 2011). This signals the arrival of a 
heavyweight, because the company is a subsidiary of Germany’s incumbent operator, Deutsche 
Bahn, the European leader in rail freight56.  
 
It should therefore be noted that in Belgium, the competition brought about by rail market 
liberalisation is coming principally from major international rail groups. As such, rail market 
liberalisation could transition the rail freight market from a situation of multiple national monopolies 
to a European oligopoly. Moreover, in its 2006-08 trading report, the Belgian railway regulator 
raised questions about the competition implications of the trend towards consolidation among 
railway companies in Europe57. 
 
However, the opening of the Belgian rail freight market to competition does not mean that all of the 
barriers to entry have been lifted. According to the FPS Economy (2010), while the situation has 
been improving for several years and Infrabel’s allocation of rail capacity is more unbiased than 
before, certain obstacles remain in practice. The FPS Economy (2010, pp. 33-34) summarised 
them in a recent report, drawing on interviews with sector stakeholders. 
 
With respect to train path allocation, it appears that passenger transport takes priority over freight 
in Belgium, which is causing problems on certain stretches due to a lack of train paths. 
 
There is also a shortage of train drivers and, according to sector stakeholders, public authorities 
have not made any effort to encourage workers to adopt the profession, as they have in other 
critical professions, such as lorry driving. In addition, there is little incentive for SNCB drivers to 
transfer to a private sector rail operator because SNCB personnel enjoy an advantageous 
employment status. Furthermore, language barriers remain a problem for train drivers, and 
sometimes force a change of driver when crossing borders. 
 
The FPS Economy (2010, pp. 33-34) also points out several barriers to entry with respect to rolling 
stock. For example, it notes that there is no market for used rolling stock and that SNCB apparently 
                                                   
51   Havenvanantwerpen.be (2011), "Antwerp Rail Feeding rijdt 'last mile' in Antwerpse haven", Nieuwsbrief 
#24. 
52   Based on royalty payments for train-kilometres actually travelled. 
53   See section 5. 
54  http://fret.sncf.com. 
55   SNCF (2010), "Captrain, la nouvelle marque européenne des activités ferroviaires de la branche SNCF 
Geodis", Perspectives Fret, no. 16, March, pp. 8-9. 
56  http://www.dbschenker.com. 
57   Regulatory Service for Railway Transport and for Brussels Airport Operations (2009, p. 12).  
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will not sell rolling stock it is no longer using to its competitors. In addition, the rolling stock approval 
process in Belgium is not without encumbrances. According to the FPS Economy, there are 
problems with the price, procedures and timeframe of the approval process. Lastly, diesel refuelling 
stations are controlled by SNCB and are not available to new rail operators, which makes it hard for 
competitors to refuel their diesel locomotives. Private rail operators thus get their fuel from Rail 
Service Net (a Crossrail company) or other suppliers, who bring fuel to the tracks in tanker trucks. 
At present, both Infrabel and Havenbedrijf Antwerpen are looking for solutions to this problem. 
 
4.1.2.2. Passenger transport 
 
Unlike for freight, the modal portion of rail passenger transport has been growing steadily since 
1996. In 2009, 7.4% of passenger-kilometres in Belgium were travelled via rail, putting it third 
behind car and bus (chart 18). Over the past 20 years, the train and bus are the two forms of 
transport with the strongest growth in terms of passenger-kilometres, with respectively +59% and 
+64% (chart 19). While car passenger-kilometres have also risen, its modal share has fallen over 
the same period, to 78.7% in 2009. 
 
Chart 18:   Modal breakdown of passenger transport in Belgium (percentages based on pkm) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
Chart 19:   Passenger transport trends in Belgium (index based on pkm, 1990 = 100) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
Even though the international passenger transport market has been liberalised since 1 January 
2010, no rail operator has yet tried to compete with SNCB in Belgium. Rail operators appear to 
favour cross-border alliances over head-on competition. As such, international passenger transport 
through Belgium is still done principally via two joint ventures: Eurostar Group Ltd and Thalys 
International SCRL. Eurostar Group is a partnership between Belgium (SNCB owns a 5% stake), 
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France (SNCF owns 55%) and the UK (London & Continental Railways owns 40%)58. Until 
31 August 2010, Eurostar Group Ltd marketed Eurostar trains on behalf of the three partners, 
which financed the operating costs of Eurostar Group Ltd (SNCB 2010b, p. 98). On 1 September 
2010, Eurostar became a standalone railway company, christened Eurostar International Ltd59. 
The Eurostar network links Belgium, France and the UK, passing through the Channel Tunnel. 
 
The German operator Deutsche Bahn (DB) is also interested in the Channel Tunnel rail link and 
could use it for a Frankfurt-London line with its high-speed ICE trains by the end of 2012, which 
would be a departure from the system of partnerships currently in place. On 13 October 2010, DB 
performed a test run using an ICE3 train in the Channel Tunnel. This was the first time one of the 
German operator’s trains had passed through the tunnel60. 
 
Thalys International SCRL is an alliance between the incumbent operators in Belgium (SNCB, 
28%), France (SNCF, 62%) and Germany (DB, 10%)61. Thalys International provides commercial 
rail transport for passengers on behalf of SNCB, SNCF and DB between Paris, Brussels, 
Amsterdam and Cologne. 
 
SNCB also has bilateral agreements with foreign operators covering the operation of cross-border 
routes, such as those signed with the SNCF for TGV lines into France and Dutch operator NS High 
Speed for a new Fyra high-speed line to the Netherlands62, for which commercial service was 
expected to start in late 201163. A partnership with the Deutsche Bahn also lets the SNCB offer 
tickets for ICE trains linking Belgium and Germany. 
 
In 2009, Thalys and Eurostar accounted for respectively 66% and 21% of revenues for SNCB 
Europe (SNCB’s international passenger transport division), compared with 7% from TGV (SNCB 
2010b, p. 137). 
 
In addition to these partnerships, the Railteam project was launched on 2 July 2007. Railteam is a 
joint effort by the incumbent operators in Germany, France, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Switzerland. The goal of the alliance is to facilitate high-speed train travel in Europe 
and to ensure uniform standards of service and quality throughout the network64. 
 
4.2. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The goal of this section is two-fold. First, it aims to assess the impact that reorganisation of the 
incumbent railway company has had on its financial structure. Second, it analyses the extent to 
which the incumbent operator is equipped to deal with the sector’s liberalisation, considering the 
strengths and weaknesses of the company’s financial situation. 
 
The indicators used for the analysis include, in addition to the group’s revenues and results, the 
trend in total debt and operating costs, as well as selected financial ratios. These data are taken 
from the annual accounts and begin prior to the 1 January 2005 restructuring. Past and expected 
changes in subsidies are also analysed on the basis of management contracts signed between the 
SNCB Group companies and the State. These last data are available from 1992 and include 
forecasts for 2008 to 2012. 
                                                   
58   SNCF (2010, p. 5). 
59  La Libre.be (2010), "Avec son nouveau statut, Eurostar veut s'attaquer à de nouveaux marchés", 1 
  September. 
60   Treinreiziger.nl (2010), "ICE voor het eerst door kanaaltunnel", 13 October. 
61   Thalys International (2010, pp. 16-17). 
62   La Libre.be (2010), "La SNCB et la grande vitesse à l'international, une stratégie en mode mineur", 29 
  January. 
63  http://www.b-europe.com/Voyager/Trains/Fyra/En%20g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral. 
64  http://www.railteam.fr/a-propos-de-nous/notre-alliance/.  
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4.2.1. REVENUES AND SUBSIDIES 
 
4.2.1.1. Revenues and results 
 
Splitting up the unified SNCB into three separate legal entities boosted the group’s revenues from 
€2.2 billion in 2004 to €5.2 billion after the split-up in 2005. As shown in chart 20, the Holding 
company is the company with the highest revenues (€2.4 billion in 2010), followed by SNCB the 
operator (€2.2 billion) and Infrabel (€1.1 billion). 
 
Chart 20:   SNCB Group company revenues 
  (€ million) 
Chart 21:   Net results of SNCB Group   
  companies (€ million) 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office).  Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
 
Chart 22:   Operating results of the SNCB Group by division (€ million) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
 
Infrabel is the only company in the group that has earned a net profit every year, apart from a 
€3 million loss in 2010 (chart 21). SNCB the operator, by contrast, has earned a net loss every 
year. In 2010, the loss amounted to €216 million. In 2010, the cumulative losses of the three group 
companies totalled €420 million, by far the largest loss since the group’s creation in 2005. The 
operating result by business sector (chart 22) shows that SNCB freight transport is the principal 
source of the group’s poor result. Unlike the losses posted by Infrabel and by the SNCB public 
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service arm, the €201 million loss by the freight activity cannot be offset by subsidies (see below), 
so the operating loss is directly reflected in the net result. 
 
4.2.1.2. Subsidies 
 
In the European Union, public subsidies to companies are governed by Community law. Article 87, 
paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Rome states that in principle, State subsidies are considered 
incompatible with the common market because they can result in unfair competition. However, 
certain exceptions are possible, and Article 73 of the Treaty even explicitly provides an exception 
for subsidies that “meet the needs of co-ordination of transport or if they represent reimbursement 
for the discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service”. 
 
As a result, the subsidies paid to the SNCB Group must be used exclusively for public service 
activities, while any other State aid must be explicitly approved by the European Commission. In 
practice, however, the SNCB Group’s current structure does not permit complete transparency 
regarding intragroup financial flows, and certain subsidies that cross between public service 
activities and commercial activities have been condemned by the Court of Audit and by the SNCB 
Board of Auditors65. The restructuring of SNCB’s freight division (see above) is likely to improve 
transparency. Note that the restructuring calls for financial support measures by the State, virtually 
all of which will go to finance the surcharge related to the employment of the permanent staff and 
taking on the past debt. This State assistance was approved by the Commission66.  
 
The subsidies paid to SNCB are cited, along with the public service activities they are intended to 
fund, in the management contracts signed with the State. The first management contract between 
the State and the SNCB was signed in 1992, the year after the SNCB was made an autonomous 
public enterprise. Since 2005, the State has signed a separate management contract with each of 
the SNCB Group companies. In addition to this assistance, subsidies were paid to the Railway 
Infrastructure Fund (RIF) between 2005 and 200867 that were to be used, along with the Fund’s 
other revenues, to repay the principal and interest of debt that was transferred to the Fund before 
being transferred back into the State’s accounts. All together, the subsidies paid to the railway 
sector amounted to €1.5 billion annually on average between 1992 and 2004, and to €3 billion 
annually on average since the reorganisation of sector institutions68 (chart 23). Between 1992 and 
2012, assistance increased by an average of 4.5% annually. 
 
The sector’s restructuring has thus been accompanied by a significant increase in the subsidies it 
receives. In 2005, RIF received more than €2 billion in subsidies to repay debts falling due during 
that year and pay interest on other debt. Splitting the SNCB into three entities also contributed to 
the rise in subsidies. Whereas the unified SNCB received €1.7 billion in subsidies in 2004, that 
amount increased to €2.6 billion in 2005 for the group as a whole, a 52% increase. Subsequently, 
                                                   
65   The Court of Audit (2008) has noted that public financing was not spent entirely or exclusively on public 
service activities by the companies of the SNCB Group during the period 2005-2007. For 2008 and 2009, 
see the respective reports of the Board of Statutory Auditors (SNCB 2009b and SNCB 2010a). 
66   European Commission (2010), "State aid: Commission approves restructuring of SNCB's freight 
activities", press release IP/10/615, 26 May. 
67   For lack of a management contract (which should have been signed between the State and the Railway 
Infrastructure Fund because of its status as an autonomous public company), amounts for the subsidies 
paid to the Fund are taken from its annual accounts. 
68   Not counting the amounts paid by the State for pensions and work-related accidents (around €550 million 
each year, of which less than €1 million for work-related accidents). In 2005, all of the costs of the SNCB 
Group’s pension fund were transferred to the State, which pledged to fund them (royal decree of 
28 December 2005) in exchange for a one-time payment of €295 million to cover sums not paid by the 
State for which the SNCB Group was responsible each year. The amounts related to financial obligations 
of the State linked to alternative financing operations stipulated in the first and second management 
contracts were not assumed either. For information, these obligations represented €22 million in 1996 and 
€13 million in 1999, to give just two examples (Court of Audit 2001, p. 193).  
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RIF’s subsidy payments decreased substantially (to €150 million in 2006 and 2007 and €358 billion 
in 2008) before being eliminated entirely when its debt was transferred back to the State. 
 
Chart 23:   Past and future estimated State subsidies to the SNCB Group and Railway  
Infrastructure Fund (in millions of current euro, and in millions of 2008 euro from 2008) 
 
Source: management contracts, RIF annual accounts, Court of Audit (2001), own calculations. 
Note:  Amounts paid by the State for pensions and work-related accidents, as well as for the alternative financing 
operations stipulated in the first and second management contracts, are not included. 
 
An examination of the trend in subsidies by category (chart 24) shows that over the years there has 
been a relative decrease in operating subsidies for infrastructure in favour of investment and other 
operating subsidies. Since the creation of Infrabel, operating subsidies for infrastructure have 
actually declined in absolute terms, from €680 million in 2004 to €457 million in 2005 (-33%). 
Furthermore, between 2005 and 2008, a portion of these operating subsidies (some €300 million) 
was paid to RIF each year as compensation for usage of the infrastructure owned by the Fund (see 
above) and thus was not spent on infrastructure operations per se, because those operations were 
not a part of RIF’s remit. In 2009, when the Fund was restructured, the annual rent paid by Infrabel 
to RIF was halted; Infrabel became the network owner, and the subsidy paid to Infrabel was 
reduced by an equivalent amount (-€332 million). Infrabel also receives royalty payments from rail 
operators who use the network, and these are its principal source of income. They amounted to 
€491 million in 2005 and €627 million in 200969, and increased each year (+28% over the period). 
In keeping with the spirit of the applicable European regulatory framework70, the State is thus 
gradually withdrawing from funding infrastructure operations, giving the manager greater financial 
autonomy. Whereas rail infrastructure operating subsidies made up the majority of subsidies (51%) 
in 1992, they will represent only 6% in 2012 according to forecasts. 
 
Since its restructuring, the SNCB Group has received between €2 billion and €3 billion in subsidies 
each year (chart 25). On average, over the period 2005-2012, 43% of subsidies have gone to 
SNCB the operator, 35% to Infrabel and 21% to SNCB-Holding. 
 
In addition to these subsidies, the federal State has created a system of financial assistance for rail 
freight operators, approved by Europe71, to promote combined transport by rail. This assistance 
                                                   
69   See Infrabel (2006, 2008 and 2010). 
70   Notably Directive 2001/14/EC (see section 2.1.). 
71   State Assistance no. N 249/2004, OJ 2005 C280/9; State Assistance no. 656/07, OJ 2008 C43/2; State 
Assistance no. N 571/08, OJ 2009 C164/1. 
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has been available since 2005 and is expected to continue until 2012, and has an annual budget of 
€30 million (€15 million in 2005)72. 
 
Chart 24:  Past and future estimated State subsidies to the SNCB Group by category 
   (percentages) 
 
Source: management contracts, Court of Audit (2001), own calculations. 
Note 1: Amounts paid by the State for pensions and work-related accidents, as well as for the alternative financing 
operations stipulated in the first and second management contracts, are not included. 
Note 2: Excluding subsidies paid to RIF. 
Note 3: From 2005, infrastructure operating subsidies are the operating subsidies paid to Infrabel. 
 
Chart 25:  Past and future estimated State subsidies to the SNCB Group companies (in millions  
    of  current  euro,  and  in  millions  of  2008  euro  from  2008) 
 
Source: 2008-2012 management contracts. 
 
State subsidies are split between operating subsidies and investment subsidies. The breakdown 
differs for each group company, as shown in chart 26. SNCB receives principally operating 
subsidies, whereas Infrabel receives principally investment subsidies. The breakdown for the 
Holding company is more balanced. According to forecasts, we note that at the overall group level 
there has been a relative increase in investment subsidies, which became a majority in 2010.  
 
                                                   
72  This assistance for combined rail-road freight transport is not new. Between 1993 and 2004, State 
assistance to SNCB already included similar assistance of around €250,000 almost every year. 
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Chart 26:   Past and future estimated State subsidies to the SNCB Group by category 
   (percentages) 
 
Source: 2008-2012 management contracts. 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
85% 83% 77% 75% 80%
70%
62% 66%
15% 17% 23% 25% 20%
30%
38% 34%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009e 2010e 2011e 2012e
SNCB
Operating subsidies Investment subsidies
45% 40% 39% 38%
16% 20% 22% 19%
55% 60% 61% 62%
84% 80% 78% 81%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009e 2010e 2011e 2012e
Infrabel
Operating subsidies Investment subsidies
25%
52%
39% 35% 38% 41% 44% 43%
75%
47%
61% 64% 62% 59% 56% 57%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009e 2010e 2011e 2012e
SNCB-Holding
Operating subsidies Investment subsidies
54% 60% 55% 52% 52% 47% 47% 46%
46% 40% 45% 48% 48% 53% 53% 54%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009e 2010e 2011e 2012e
Group
Operating subsidies Investment subsidies 
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  43
Since SNCB was split up, the operating subsidies paid to SNCB the operator have averaged 39% 
of its revenues, close to the 1992 level of 41% (chart 27). The percentage fell to 35% in 2010 
following an increase in the rail company’s revenues, in line with the average percentage from 
before SNCB was split up (34%). 
 
Chart 27:   Operating subsidies and revenues of SNCB the operator (€ million) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office), SNCB management contracts, Court of Audit (2001), own calculations. 
 
Chart 28 shows how the operating subsidies are used. For each of the three group companies, the 
lion’s share of the operating subsidy is made up of the annual base subsidy intended to offset the 
costs of the companies’ basic public service activities. On top of the base subsidy are additional 
operating subsidies used to cover specific public service activities. The basic public service 
activities of each of the three companies are listed in Table 5. 
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Chart 28:  Past and estimated future usage of operating subsidies over the period 2005-2012 
    (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2008-2012 management contracts. 
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Table 5:   Basic public service activities of the three SNCB Group companies. 
Company 
Basic public service activities 
(according to the management contracts) 
 
SNCB 
 
x  Supplying ordinary domestic and cross-border passenger trains 
x  Reduced tariffs for domestic passenger transport and discounts for 
persons qualifying as beneficiaries for reasons of social security, 
national service, profession and Europe (listed in the management 
contract) 
 
   
Infrabel  x  Acquiring, building, replacing, maintaining and managing railway 
infrastructure 
x  Managing systems for infrastructure regulation and safety 
x  Supplying rail operators with services as defined in the Law on 
infrastructure* 
x  Pricing, invoicing and collecting royalties for rail infrastructure usage and 
services provided to rail operators 
x  Allocating available rail infrastructure capacity in accordance with the 
principles and procedures set out in the Law on infrastructure* and its 
implementation decrees 
 
 
SNCB-Holding 
 
x  Ownership and management of its stakes in the capital of SNCB and 
Infrabel 
x  Safety and security in the rail sector 
x  Acquiring, building, maintaining and managing rail stations and 
surrounding buildings 
x  Conservation of historically important assets related to the railway 
network 
x  Coordination among the three group companies 
x  Providing personnel to the two other SNCB Group companies, as 
SNCB-Holding remains the sole employer to ensure employees a single 
status and a focal point for labour relations 
x  Meeting the needs of the Nation (listed in the management contract) 
 
Source: 2008-2012 management contracts. 
* Law of 4 December 2006 on rail infrastructure usage. 
 
Investment subsidies are granted based on a multi-year investment plan corresponding to the 
period covered by the management contract. Details regarding the usage of these subsidies for the 
period 2008-2012 are shown in chart 29. SNCB principally uses its investment subsidies to acquire 
rolling stock (76% of the planned use of these investment subsidies), whereas Infrabel uses them 
mostly to expand network infrastructure (55%). The Holding company uses them chiefly for train 
stations and parking areas (50%). For the group as a whole, infrastructure expansion is the biggest 
use of investment subsidies, at an estimated 38% for the period 2008-2012. 
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Chart 29:  Planned use of investment subsidies over the period 2008-2012 (percentages) 
 
Source: 2008-2012 management contracts, own calculations. 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
4.2.2. OPERATING COSTS 
 
Chart 30 shows the trend in the SNCB Group companies’ operating costs. To put these costs into 
perspective, the trend in the associated revenue level is also included.  
 
Chart 30:   Operating costs of the SNCB Group companies and associated revenues (€ billions) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
As already mentioned, all SNCB Group personnel are employed by SNCB-Holding. Thus, it is not 
surprising to note that personnel costs are the principal component of that company’s operating 
costs. Services and other goods represent virtually all of the costs of SNCB and Infrabel. At the 
group level, personnel costs were stable after the restructuring, but the cost of services and other 
goods increased sharply (+479%) following the creation of the new SNCB and Infrabel, which 
resulted in invoicing between companies for services that had previously been performed internally 
(see below). As a result, the proportion of these two items in total costs was reversed from 2005. 
Whereas personnel costs represented 63% of SNCB operating costs in 2004, they represented 
only 33% in 2005, whereas the share of services and other goods rose from 19% in 2004 to 59% in 
2005. 
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Consolidated group figures allow us to see that costs rose sharply from 2005, from €3.1 billion to 
€6 billion, a 90% increase. The costs of the unified SNCB, now SNCB the operator, admittedly fell 
by €0.96 billion, or 31%, but it makes sense to add in the costs of SNCB-Holding and Infrabel, 
which jointly amounted to €3.8 billion in 2005. The cost increase, however, was accompanied by a 
proportional increase in associated revenues (+87%). Thus, it appears that the restructuring of the 
SNCB resulted in a significant increase in the group’s activities in terms of both income and 
expenses. Moreover, it appears that the two items moved generally in line with each other from one 
year to the next at the group level. For SNCB, by contrast, costs tended to rise faster than 
revenues, particularly from 2008 (increase in services and other goods). At Infrabel, operating 
income and costs were roughly balanced until 2008. In 2009 and 2010, income fell due to weaker 
sales, whereas operating costs rose due to depreciation and impairments on fixed assets (line 
630), resulting in a negative operating result. This increase in operating costs at Infrabel is reflected 
at the group level, where other costs were higher in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Chart 31:   Operating costs of the SNCB Group by business segment and associated revenues  
    (€  billions) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
 
An analysis of annual accounts by business segment (chart 31), however, gives a completely 
different picture of the costs and revenues of the SNCB Group before and after restructuring73. We 
note that the totals gleaned from the statutory annual accounts (by line) are smaller than the sum of 
the segments in the annual accounts by business segment (by column), particularly in 2003 and 
2004. One possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that the statutory annual accounts 
indicate consolidated figures for the business segments, thus stripping out services internal to the 
company. Operating costs remained stable between 2004 and 2005, in contrast to the preceding 
chart. Consolidated operating costs of the SNCB Group companies thus appear to be comparable 
to costs under the unified SNCB, when internal costs between business segments are taken into 
account. 
 
                                                   
73   In an analysis of the SNCB annual accounts by business segment from 2003 and 2004, it may come as a 
surprise that there is no “support activities” sector in the income statement, even though this sector does 
appear on the balance sheet. The Board of Auditors reports for the annual accounts of 2003 and 2004, 
however, state that with respect to the accounts by business segment, “together, the income statements 
of the five client business segments [Domestic passengers, Infrastructure, International passengers, 
Freight and ABX] encompass all of the income and expenses of SNCB” (see respectively SNCB 2004, 
p. 25 and SNCB 2005, p. 19). This means that all of the income and expenses of the support activities are 
spread among the five activity segments included in the income statement. As a result, for the purposes 
of comparing 2003 and 2004 figures with those from after the SNCB’s restructuring, it makes sense, from 
2005, to consolidate the figures of SNCB the operator with those of Infrabel and the Holding company. 
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Chart 31 also allows us to break down by business segment the discrepancy between operating 
income and charges of the SNCB rail operator shown in chart 30. While the three activity segments 
mostly show a negative operating result, it is the freight sector, the market for which is liberalised, 
that has the biggest deficit each year in relative terms (with the exception of 2007). Over the entire 
period under revue, the sector exhibits average operating costs 20% higher than its income, 
compared with 9% and 5% respectively for domestic and international passenger transport. This 
imbalance widened after the restructuring, up from 14% on average in 2003-04 to 24% in 2005-10. 
The operating deficit in freight was particularly severe in 2009, with charges exceeding income by 
45% compared with 18% for domestic passenger transport and 9% for international passenger 
transport. The situation worsened again in 2010, when freight operating costs exceeded operating 
income by 51%. 
 
The SNCB rail operator’s productivity, expressed as the ratio between the number of workers 
(FTE) and the number of passenger-tonne-kilometres (ptkm) travelled74, has been falling since 
2008 due to the drop in SNCB traffic while headcount has been stable75 (chart 32). The difference 
in headcount trends between the operator and the group as a whole is responsible for the slightly 
more pronounced drop in productivity at the railway company compared with the group. 
 
Chart 32:  Number of workers (FTE) and productivity (index, 2005 = 100) at SNCB the 
    operator  and  the  SNCB  Group 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office), SNCB annual reports and own calculations. 
 
4.2.3. DEBT76 
 
SNCB’s restructuring provided an opportunity to clean up the incumbent railway company’s 
finances, as required by the European Commission77. Part of the historical financial debt of the 
former SNCB was transferred to an entity separate from the SNCB Group created for this purpose 
with autonomous public enterprise status, the Railway Infrastructure Fund (RIF). In exchange, this 
entity was given ownership of some of the land and rail network of the former SNCB as it existed at 
                                                   
74   Passenger-tonne-kilometres are the sum of passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres. They are used to 
measure total traffic, by adding together passenger traffic and freight traffic. 
75   While all SNCB Group personnel are included in the annual accounts of the Holding company, which is 
the Group’s sole employer, it is possible to determine the number of workers assigned to SNCB the 
operator in that company’s annual reports. 
76   Unless otherwise stated, the debt used is the total debt, line 17/49 on the balance sheet. The Group’s 
debt is obtained by adding together the debts of the individual companies and so is not equal to the 
consolidated net debt as defined in the management contracts. 
77   As indicated in the section on the European legal framework, European directives allow the creation of a 
separate debt amortisation unit for the purposes of cleaning up incumbent railway company finances. 
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the time of the split. This part of the network was made available to Infrabel in exchange for an 
annual rent payment. 
 
In July 2008, three months after the RIF debt was reclassified in the national accounts78, the State 
decided to take over the Fund’s long-term debt to rationalise its management by pooling it with the 
rest of the public debt79. The railway infrastructure that belonged to RIF was transferred to Infrabel 
on 31 December 2008, and the Fund was transformed into a limited company charged with 
managing the land that had been transferred to it. All of the shares of the Fund issued at this time 
went to the State, who transferred them to the Federal Holding and Investment Company, a limited 
liability company (SA/NV) under public law. 
 
The SNCB Group’s total debt (line 17/49) experienced a structural increase during the period under 
review (chart 33). Between 2000 and 2005, it rose by an average of 20% per year (including RIF 
debt), including a spike in 2004 (+26%) due to the 1 January 2004 absorption of Financière TGV, a 
financing vehicle used to fund the TGV high-speed train project in Belgium. 
 
Chart 33:   Debt* of SNCB Group companies and RIF (€ millions) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
 
The portion transferred to RIF was €7.4 billion, or 60.8% of the €12.2 billion in pre-restructuring 
SNCB debt. This transfer made it possible to stabilise the overall debt level of the SNCB Group and 
RIF (+1% per year in 2006 and 2007) due to a clean-up of the debt transferred to the Fund. In 
2008, the transfer of RIF’s long-term debt back to the State (RIF kept only its short-term debt, 
which amounted to €24 million) resulted – for the first time in the period under review – in a drop in 
the total debt of the SNCB Group and RIF, which fell to €11.1 billion at 31 December. The debt 
then increased slightly in 2009 (+2%) due to the substantial increase in debt at SNCB the operator 
(+94%), even though debt fell at Infrabel and the Holding company. The second decrease in debt, 
observed in 2010, was due to a change in accounting methods at the Holding company as a result 
of which the alternative financing operations that had previously been included in liability 
adjustment accounts disappeared from the balance sheet. In 2009, these operations amounted to 
€3.2 billion. 
                                                   
78   According to Belgian national accounting methods, the RIF debt was not initially considered public debt in 
the sense of Maastricht, and so the transfer did not have an impact on Belgian public debt. However, in 
April 2008, this methodology had to be adapted to comply with Eurostat’s interpretation and the debt 
transfer to RIF had to be booked as a public expense. This change resulted in the Belgian public deficit in 
2005 being restated from 0.2% of GDP to 2.6%, and the public debt from 90.4% of GDP to 92.1% 
(Institute of National Accounts, 2008, pp. 97-98). 
79   Council of Ministers press release of 25 July 2008. 
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A breakdown of the SNCB Group’s debt by source (charts 34 and 35) clearly shows the decrease 
in the group’s financial debt following the restructuring. It also shows, in chart 35, that the Holding 
company took in the balance of the financial debt, such that SNCB and Infrabel were able to get off 
the ground without any financial debt. 
 
Chart 34:  Debt* of the SNCB Group by source (€ millions) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
Chart 35:  Debt* of the SNCB Group by source (percentages) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
At the group level, most of the debt stems from financial debt and, through 2009, liability 
adjustment accounts80, which principally include the alternative financing operations with the 
Holding company. As we mentioned above, the debts related to these operations were no longer 
included in the Holding company’s balance sheet in 2010 following a change in accounting 
methods. Accounting method changes also explain much of the increase in the Holding company’s 
                                                   
80   The adjustment accounts on the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet include income and charges 
booked during the financial year in respect of a subsequent financial year. These are generally charges 
that are spread over several financial years, as well as deferred income and charges. 
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financial debt, and thus that of the group, in 2010. The increase in the group’s financial debts in 
2010 is also attributable to SNCB the operator, whose financial debts have risen sharply since 
2008 (+1,265%), to the point where they became the principal type of debt in 2010, ahead of trade 
debts. The latter remain the principal type of debt at Infrabel. 
 
The charts below show the breakdown of SNCB Group debt by business segment, first in absolute 
terms (chart 36), then in relative terms for the SNCB Group (chart 37) and SNCB the operator 
(chart 38). In 2004, when SNCB was a unified entity, most of the debt was split between 
infrastructure (45%) and support activities (28%). These two sectors together totalled €8.8 billion of 
debt. In 2005, the company’s reorganisation and the transfer to RIF significantly altered the 
breakdown of debt among the group’s various business segments. For example, the portion of debt 
related to infrastructure fell to 6% of total debt with the creation of Infrabel, whereas debt stemming 
from support activities jumped to 87% if we include the debt of SNCB-Holding81. Debt related to 
transport (passengers and freight) has fallen considerably under the new structure, from €2.4 billion 
to €0.6 billion (-74%). 
 
However, the reduction was not accomplished to the same extent for all three of the operator’s 
business segments. Whereas the debt of the freight transport segment and that of the international 
passenger transport segment fell by respectively 86% and 91% between 2004 and 2005, that of 
the public service passenger transport activity fell by only 36%. As a result, debt related to the 
public service activity has taken on much greater importance in the overall debt of SNCB the 
operator, climbing from 28% in 2004 to 68% in 2005 (chart 38). In light of these figures, we can 
assume that when SNCB was restructured, it sought to reduce the debt burdens of the segments 
whose markets were to be liberalised by more than that of the segment that would remain a public 
service. 
 
Chart 36:  Debt* of the SNCB Group by business segment (€ millions) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
Note 1: For 2008, 2009 and 2010, the total balance sheet debt of SNCB listed by business segment do not correspond to 
the total debt of SNCB’s statutory balance sheet. 
Note 2: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
Between 2005 and 2007, the debts of the rail operator’s three segments fluctuated within the same 
proportions (chart 36), which explains the lack of change in the breakdown of debt seen in chart 38. 
In 2008, debt related to freight transport more than doubled (+148%) to 32% of the operator’s debt, 
close – in relative terms – to its 2004 level of 39%. This trend, which continued in 2009 and 2010, 
                                                   
81   Note that the activities of SNCB-Holding are probably not entirely equivalent to what was called “support 
activities” under the unified SNCB. 
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is worrisome for SNCB in a freight market where the operator faces greater competition every year 
(see above). 
 
Chart 37:  Debt* of the SNCB Group by business segment (percentages) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
Note: Figures for the individual group companies are added together to produce group figures. 
 
Chart 38:  Debt* of SNCB the operator by business segment (percentages) 
 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Total debt = balance sheet line 17/49. 
 
As shown in chart 33, the operator’s debt increased significantly in 2009 and 2010 in all three 
business segments (chart 36), such that in relative weight of each segment’s debt did not change 
much. The weight of the public service activity, however, increased marginally to 71% of the 
operator’s total debt in 2009 and 68% in 2010. Of the SNCB operator’s three business segments, it 
is the public service activity that made the biggest contribution to its debt between 2008 and 2010, 
with an increase of 248% compared with 130% for freight transport and 188% for international 
passenger transport. 
 
4.2.4. ANALYSIS OF THE RATIOS 
 
Analysis using ratios makes it possible not just to study debt and costs, but to get a fuller picture of 
SNCB’s financial health before and after its reorganisation. We have looked at ratios covering 
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value added (Table 6), profitability (Table 7), solvency (Table 8) and investments (Table 9). The 
formulae used to calculate these ratios are provided in Annex 1. 
 
At the overall SNCB Group level, we note few changes in the value added ratios after the 
restructuring, apart from those related to interest expense. As a reminder, much of the group’s debt 
was transferred to RIF, which explains the sizeable drop in Ratio 3 from 2005. The value added 
ratios are often unavailable for SNCB the operator because the company’s value added is negative 
every year except 2007, when interest expense as a share of value added was much higher at 
SNCB than at Infrabel or the Holding company. 
 
Personnel costs as a share of value added (Ratio 1) are fairly high. This ratio actually rose 
significantly in 2009 at the group level due to a drop in value added whereas personnel costs 
remained constant. 
 
Table 6 also highlights the high level of depreciation, value impairments and provisions as a share 
of value added (Ratio 2) at both Infrabel and SNCB. The ratios of over 100% (except in 2005 for 
Infrabel) mean that net value added82 is negative for the two companies. Among the few figures 
available by SNCB business segment, we note that passenger transport as a public service activity 
had a strongly negative net value added in 2005 and 2006, unlike other passenger transport, where 
the ratio was under 100%. 
 
Table 6: Value added ratio for SNCB Group companies (percentages) 
   
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
1  Share of staff costs in 
value added 
SNCB-Holding      91.8  91.3  89.9  89.9  93.2 
Group  87.2  85.9  91.7  88.8  86.4  90.6 105.4 
2  Share of allocations to 
depreciation, 
impairments and 
provisions for 
contingencies in  
value added 
SNCB-Holding      3.8  2.1  2.7  2.4  8.6 
SNCB          979.6     
o/w F               
o/w PSP      1717.6  547.6       
o/w OP          57.8  70.9   
Infrabel      98.1 133.1  138.1 122.4 533.9 
Group  16.5  14.6  14.7  13.1  11.1  15.1  33.7 
                  
3  Level  of  borrowing 
costs in relation to  
value added 
SNCB-Holding      5.2  6.7  7.9  8.1  6.1 
SNCB          25.5     
Infrabel      0.7  1.9  0.7  1.0  2.4 
Group  9.4  12.5  5.3  6.7  7.7  8.3  7.3 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
Note 1: Ratios for the individual group companies are added together to produce group ratios. Before 2005, the group refers 
to the unified SNCB. 
Note 2: Empty cells = figures unavailable. 
Note 3: F = freight transport; PSP = public service passenger transport; OP = other passenger transport. Based on annual 
accounts by business segment. 
 
Table 7 shows that the group’s profitability improved after the restructuring, even though with the 
exception of 2007, net return on equity after tax (Ratio 4) remained negative. This trend in the ratio 
is chiefly attributable to two factors. On the one hand, financial year losses at the group level were 
lowered, principally through a substantial increase in the capital subsidies granted by public 
authorities and recorded in the income statement (line 9125 in the annual accounts); from around 
€10 million per year before the restructuring, these rose to more than €200 million for the group as 
a whole between 2005 and 2007, €475 million in 2008 and €2.2 billion in 2009. In addition, the 
significant increase in share capital (paid-in capital and capital subsidies) following the creation of 
                                                   
82   Net value added is obtained by subtracting depreciation, value impairment and provisions for 
contingencies and charges from gross value added. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “value added” 
refers to gross value added.  
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the new structure made it possible to reduce the size of losses relative to equity capital and thus 
improve the ratio. 
 
Table 7: Profitability ratios of the SNCB Group companies (percentages) 
   
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
4  Net return  on 
equity after tax 
SNCB-Holding      -0.7  -3.6  2.4  -3.9  6.9 
SNCB  -1615.1
g -709.0
g  -2.7  -2.2  -0.5  -3.9  -14.8 
o/w F  -33070.3  -16622.0  -9.6
e  -9.7
e  -5.4
e  -16.7  -40.5 
o/w PSP  -581.7  -166.0  -0.1
e  0.3
e  0.2
e  -2.2  -11.8 
o/w OP  -3458.6  -892.3  -7.7
e  -4.9
e  2.4
e  1.7  -9.3 
Infrabel*  44.0  108.3  1.2  0.9  1.2  0.8  0.5 
Group  -8.6  -17.6  -0.5  -0.9  0.9  -0.6  -1.5 
5  Net return  on  total 
assets before tax 
and debt charges 
SNCB-Holding      1.0  0.8  1.8  0.8  2.1 
SNCB      -2.1  -1.6  -0.4  -3.0  -9.6 
Infrabel      1.1  0.8  1.1  0.8  0.5 
Group  -0.8  -0.5  0.4  0.3  1.2  0.2  -0.5 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Before 2005, Infrabel refers to the “Infrastructure” segment of the unified SNCB, based on annual accounts by business 
segment. 
e Estimate. 
g Composite ratio for the F, PSP and OP segments, based on annual accounts by business segment. 
Note 1: Ratios for the individual group companies are added together to produce group ratios. Before 2005, the group refers 
to the unified SNCB. 
Note 2: Empty cells = figures unavailable. 
Note 3: F = freight transport; PSP = public service passenger transport; OP = other passenger transport. Based on annual 
accounts by business segment. 
 
Looking at the companies individually, we note that Infrabel is the only group company with a 
positive net return on equity after tax each year. This performance is due to the subsidies it 
receives from public authorities and books in its income statement (line 9125 of the annual 
accounts), which more than offset a perennially negative operating result (line 9901 of the balance 
sheet). The Infrabel ratios for 2003 and 2004 refer to the infrastructure division of the then-unified 
SNCB, and are thus taken from SNCB’s accounts by business segment, which makes them hard to 
compare with ratios in subsequent years. The SNCB Infrastructure division had around 30 times 
less capital than Infrabel but a higher annual result, which changes the ratio’s order of magnitude 
substantially. 
 
For SNCB the operator, the subsidies it receives do not allow it to offset operating losses, except in 
2007, when exceptional costs (value impairments to non-current financial assets) nevertheless 
contributed to a negative annual result. SNCB ratios by business segment show that the only 
sector in which SNCB faces competition (see below), the freight transport segment, has the 
weakest profitability and has been a drag on the operator since 2007. This is also the only segment 
to experience negative profitability each year. Despite the subsidies, the public service passenger 
transport segment is barely profitable, generating only a weakly positive margin in 2006 and 2007. 
International passenger transport, which is not subsidised, managed to turn a profit in 2007 and 
2008. 
 
The holding company posted an operating profit each year from 2005 to 2008, but the profit was 
wiped out by financial and exceptional results in 2005, 2006 and 2008, which explains the negative 
sign for ratio 4 in those years. Paradoxically, the only year in which the holding company earned a 
negative operating result was the year for which the company has the highest profitability ratio (6.9 
in 2009). The operating loss was offset by subsidies from public authorities (line 9125), which 
increased significantly that year, to €248 million from €55-60 million per year in earlier years. 
 
The same conclusions can be drawn from analysing the net return on total assets before tax and 
interext expense (Ratio 5). The absence of interest expense in calculating this ratio explains why it 
is positive where ratio 4 is negative. Note that taxes do not affect the differences between ratios 4 
and 5, because SNCB Group companies did not pay any taxes during the period in question.  
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The group’s solvency (Table 8) improved significantly after the railway company’s restructuring and 
has not stopped improving since. As a reminder, part of the group’s debt was transferred to a 
separate fund, then to the State. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, group equity capital increased 
substantially following the creation of the new SNCB and Infrabel. These two factors explain the 
relatively solid solvency of Infrabel and, to a lesser extent, that of SNCB. The holding company’s 
solvency is not as solid because it was the entity that took over most of the debt the group had in 
2005, which explains why its solvency deteriorated from that year onward.  
 
At the level of SNCB the operator’s business segments, the freight transport division has had the 
weakest solvency each year, and its solvency deteriorated considerably in 2009. Since 2006, the 
international passenger transport division has been more solvent than the public service passenger 
transport activity. 
 
Table 8: SNCB Group companies’ solvency ratios (percentages) 
Source: NBB (Central Balance Sheet Office). 
* Before 2005, SNCB-Holding and Infrabel refer to the “Support activities” and “Infrastructure” segments of the unified 
SNCB, based on annual accounts by business segment. 
e Estimate. 
g Composite ratio for the F, PSP and OP segments, based on annual accounts by business segment. 
Note 1: Ratios for the individual group companies are added together to produce group ratios. Before 2005, the group refers 
to the unified SNCB. 
Note 2: F = freight transport; PSP = public service passenger transport; OP = other passenger transport. Based on annual 
accounts by business segment. 
 
Infrabel has the highest investment ratios (Table 9). As the infrastructure manager, Infrabel must 
invest in the infrastructure every year (TGV, RER, capacity maintenance and expansion, etc.). 
Infrabel’s investment ratios were significantly higher in 2005, the year in which some of the former 
SNCB’s property, plant and equipment was transferred to the infrastructure manager, and in 2008, 
due to the transfer to Infrabel of RIF assets (principally property, plant and equipment) as part of 
the transfer of RIF debt to the State (see above). As a result of these transactions, the group’s 
investment ratios ballooned in those two years. 
 
Table 9: SNCB Group companies’ investment ratios (percentages) 
   
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
7  Acquisitions of tangible 
fixed assets in proportion 
to value added 
SNCB-Holding      7.3  8.8  19.8  20.0  44.3 
SNCB          3362.4     
Infrabel     3298.6 1412.9 1023.8  7730.0 1990.6 
Group  65.8  67.9  247.8  55.7  67.2  364.7  128.3 
8  Acquisitions of tangible 
fixed assets in proportion 
to tangible fixed assets 
at the end of the 
previous year 
SNCB-Holding      1.3  16.6  31.0  30.5  76.7 
SNCB        7.4  10.4  14.4  15.0 
Infrabel        41.8  25.2  194.4  10.8 
Group  14.2  13.7  42.5  21.5  20.6  100.0  17.5 
Source: Central Balance Sheet Office. 
Note 1: Ratios for the individual group companies are added together to produce group ratios. Before 2005, the group refers 
to the unified SNCB. 
Note 2: Empty cells = figures unavailable. 
 
In conclusion, an analysis of ratios shows that restructuring the railway company has had material 
consequences in terms of solvency, profitability and investments. Solvency improved and the 
   
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
6  Solvency  SNCB-Holding*  43.9 27.2  17.1  16.6  17.3 14.7 16.4 
SNCB  0.8
g 0.6
g  77.0  75.0  80.5 78.7 66.2 
o/w F  0.0  0.0  73.3
e  72.7
e  80.0
e  61.1  47.1 
o/w PSP  2.0  1.8  78.0
e  75.4
e  80.4
e  78.9  64.2 
o/w OP  0.4  0.3  77.0
e  76.9
e  81.5
e  81.7  71.7 
Infrabel*  3.0  3.1 87.4 87.0 87.6 93.6 94.6 
Group  24.8 12.3  47.2  48.1  50.3 59.2 59.6  
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weight of interest expense relative to value added decreased following the transfer of a portion of 
SNCB’s historical debt to RIF. The group’s profitability improved due chiefly to the increase in 
subsidies booked in the income statement (line 9125 of the annual accounts). Lastly, investment 
ratios increased substantially due to the transfer of certain assets (when the subsidiaries were 
created and RIF was restructured), which inflated the measurement for acquisition of property, 
plant and equipment. Thus, it appears that the principal changes reflected in these ratios are rather 
artificial in nature. 
 
Furthermore, the SNCB Group is characterised by relatively good and improving solvency, and 
high investment ratios, but also by a significant level of personnel costs relative to value added; 
moreover, at Infrabel and SNCB the operator, net value added is negative. 
 
Analysing the ratios by SNCB business segment confirms the poor financial health of the freight 
division, which was already apparent from a review of the total debt and operating costs of the rail 
operator. These results are particularly worrisome for SNCB considering the liberalisation of the 
freight market, where competition is steadily increasing. 
 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
For Belgium, the rail reform initiated by the European Union has resulted in significant changes for 
the incumbent rail operator, but has not materially altered the Belgian rail transport landscape. 
 
While still owned by the State, in 2005 SNCB changed from a unified structure to a holding 
company model in which the rail operator – SNCB – and the infrastructure manager – Infrabel – are 
held by a parent company – SNCB-Holding. This holding company structure can raise questions 
regarding the companies’ independence in crucial areas of infrastructure management vis-à-vis the 
incumbent operator, especially because only five Member States have opted for such a model. In 
the case of Belgium, however, European authorities have for now dropped their concerns regarding 
the model. 
 
Despite the liberalisation of the freight market in 2003, SNCB still had a market share of more than 
80% in 2010. That said, its share has been declining steadily since 2006 due to the expansion of its 
two principal rivals, Crossrail and Captrain (SNCF subsidiary). The precarious position of the 
SNCB’s freight division compared with the operator’s other business segments in terms of 
operating result, solvency and profitability (which is negative every year), and the deterioration of 
its financial situation in 2008 and 2009 (increase in total debt and operating deficit, decrease in 
profitability and solvency) are unlikely to strengthen the incumbent operator’s position in this 
market. Moreover, we note that 2009, which was particularly poor in financial terms for SNCB 
Logistics, was also the year in which the operator saw its biggest decline in market share. 
However, plans to spin off the SNCB’s freight division into a subsidiary and scale back its activities 
could change the situation. 
 
Considering the number of companies authorised to operate on the Belgian rail network, it is likely 
that there will be other competitors to enter the freight market, even though certain barriers to entry 
remain from a practical standpoint. These new players, often subsidiaries of international 
corporations, raise the question of the impact that competition is having on the consolidation of 
European railway companies. With respect to passenger transport, the international market for 
which was liberalised on 1 January 2010, no company has yet emerged to challenge SNCB’s 
monopoly in Belgium. Rail operators appear to prefer cross-border alliances to head-on 
competition, as witnessed by the agreements between SNCB and its various foreign partners to 
operate Thalys and Eurostar trains, which are SNCB’s principal source of revenues in this market. 
However, Deutsche Bahn’s desire to compete with Eurostar in the Channel Tunnel may at some 
point challenge this policy of partnerships among European operators. 
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The reorganisation of rail sector institutions has also led to a substantial increase in the subsidies 
that it receives. These rose from an average of €1.5 billion over the period 1992-2004 to €3 billion 
on average in 2005-12 according to management contract estimates. Infrastructure operating 
subsidies, however, have decreased in order to give Infrabel greater financial autonomy. For the 
SNCB Group, we note that the lion’s share of the €2 billion to €3 billion in subsidies it receives 
every year (past and forecast) go to SNCB the operator. The operator receives principally 
operating subsidies, unlike Infrabel and the Holding company, which receive mostly investment 
subsidies. The operating subsidies received by the rail operator represent around 40% of its 
revenues, which is a higher ratio than before the restructuring. 
 
A financial analysis of the SNCB Group allowed us to identify several points of concern. The 
group’s total debt has experienced a structural increase over the period under review (2000-2010). 
When the railway company was restructured, the transfer of a portion of its debt to a separate fund 
(and then later to the State) did enable the group to substantially lower its debt, but did not reverse 
the upward trend, such that in 2009, total group debt was again approaching its pre-restructuring 
level. 
 
The composition of total debt and its breakdown by business segment also changed significantly 
after the restructuring. In 2004, the unified SNCB’s debt was principally financial in nature, whereas 
from 2005, adjustment accounts – basically comprising the Holding company’s alternative financial 
operations – took up the biggest share. With respect to business segments, there has been a 
reallocation of debt at two levels. At the group level, first of all, the majority of the debt remaining in 
SNCB’s accounts was taken over by the Holding company at the time of the reorganisation. As a 
result, the support activities (performed by the Holding company) became responsible for a majority 
of the debt, even though in 2004 most of the debt was related to infrastructure activities. 
Furthermore, at the level of SNCB the operator, public service passenger transport activities are 
now responsible for the majority of the company’s debt; prior to the restructuring, the breakdown of 
debt was relatively balanced among the three business segments (freight transport, public service 
passenger transport, and other passenger transport). 
 
The restructuring of the incumbent rail operator appears to have gone hand in hand with a 
significant increase in its revenues and associated costs. However, when internal costs are taken 
into consideration, based on the annual accounts by business segment, we note that revenues and 
associated costs remained fairly stable. Trends in the group’s operating income and costs were 
similar, except for SNCB, whose revenues are significantly lower than its costs every year. This 
operating deficit is principally due to the operator’s freight division, which exhibits the biggest 
operating deficit in relative terms every year (with the exception of 2007). 
 
In addition to examining debt and costs, an analysis of SNCB’s annual accounts by using ratios 
highlights the changes in the company’s financial structure before and after its restructuring on the 
one hand, and developments in subsequent years on the other. The improvements in solvency and 
profitability that followed the restructuring have been, like the improvement in investment ratios, 
rather artificial (debt transfers, increased subsidies, intragroup asset sales). However, the group’s 
solvency has continued to improve over the years due to an increase in equity capital and despite 
rising debt, driven by good solvency at Infrabel and, to a lesser extent, SNCB the operator. The 
group’s profitability has improved but, by contrast, remains either negative or slightly positive, 
depending on which ratio is used. The group is also characterised by high personnel costs as a 
share of value added and, for Infrabel and the SNCB rail operator, negative net value added. 
    
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  58
5. THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS IN FRANCE 
5.1. REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCUMBENT RAILWAY COMPANY  
5.1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
In France, the incumbent rail operator is Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF). It 
has had the status of state-owned industrial and commercial enterprise (Etablissement public 
industriel et commercial, or EPIC) since 1983. Under this legal framework, SNCF is controlled by 
the French State (Transportation Ministry and Economic and Finance Ministry), with whom it 
decides upon project specifications and multi-year “planning contracts”. The separation between 
the rail operator and the infrastructure manager required by Directive 91/440 was enacted by Act 
no. 97-135 of 13 February 1997 "creating the State-owned entity Réseau Ferré de France (RFF) 
for the purpose of reorganising French rail transport”. As its name suggests, the new law gave birth 
to RFF, the new rail infrastructure manager. This new EPIC was placed under the authority of the 
same ministries that oversee SNCF (Figure 3). RFF was given ownership of the rail infrastructure, 
then valued at €22.4 billion, in exchange for assuming a portion (€20.5 billion) of SNCF’s debt 
(Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 111)83.  
 
Figure 3: Institutional organisation of the rail sector in France 
 
Source: NBB. 
 
This reorganisation was unique in many ways. To begin with, the transfer of rail infrastructure 
ownership did not go smoothly, giving rise to a lawsuit between SNCB and RFF. For more than a 
decade, the two companies have been unable to agree on the scope of the asset transfer, which is 
quite a concern for two companies whose activities are closely linked and must work together on a 
daily basis. 
 
In addition, the debt taken over by RFF was not recorded in the public debt in the sense of the 
Maastricht treaty, even though RFF belongs to the State. This accounting distinction was critical, 
because 1997 was the year in which France had to qualify for euro zone membership. The 
argument made for excluding RFF’s debt from public debt had to do with the company’s revenue 
source. Under French national accounting standards, the royalty payments railway companies 
make to RFF to use the rail network are considered to be a sale of services. Because the total 
royalty payments represent more than half of its operating costs, RFF is classified in the national 
accounts as a commercial enterprise, outside the scope of public administration (Cour des 
comptes, 2008, p. 3). Here we can see the difference with Belgium, where Eurostat insisted that 
the SNCB debt assumed by RIF (which does not receive royalties) be classified as public debt 
under Maastricht (see chapter 4). 
                                                   
83   The option under Directive 91/440 of creating a separate debt amortisation unit in order to clean up the 
finances of incumbent railway companies had already been exercised in France in 1991 with the creation 
of the Special Debt Amortisation Service (Service annexe d'amortissement de la dette, or SAAD). 
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But the real uniqueness of the French case is in the breakdown of tasks between RFF and SNCF. 
The transfer of infrastructure ownership and management to RFF was not accompanied by a 
transfer of human resources due, according to the Cour des comptes (2008, p. 3), to agreements 
with unions that have always fought for a unified SNCF. Whereas around 55,000 SNCF employees 
out of a total of 170,000 were assigned to infrastructure in 2006 (Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 2), 
RFF has fewer than 800 employees (Table 10). RFF thus outsources much of its duties to SNCF, 
which is consequently the delegated infrastructure manager. According to the Cour des comptes 
(2008, p. 2), this situation is “unique in Europe, and perhaps in the world”. As a result, there is a 
legal separation between infrastructure management and network operation, as required by the 
European Union, but not a de facto one. 
 
Table 10: Number of employees at the SNCF and RFF EPICs (units) 
   
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
SNCF (EPIC)*  180,254 175,328 170,868 168,313 166,140 163,417 161,710 157,832 
RFF  521  588  691  761  843  939  1,166  1,299 
o/w personnel 
provided by SNCF 
85  88  86  73  73  68  61  62 
Source: RFF annual reports and SNCF Group financial reports. 
* Excluding personnel provided to RFF. 
 
RFF is the project manager for network investment projects. In this respect, RFF is responsible for 
funding, developing and extracting value from the French rail network (railways, 
telecommunications facilities, buildings used for operations and maintenance), and orders and 
pays for work done by the general contractor. RFF can perform its duty of project manager directly 
or delegate it to a representative, usually SNCF. 
 
Furthermore, RFF sets the targets for the following duties, which French law84 requires it to 
delegate to SNCF (Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 15):  
x  technical studies necessary when reviewing train path requests and creating the circulation 
chart85; 
x  operational management of circulation (switching stations) and traffic regulation and safety 
systems;  
x  monitoring, maintenance, repairs and other measures necessary to network operation and 
safety. 
 
The first two duties (circulation chart and circulation management) correspond to “operating” the 
network, and the third, to network “maintenance”. An agreement must specify how these duties are 
to be defined, executed and compensated. The first duty is critically important in the context of 
opening the market to competition, because it is a step in the process of allocating train paths, 
which is RFF’s responsibility. Involving the incumbent operator in this task may call into question 
the neutrality of the procedure for allocating infrastructure capacity among the various operators. 
 
RFF compensates SNCB for network management, whereas SNCF pays RFF royalties (tolls) for 
infrastructure usage. In 2007, for example, RFF paid €3.8 billion to SNCF, which paid €2.7 billion in 
tolls to RFF86. The function of these royalties is three-fold (Crozet 2010). First of all, they allow a 
reduction in the subsidies that the State pays to the infrastructure manager. In addition, the tolls are 
also a signal to users. In high-traffic areas, train paths are a scare resource and access costs are 
one way to reflect this scarcity and encourage the incumbent operator to boost productivity in order 
to use the resource efficiently, while also regulating demand and financing a portion of capacity 
                                                   
84  Decree of 5 May 1997 implementing the Act of 13 February 1997. 
85   The circulation chart shows all available train paths and their usage throughout the year. 
86  http://www.sncf.com/.  
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investments. But tolls also work to protect the incumbent rail operator (Crozet, 2010; Gómez-
Ibáñez and de Rus, 2006). The higher the toll, the less likely competitors are to step forward. As 
Crozet (2010) explains, there is a trade-off between developing the network and encouraging 
competition among operators. Encouraging competition lowers costs for users. This means 
lowering access costs to a level equal to the marginal cost. Because this is a constraint on the 
public funding activity, it reduces network development. On the other hand, protecting the public 
funding activity through high tolls encourages more network development, but puts a damper on 
competition.  
 
In France, the continual rise in tolls since their introduction in 1997 (Table 11) has not encouraged 
the emergence of new operators, particularly for the high-speed TGV, which is by far the type of 
train that accounts for the largest share of RFF infrastructure access revenues. Tolls for TGV trains 
are much higher in France than in neighbouring countries (chart 39), which could mean that France 
has chosen to promote network development and the State-owned SNCF and RFF companies 
rather than cultivate competition. The high level of tolls, which for rail operators represent a cost of 
around 25% to 40% of revenues in the case of TGV trains (Nash 2009, pp. 18-19), also explains 
why international high-speed rail lines are run in partnership with other railway companies rather 
than through head-on competition. 
 
Table 11: Infrastructure access royalty revenues (€ millions) 
   
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2008e 
TGV   
211 
139  616  635  752  897  934  993  944  1245 
Long-
  distance 
  passenger 
  trains 
126  154  156  154  165  151  198  163  164 
Regional 
  express 
  trains 
85  94  130  134  143  215  224  459  468  515 
Serving 
  greater 
  Paris 
  region 
430  462  457  472  481  488  506  545  529  573 
Freight  132  150  148  151  155  143  125  225  159  202 
Other  34  -  -  -  -  46  38  41  22  31 
Total  892  971  1505  1548 1685 1954 1978  2461  2579  2730 
Source: Gómez-Ibáñez and de Rus (2006), Cour des comptes (2008). 
 
In addition to the level of royalty amounts, the criteria used to set them may also prove a 
disadvantage to competing companies. In particular, the Cour des comptes (2004, p. 261; 2008, p. 
51) noted that SNCF’s “contributive capacity” is taken into account when setting toll amounts. The 
consideration given to one network user’s contributive capacity is not justified by economic theory. 
Contributive capacity also depends on the user’s other costs, those of its potential competitors, and 
the effectiveness of its commercial strategy. But tolls should reflect infrastructure costs and not the 
competitiveness of each railway company (Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 53). According to Gómez-
Ibáñez and de Rus (2006, pp. 93-94), between 1997 and 2003, the amount of royalties paid was in 
practice determined after the fact, once SNCF’s annual costs were known. This situation changed 
in 2004, when a system of setting tariffs two years in advance was adopted. 
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Chart 39: Access costs for a typical inter-city high-speed passenger train (€/train-km) 
 
Source: International Transport Forum (2008). 
 
The institutional reorganisation of the French rail system has been criticized both in France and at 
the European level. In France, the Cour des comptes (2008) and a report by Senator Haenel 
(2009) condemned the bilateral monopoly situation into which the law has placed RFF and SNCF. 
For example, RFF is both the sole supplier of access to the network for SNCF, the rail operator, 
and the sole client of SNCF’s infrastructure division, supplier of infrastructure management 
services to RFF. This mutual dependence and divergent interests (on compensation owed by RFF 
to SNCF or liberalisation of the network, for example) is a source of ongoing conflict between the 
two EPICs which is detrimental to the smooth operation of the rail network. The Cour des comptes 
(2008) also lamented the unclear division of tasks between SNCF and RFF, which has led to 
confusion regarding responsibilities and a host of malfunctions with respect to, for example, setting 
timetables, allocating train paths and scheduling infrastructure work. Gómez-Ibáñez and de Rus 
(2006), on the other hand, believe that coordination at the operating level between infrastructure 
operation and management is facilitated by the fact that these tasks are entrusted to a single entity, 
i.e. SNCF. 
 
The structure of French entities is also a concern for European authorities. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, in June 2010 the Commission referred France to the European Court of Justice for 
inadequate transposition of the first railway package, and notably a lack of independence for the 
infrastructure manager87. 
 
5.1.2. DEVELOPMENT ON THE FRENCH RAIL MARKET 
 
France transposed the first railway package Directives with the Decree of 7 March 2003 “regarding 
use of the national rail network”. The rail freight market was then completely liberalised on 31 
March 2006, or nine months before the deadline imposed by the second railway package. Opening 
the market ahead of schedule was the condition imposed by the European Union for authorisation 
of €800 million in State assistance intended to restructure the freight division of SNCF (Haenel 
2009, p. 18). 
 
To operate in the French market, companies must have a licence and a safety certificate before 
they can request train paths from RFF. Licences are issued by the Transportation Ministry, 
                                                   
87   The referral to the Court of Justice marked the beginning of a legal phase of proceedings for failure to 
fulfil an obligation initiated by the Commission against the Member State. It follows a pre-litigation phase, 
also referred to as “infringement proceedings”, officially comprised of two stages: the formal notice and 
the reasoned opinion. Only the pre-litigation phase was launched against Belgium. 
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whereas safety certificates are issued by the Etablissement public de sécurité ferroviaire (EPSF), 
the French rail safety authority. This entity is an administrative public authority reporting to the 
Transportation Ministry88. In addition, the Railway Activities Regulatory Authority (ARAF), the 
national regulator, is in charge of making sure that railway companies’ network access is equitable 
and non-discriminatory. The ARAF can issue rulings, resolve disputes or levy penalties. The 
authority was created in December 2009 in accordance with Directive 2001/14/EC, but the actual 
start of its principal duties was postponed by the Law89 of 1 December 2010, so it did not really 
begin operating until 2011, according to its website90. 
 
Table 12: Railway companies operating in France (at 18 July 2011) 
 
Company 
 
Date current safety 
certificate was issued 
 
Date commercial service 
launched 
B-CARGO (SNCB subsidiary)  5 July 2007  11 December 2006 
EURO CARGO RAIL (DB 
Schenker Rail Group) 
30 September 2010  13 May 2006 
(under EWSI’s certificate) 
SNCF  28 June 2007  Prior to delivery of certificate 
VFLI (SNCF Participations 
Group) 
3 October 2007  4 October 2007 
CFL CARGO (CFL and 
Arcelor Mittal subsidiary) 
13 December 2007  4 February 2008 
COLAS RAIL (rail division of 
the Colas Group) 
31 July 2008  8 January 2007 
(under SECO RAIL’s 
certificate) 
TSO  4 March 2009  29 July 2009 
TRENITALIA  31 March 2010  22 February 2011 
TRAIN DU PAYS CATHARE 
ET DU FENOUILLÈDES 
(TPCF) 
19 May 2010  22 July 2010 
CFR  21 July 2010  19 November 2010 
EUROSTAR 
INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
(SNCF = 55%) 
30 August 2010  1 September 2010 
EUROPORTE CHANNEL 
(Eurotunnel Group) 
29 October 2010  26 November 2007 
(under Europorte 2’s 
certificate) 
EUROPORTE FRANCE 
(Eurotunnel Group) 
4 November 2010  13 June 2005 
(under CFTA – Cargo’s 
certificate) 
ON SITE RAIL FRANCE 
(SNCB subsidiary) 
18 November 2010  18 November 2010 
CROSSRAIL BENELUX  25 November 2010  Launch scheduled for 2011 
RENFE  27 June 2011  21 December 2010 
SNCB LOGISTICS  14 April 2011  14 April 2011 
ETF SERVICES  27 June 2011  5 July 2011 
COMSA RAIL TRANSPORT  11 July 2011  Launch scheduled for 2011 
Source: www.securite-ferroviaire.fr, Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation (2011). 
                                                   
88  http://www.securite-ferroviaire.fr/ 
89   Article 62 of Act no. 2010-788 of 12 July 2010 "regarding national environmental commitments", known as 
the "Grenelle II Act”. 
90  http://www.regulation-ferroviaire.fr/  
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The railway companies active in the French market are listed in Table 12. All of these companies 
operate in the freight market, with the exception of Eurostar and the incumbent Spanish operator, 
RENFE. However, these two companies do not really compete with SNCF in passenger transport, 
because SNCF is a majority shareholder in the former (55%) and partners with the latter on 
Franco-Spanish links. 
 
5.1.2.1. Freight 
 
In France, rail is the second most commonly used form of transport for freight after roadways (chart 
40). The modal share of rail has fallen relative to 1996, but its number two ranking does not appear 
threatened. In 2009, rail transported 13.8% of the goods passing through France, compared with 
74.6% for roads and 7.8% for oil pipelines. 
 
Chart 40:   Modal share of freight transport in France (percentages based on tonne-kilometres) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
The trend in freight volumes transported by rail (in tonne-kilometres) is worrisome. Since 2000, it 
has steadily declined, with the exception of an up-tick in 2006 and 2007. With a drop of more than 
44% in nine years, it has lost more traffic than any other transport method (chart 41). In 1996, the 
year before rail reform, 50 billion tkm of goods were transported by rail, compared with 43 billion in 
2007 and 32 billion in 2009 under the impact of the economic crisis, i.e. declines of 15% and 36% 
respectively. 
 
Chart 41:   Freight transport trends in France (index based on tkm, 1995 = 100) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
The first competing operator entered the market in 2005, running international traffic between the 
Meuse region and Germany. The train, operated by CFTA Cargo of the Connex Group 
(subsequently of Veolia and then Europorte France), was transporting lime. It was stopped for 
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several hours in France by rail workers from a variety of unions protesting the sector’s privatisation 
(Haenel, 2009, pp. 18-19). The market share of the new entrants developed rapidly from 2007, 
even though overall traffic fell every year (chart 42). Whereas SNCF traffic fell by 40% between 
2007 and 2010, that of its rivals more than tripled over the same period. If this pace were to keep 
up,91 the competing operators would pass SNCF in 2012. 
 
Chart 42:   Trend in rail freight traffic in France (tkm) and SNCF market share (percentages) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011), RFF financial reports, UIC and own calculations. 
 
According to Grignon (2010, pp. 18-19), whose observations are based on SNCF figures, six 
alternative operators shared 16% of the market in 2009 (in train-kilometres). The leader among the 
new operators is Euro Cargo Rail (Deutsche Bahn subsidiary), with a market share of 10.4%, 
followed by Europorte France (merger between Europorte 2, Eurotunnel subsidiary, and Veolia 
Cargo France after the latter was acquired by Eurotunnel in late 2009) with 3.6% (chart 43). The 
other competing operators (Colas Rail, CFL Cargo and B-Cargo) represent only 1.6% of the 
market. According to RFF (2010, p. 9; and 2011, p. 9), however, the market share of new railway 
companies based on train-kilometres amounted to 7% in 2008, 12.5% in 2009 and 16% in 2010. 
Measured in tonne-kilometres, it was 24% in 2010.  
 
Chart 43:   French rail freight market share in 2009 (percentage based on train-kilometres) 
 
Source: Grignon (2010). 
                                                   
91   Average annual growth rate of -17% for SNCF and 54% for its competitors combined. 
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5.1.2.2. Passenger transport 
 
With respect to passengers, trains are the second most commonly used form of transportation after 
cars (83%) and ahead of buses (5.6%). Unlike freight, the modal share of rail for passenger 
transport is on the rise. In 2009, it was close to 10%, compared with 8% in 1996 (chart 44). 
Furthermore, rail is the form of transportation with the strongest growth in passenger-kilometres, at 
35% in 1990-2009, compared with 24% growth for cars (chart 45). Rail traffic has more than 
doubled over the past 30 years. 
 
Chart 44:   Modal share of passenger transport in France (percentages based on passenger- 
    kilometres) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
Chart 45:   Trend in French passenger transport (index based on pkm, 1990 = 100) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). 
 
Despite this market growth, SNCF still maintains a monopoly. As is the case in Belgium, no 
alternative operator has yet entered the market, and international connections have so far been 
operated by partnerships among the incumbent railway companies92. That said, several competing 
operators have shown an interest. In November 2010, Veolia signed an agreement with railway 
company Trenitalia to create a service between Paris, Lyon and Turin93. Service is expected to 
start in 2012, but will initially use only night trains. Day trains are expected to run in the second 
phase (using Corail trains), and TGV service is to start in 2014 at the earliest. In December 2011, 
                                                   
92   Note that, as we mentioned in section 4, since 1 September 2010 Eurostar has been a standalone railway 
company. However, it cannot be considered a real competitor to SNCF because SNCF owns a 55% 
equity stake in Eurostar. 
93   Escande, P. (2010), "Train à petite vitesse pour la concurrence ferroviaire", Les Echos.fr, 18 November. 
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Trenitalia and Veolia-Transdev (the new name for Veolia Transport since its merger with Transdev 
in March 2011) are opening a Paris-Venice line using night trains supplied by Thello, a joint 
subsidiary created specifically for the purpose. 
 
A variety of obstacles may explain why competition has been slow to develop. The practical 
conditions for accessing the French rail network are unclear, notably the price of the royalties a 
new entrant would have to pay to RFF and exactly which lines are open to competition. As we 
mentioned above, the royalties that SNCF pays to RFF for the TGV are relatively high compared 
with other countries, which may dissuade potential entrants. Furthermore, the procedures for 
issuing licences, certifying personnel and granting technical approval for equipment (notably TGV 
high-speed trains) are so many administrative steps that can be difficult for new entrants to 
navigate. In addition, there is the unique nature of the French rail system, which still leaves 
substantial power in the hands of SNCF as delegated infrastructure manager, a power it can use to 
its advantage when it comes to allocating train paths, for example. In this respect, it is important to 
note the creation on 1 January 2010 of a rail circulation department (DCF) at SNCF. The DCF is in 
charge of managing traffic and circulation on behalf of RFF and is, according to the French 
government, independent of SNCF (Grignon 2010, p. 33). 
 
5.2. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
Following the presentation of the French rail market and the description of the sector’s institutional 
reorganisation, this section examines the financial aspect of the reform. We briefly explain the 
organisation of the SNCF Group and analyse the trend in its financial results before and after the 
reform. We also examine the financial impact of French rail system reform in the light of the 
sector’s total debt and the subsidies that it receives. 
 
5.2.1. REVENUES AND SUBSIDIES 
 
5.2.1.1. Revenues and results 
 
Together, the SNCF EPIC and SNCF Participations94 form the SNCF Group. The SNCF Group is 
organised into five business lines: 
x  "SNCF Infra", which manages and operates the rail network; 
x  "SNCF Proximités", which handles urban, suburban and regional public transport activities; 
x  "SNCF Voyages" (formerly "Voyageurs France Europe"), which covers transport for long-
distance and high-speed rail passengers; 
x  "SNCF Geodis", which handles freight transport and logistics; 
x  "Gares et Connexions", which is in charge of train station management and 
development.95 
 
The SNCF Group, via these divisions, is present in 120 countries spread over five continents. In 
the European market for international passenger transport, the group has developed principally 
through alliances. For example, in addition to its membership in the Railteam project,96 the group 
has created joint ventures with the incumbent operators in neighbouring countries: Thalys and 
Eurostar (see section 4), Artesia (France-Italy connections in partnership with Trenitalia), Lyria 
(with CFF, links between Paris and Switzerland), Elipsos (50/50 JV with RENFE for Spain) and 
Alleo (with Deutsche Bahn, connections with Germany). According to the SNCF website,97 the 
operator has a 53% market share of high-speed traffic in Europe and aims to double its revenues in 
                                                   
94   SNCF Participations is a holding company that manages most of the SNCF Group subsidiaries. 
95   This new division was not included in the 2009 annual accounts. 
96   See section 4. 
97  http://www.sncf.com/.  
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this segment over the next four years through continued partnerships with other European 
operators. 
 
For freight transport, the other market open to competition, the SNCF Group has made acquisitions 
in recent years that have made it, according to its 2009 annual report, the second-biggest rail 
freight transport company in Europe. The group acquired 75% of Import Transport Logistik (ITL) in 
2008 and the remainder in 2010. ITL is a private German railway company present in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2009, the group bought the subsidiaries 
of rail operator Veolia Cargo in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Germany. In Germany, Veolia 
Cargo is the biggest private freight transport operator via its subsidiary Rail4Chem (SNCF 2010b). 
Following these acquisitions, the group decided to rename its freight subsidiaries under the 
Captrain brand. This gave rise to Captrain Benelux, Captrain Deutschland and Captrain Italia. The 
SNCF Group is also present in the UK via Freight Europe UK, a logistic services company that 
became a rail operator in 200898. Owned 100% by the SNCF Group, the company was 
rechristened Captrain UK when the group changed the name of its freight subsidiaries. 
 
The trend in revenues (chart 46, left-hand scale) shows the SNCF Group’s growth over the years. 
Between 1995 and 2009, revenues rose by 74%, from €14.3 billion to €24.8 billion, due notably to 
numerous acquisitions. For example, in 1995 the group’s consolidation scope included 414 
companies, compared with 912 in 2009. The biggest subsidiary, without question, is Géodis. This 
logistics company represented 73% of the consolidated revenues of SNCF Group subsidiaries in 
1996 and 76% in 2007. In 2008, it became a fully-owned subsidiary of SNCF, which changed the 
name of its freight transport and logistics division to “SNCF Géodis” the following year. 
 
The group’s net result (chart 46, right-hand scale) has had more ups and downs than its revenues. 
Whereas the group posted losses of more than €2.5 billion in 1995 and 1996 (notably due to strikes 
in December 1995 and a deterioration in results linked to infrastructure management), it almost 
broke even in 1997 (loss of €92 million). This spectacular earnings recovery is chiefly attributable to 
the reform of the rail system and the creation of RFF. To begin with, the transfer of infrastructure 
ownership and a large portion of the group’s debt to RFF enabled SNCF to reduce its depreciation 
charges and interest expenses by around €0.8 billion and €1.4 billion respectively in 1997. In 
addition, the SNCF began receiving two types of compensation annually from RFF starting in 1997: 
one for its role as delegated infrastructure manager and another for capital improvements made to 
the rail network on behalf of RFF. In 1997, the former was set at a lump sum of €2.6 billion and the 
latter, which depended upon project invoicing, amounted to €1.9  billion. Alongside these new 
revenue sources, it is also necessary to take into account the new SNCF royalty payment to RFF 
for infrastructure use (€0.9 billion) and the transfer of income associated with the rail network to 
RFF, which consists primarily of the State’s contribution (€1.8 billion in 1997). Even so, the balance 
of all of these transfers was substantially positive for SNCF, amounting to €4  billion plus a 
reduction in interest expense from the transfer of an additional portion of SNCF debt to a separate 
debt amortisation unit (see below), a reduction estimated at €285 million in 1997. 
 
In subsequent years, the SNCF Group barely managed to generate a positive net result until 2005, 
when it earned a record net profit of €1.3 billion resulting from, among other things, asset sales and 
increased subsidies (see above), but also from good performances by the Freight division, which 
significantly reduced its operating loss, and the Passengers France & Europe division, whose 
operating profit is improving (chart 47). The trend in net results was also marked by a loss of 
€980 million in 2009 in the midst of the economic crisis. 
 
In general, the Freight division has proven to be the SNCF Group’s weakest link. The division has 
posted an operating loss every year except 2007 (chart 47). By contrast, the Passengers France & 
Europe division was the only one to earn an operating profit every year between 2003 and 2009, 
                                                   
98  Freight Europe UK (2007), " FE (UK) Ltd becomes Freight Operating Company", press release, 28 
December.  
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including a €1.1 billion profit in 2008 due notably to improvement in the TGV offering. This division 
also stands in contrast to the Infrastructure and Public Transport divisions, whose results have 
declined every year. Whereas the Public Transport division managed to earn an operating profit 
until 2008, the same cannot be said of Infrastructure, which posted operating losses from 2005. 
The losses kept growing thereafter, notably in 2008 due to asset write-down's. 
 
Chart 46: SNCF Group revenues and net result (€millions) 
 
Source: SNCF annual accounts. 
 
Chart 47: Operating result by division (€ millions) 
 
Source: SNCF annual accounts. 
Note:  Results by division are unavailable prior to 1999. From 2003, figures for the Passengers division are broken down 
into Passengers France & Europe and Public Transport. 
 
5.2.1.2. Subsidies 
 
French government subsidies to the rail sector (chart 48) more than doubled over 17 years, from 
€4.5 billion in 1992 to €9.6 billion in 2009,99 an increase of 113%. These subsidies include those 
paid since 1991 to the separate debt amortisation unit (SAAD) to help service the debt that was 
transferred to it (see below). From 1997, the total amount of subsidies paid to the rail sector rose 
                                                   
99  For the sake of consistency with data on Belgian subsidies, the annual share of SNCF pension costs 
borne by the State is not included in these figures. This portion amounted to €2.1 billion in 1995 and 
€3.2 billion in 2009. 
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significantly (+22% vs. 1996) owing to the creation of RFF. The amounts paid to SNCF for 
infrastructure costs are now paid to RFF, which also enjoys a capital grant and investment 
subsidies. Some of the subsidies paid to RFF are used to compensate SNCF for the duties it 
performs on behalf of the infrastructure manager (see above). 
 
Chart 48:   Payments by French public authorities to the rail sector (€ billions) 
 
Source: Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation. 
Note: Excluding the portion of SNCF pension costs borne by the State. 
 
However, whereas subsidies to SNCF have continued to grow steadily since 1997, the total 
amount of subsidies paid to RFF began to decline in 2000, despite an increase in investment 
subsidies. Between 2001 and 2003, the planned RFF capital grant of €1.8 billion was never paid 
entirely by the State and was not paid at all in 2003 (Commission des comptes des transports de la 
Nation, 2004, p. 119). From 2004, the capital grant was changed to a budgetary allocation for debt 
reduction (€800 million in the first year) and a modernisation subsidy (€655 million in the first year). 
The latter was intended to cover any investments in network modernisation and security that would 
not generate future income and that, under the previous system, increased the indebtedness of 
RFF every year (Marini, 2004, p. 15). From 2009, these subsidies gave way to a single operating 
subsidy (€2.3 billion in 2009) to be shared among the various types of infrastructure for which user 
royalties do not cover related costs: regional passenger trains, conventional domestic passenger 
trains and freight trains. The result generated should enable RFF to finance its investments on its 
own, along with investment subsidies (Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation, 2010, 
p. 120).  
 
The trend in State payments to the rail sector is also marked by the inclusion of SAAD in the 
government’s accounts, which caused its allocation to disappear from 2008. 
 
The subsidies paid to the SNCF EPIC in 2009 represented 21% of its ordinary operating income 
(chart 49). This ratio fell sharply following the sector’s reform, from 33% in 1996 to 15% the 
following year. The proportion then increased until 2006, before falling slightly due to an increase in 
operating income. 
 
The breakdown of public transfers to SNCF and RFF by category (chart 50) shows the 
preponderant share of operating subsidies excluding infrastructure, and the relative decrease in 
infrastructure operating subsidies. The latter did increase in 1997 with the creation of RFF (+59% in 
real terms compared with 1996), but their proportion of overall subsidies has since dropped, 
reaching 17% in 2008. Like what is happening in Belgium, the State apparently wants to gradually 
shift infrastructure operating costs from the taxpayer to users. The decrease in subsidies has been 
accompanied by a steady rise in the infrastructure usage royalties paid to RFF, which have 
increased by an average of 10% annually since 1997 (Commission des comptes des transports de 
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la Nation, 2010, annex I). We also note the relative increase in investment subsidies from 2001 
(with the exception of the dip in 2004). In absolute terms, these subsidies rose every year between 
2000 and 2008, growing at an average annual rate of 23%. 
 
Chart 49: Subsidies and operating income of the SNCF EPIC (€ millions) 
 
Source:   Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation, High Council on Railway Public Service (2001), SNCF 
financial reports, own calculations. 
 
Chart 50:  French State payments to SNCF and RFF by category (percentages) 
 
Source: Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation. 
Note 1:  Excluding the portion of SNCF pension costs borne by the State and allocations to SAAD. 
Note 2: Subsidies for modernisation work paid to RFF between 2004 and 2008, in the annual amount of €863 billion, are 
counted as infrastructure operating subsidies even though a portion of these payments may be used for investment 
because we lack a detailed breakdown. 
 
5.2.2. OPERATING COSTS 
 
The operating costs of the SNCF Group (chart 51) include chiefly personnel costs and external 
purchases and charges. Personnel costs as a share of total operating costs fell in 1997 due to the 
relatively greater increase in external purchases and charges, then remained relatively stable at 
around 42%. 
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The SNCF EPIC’s productivity100 (traffic relative to the number of workers) has increased by 8% 
since the 1997 sector reform, principally via a decrease in the number of workers (chart 52). 
 
Chart 51: Operating costs of the SNCF Group by category (percentage of the total) 
 
Source: SNCF annual accounts. 
 
Chart 52: Number of workers (left-hand scale) and productivity of the SNCF EPIC 
 
Source:   Commission des comptes des transports de la Nation, Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, 
Transportation and Housing (2011), UIC and own calculations. 
 
5.2.3. DEBT101 
 
As chart 53 shows, the financial debt102 of SNCF rose strongly until 1996, at an average annual 
growth rate of 12.4% in 1990-1996, principally due to operating deficits and financing for 
infrastructure investments (Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 111). In 1996, the year before RFF was 
created, SNCF debt amounted to €31.7 billion, compared with €17.9 billion in 1990, or a 77% 
                                                   
100  Productivity is calculated for the EPIC and not for the SNCF Group because it is measured on the basis of 
SNCF traffic in France, which is that of the EPIC. 
101  The SNCF figures in this section refer to the SNCF EPIC, which operates solely in France, and not to the 
Group, which is present both in France and abroad.  
102  Financial debt net of certain investments and receivables. This is the same concept used in the Cour des 
comptes' report (2008) and is generally accepted as representative of the French rail system’s debt, 
although figures may vary slightly depending on which sources are used. For a detailed analysis of 
French rail sector debt, see also Caisse des dépôts et consignations (2004). 
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increase in six years. From 1991, a portion of the operator’s debt, some €5.8  billion, was 
transferred to a separate debt amortisation unit (SAAD) created specifically for this purpose103. As 
a result, among other things, of State subsidies (see above), this debt was progressively paid 
down, but the reduction was not enough to diminish the financial debt of the rail sector overall 
(SNCF and SAAD), which amounted to €36.1 billion in 1996.  
 
Chart 53: Financial debt of the French rail sector (€ billions) 
 
Sources:   Joly (2002), Caisse des dépôts et consignations (2004), Marini (2006), RFF, Commission des comptes des 
transports de la Nation. 
Note: For SNCF and RFF, figures refer to financial debt net of certain investments and receivables. 
 
As was the case in Belgium several years later (see section 4), the institutional reorganisation of 
the rail sector in 1997 enabled the incumbent rail operator to unload much of its financial debt. In 
France, RFF assumed €20.5 billion of SNCF debt, or 65% of its end-1996 value. Furthermore, in 
the same year, €4.3 billion of SNCF debt was transferred to SAAD104. In 1997, SNCF’s debt 
amounted to €7.6 billion and represented only 20% of rail system debt, compared with 100% in 
1990 and 88% in 1996. In 1999, SAAD took over a further €0.6 billion of SNCF debt105.  
 
The rail system reform thus enabled the operator to drastically reduce its debt, but without reducing 
the debt of the sector overall. Between 1997 and 2006, this debt rose by a further 7%, from 
€38.1  billion to €40.6 billion, chiefly due to the increase in RFF’s debt on the back of new 
investments and inadequate State subsidies (Cour des comptes, 2008, p. 111). 
 
In 2007, Eurostat required France to account for SAAD debt as a public debt in the Maastricht 
sense. Due to the new interpretation, France had to recalculate its deficit and public debt in the 
Maastricht sense from 1993 onwards.106 As a result, SAAD was shut down and its debt, which 
amounted to €8.2  billion at end-2006, was transferred to the State’s accounts and no longer 
booked as rail sector debt. In addition, that same year saw another accounting change that was 
favourable to SNCF debt. The Caisse de Prévoyance et de Retraite du Personnel (CPRP), used to 
fund SNCF pensions, became a social security entity separate from SNCF, and its debt was 
deconsolidated from that of the operator. The rail sector’s debt thus declined significantly in 2007  
(-22% vs. 2006), but began to climb again the next year due to an increase in SNCF’s debt. From 
2007 to 2009, rail sector debt rose by an average of 2.6% annually. 
                                                   
103  SAAD is not legally separate from SNCF, but is an accounting framework used to isolate a portion of the 
incumbent railway company’s debt in accordance with Directive 91/440/EC (see section 2.1). SAAD debt 
is financed principally through specific contributions by the State. 
104  Berchet (1998). 
105  Caisse des dépôts et consignations (2004, p. 4). 
106  See INSEE (2007). 
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It thus appears that the French rail sector is having a hard time getting its financial debt under 
control. The steps that have been taken, have shifted debt to one entity or another without 
changing the structural trend in the debt, even though since 1997 it has been growing at a slower 
pace than before. 
 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
Rail reform in France has created a unique system of sharing tasks between the newly created 
infrastructure manager and the incumbent rail operator. The way tasks are shared casts doubt 
upon whether there is a real separation between the two functions as required by Europe, given 
that in fact both are largely carried out by SNCF. This may explain why no operator has yet decided 
to compete with SNCF in the international passenger transport market. With respect to freight, on 
the other hand, competition has been developing rapidly since 2007, driven by Euro Cargo Rail 
(Deutsche Bahn subsidiary) and Europorte France (Eurotunnel Group). Despite an overall 
decrease in traffic, the volume transported by the new entrants is rising every year. In 2010, their 
market share was between 16% and 24%, depending on which measurement is used. 
 
At the financial level, the reform enabled the incumbent operator to significantly reduce its debt and 
improve its results. Through a strategy of acquisitions (in the freight market) and partnerships (in 
the international passenger transport market), the SNCF Group has built a rail operator that is a 
force to be reckoned with in Europe, even though the Freight division still struggles to earn a profit. 
For the French rail sector overall, the reorganisation has resulted in higher debt and ever-
increasing subsidies. 
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6. THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS IN GERMANY 
6.1. REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCUMBENT RAILWAY COMPANY 
6.1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The economic development of the West German railways, Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB), up to the 
beginning of the 1990s was the starting point for a thorough reform of the railways 
(Bahnstrukturreform) in 1994. It is here that the German situation differs from the other European 
countries where the changes in the rail sector were the result of European legislation. From 1960 to 
1990, not only did the total size of the network in Germany come down from 36,000 km to 30,000 
km, but the market share of passenger transport also fell from 36% to 6.1% and that of freight 
transport from 37.4% to 20.5% (Seidel, 2002). The financial situation of the railway company got 
consistently worse as a result of which revenues during the 1970s were no longer even sufficient to 
cover staff costs (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006). Through the reunification of East and West 
Germany, the East German railways Deutsche Reichsbahn (DR) was merged with DB as of 1992 
and consequently the financial situation became even more precarious. The former East German 
railway company was deep in debt, possessed an outdated infrastructure and train fleet and, with 
203,000 employees, was heavily overstaffed. Despite the annual financial contribution from the 
German federal government amounting to €7 billion as compensation for the provision of public 
services and the takeover in 1991 of DB's long-term debt to the tune of €6.44 billion, DB and DR's 
consolidated losses had risen to €8.13 billion by 1993 (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006).  
 
In an attempt to reduce DB's debt burden and cut back the federal subsidies for infrastructure, in 
1989 the German federal government set up a public rail board, called the Regierungskomission 
Bahn (RegB). With the German reunification, the scope of this board's tasks was radically altered 
since DR now also had to be taken into consideration in the reform of the German railways. RegB 
published its findings in 1991 and came to the conclusion that the only possible solution to the 
problems mentioned above was to open the state monopoly up to the free market economy. To do 
this, a capital injection by private shareholders was necessary, as was the taking-over of the debt 
burden by the government, the conversion of the legal status to a public corporation and a clear 
distinction being made between business activities and politically motivated activities. RegB also 
proposed to merge DB and DR and turn them into a public limited company with a separate 
division for passenger transport, freight traffic and the rail infrastructure. Furthermore, a case was 
made for free access to the railway infrastructure, the abolition of the public service provision and 
the regionalisation of decision-making powers regarding local transport. Finally, a legal solution 
would have to be worked out for members of staff whose civil servant status would be converted 
into private sector employee (Benedikt, 2008). 
 
Under pressure from the increasing debt burden of DB and the precarious situation of the German 
budget owing to the many transfers to the former East German states, the first proposals from the  
RegB had already been transposed into law by 1992, followed by a thorough reform of the railway 
system in 1994. In an initial phase, DB and DR were amalgamated and at the same time public and 
commercial activities split up so the railways could be run without being under the influence of the 
federal and/or territorial authorities. Moreover, this separation ensured that the railways were 
relived from non-profit-making obligations (i.e. universal service). Commercial activities were 
brought under the umbrella of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG), a private equity company with the 
government as sole shareholdder. DB AG had to unbundle organisation and accounting activities 
into four entities: short-haul passenger transport, long-haul passenger transport, freight traffic and 
infrastructure (see figure 4). Aspects concerning infrastructure and provision of public services 
remained under the government's responsibility. 
 
A special institution called the Bündeseisenbahnvermögen (BEV) was set up for personnel 
management and for the former German railway company's debts. The BEV serves as employer of 
the former staff of the German railways. In exchange for accepting the reform, the rail unions had 
set a number of strict conditions concerning the status of railway personnel. Each member of staff  
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could opt to keep his or her status as public official as a result of which they could not be directly 
employed by DB AG, a company established under private law (Chabalier, 2006). DB AG employs 
the former public officials under market conditions which in practice means lower pay. The 
difference is made up and borne entirely by the BEV. This structure was set up as part of the 
efforts to restore DB AG's balance sheet to health. The difference in staff costs covered by 
establishing the BEV is estimated at €4.1 billion per year (Benedikt, 2008). 
 
To make it possible to restore DB AG to a sound financial basis, its debts were completely 
cancelled as part of the radical reform of the railways. After a previous takeover of DB's debts 
worth €6.44 billion in 1991, another debt transfer to the tune of €34.41 billion followed in 1994 and 
which was borne entirely by BEV (Booz Allen Hamilton 2006).  
 
Figure 4:  First and second phase in the German railway reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Benedikt P. (2008) 
 
In a second phase in the rail reform in 1999, the above-mentioned entities were converted into five 
separate companies under DB AG which served as the holding group. The idea was to prevent 
public resources intended for the infrastructure from being diverted into traffic or regionalisation 
resources from not only being used for regional passenger transport (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006). 
The management holding owns 100% of the shares in the following five subsidiaries (Seidel, 2002): 
 
x  DB Netz AG, which is responsible for construction and maintenance of the railway 
infrastructure, inspection and oversight of infrastructure management and the handling of 
infrastructure capacity. Its revenue comes from access fees and government subsidies for 
laying new tracks or for measures to improve the existing infrastructure; 
x  DB Station und Service AG, which  is responsible for running approximately 6,000 
German railway stations for passenger transport. These stations will be modernised and 
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maintained with the help of revenues derived from fees that are charged to train operators 
for the use of stations. The costs that are charged depend on the number of stations a 
given passenger train calls in at; 
x  DB Regional AG which operates in the local, regional and district transport of passengers. 
In this latter area in particular, DB is trying to gain a foothold by entering into joint ventures 
with local transporters. The reform of the railways has led to radical changes in the 
structure of regional passenger transport by bringing the organisation under the wing of the 
German Länder that receive annual subsidies for that. These federal States have full 
responsibility for planning, management and acquisition of regional transport and grant 
service contracts to DB Regional AG or a private rail operator; 
x  DB Reise und Touristik AG, which is responsible for long-haul passenger transport in 
Germany and for which no public financial support whatsoever is provided. So, DB Reise 
und Touristik AG also saw itself obliged to cut back considerably on inter-regional services 
for some time; 
x  DB Cargo AG is responsible for goods transport, but is making a great effort to expand 
into an international logistics service provider because wagon-load transport (unit or block 
trains) alone does not appear to be profitable. After a merger with the Dutch freight carrier, 
NS Cargo, in 2000, its name was changed to Raillon.  
 
In 2008, DB Mobility Logistics AG (DB ML AG) was set up in the context of the planned part-
privatisation of the DB group. At the time, the German government had planned a partial flotation of 
DB on the stock exchange by the end of 2009. DB ML AG had formerly operated under the name 
of Stinnes AG, a listed company that specialises in the provision of logistic services which was fully 
incorporated into the DB group in 2003. Both the passenger transport and the logistics section 
were put into six autonomous corporate divisions under the joint management of DB ML AG, in turn 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of DB AG (see figure 5): 
 
x  DB Regional AG provides the regional passenger transport services; 
x  DB Long-Distance AG is responsible for long-haul passenger transport in Germany; 
x  DB Schenker Rail AG is in charge of freight traffic; 
x  DB Urban GmbH is the regional bus service operator; 
x  DB Schenker Logistics GmbH provides logistic services; 
x  DB Services is responsible for real estate (railway station buildings). 
 
Within the DB group, DB AG and DB ML AG both operate as management holding companies that 
run the group under a vertically integrated structure. Close cooperation between the DB AG and 
DB ML AG boards is ensured not only by an Integration Committee, but also by the fact that they 
both have the same CEO and CFO and that this is also the same person as the chairman of the 
legal, personnel, technical and infrastructure division (Deutsche Bahn Mobility Networks Logistics 
AG, 2008). DB AG itself regards vertical integration as a key factor in its successful development. 
 
The DB group's infrastructure companies remain under the umbrella of DB AG and therefore are 
wholly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany: 
 
x  DB Netz AG runs the railway network; 
x  DB Station & Service AG is responsible for the stations; 
x  DB Energie GmbH is energy manager and responsible for locomotive power. 
 
The stock exchange flotation, originally planned in autumn 2008, whereby a maximum of 24.9% of 
DB ML AG's capital would be sold off to private investors, has been postponed indefinitely owing to 
the uncertainty on the financial markets (Schreyer et al., 2010).  
 
Consequently, the German rail market is characterised by a vertically integrated DB AG which, on 
the one hand, is a monopolistic owner of the railway infrastructure (upstream activities) and, on the 
other hand, a dominant rail operator (downstream activities). The vertical integration of the 
upstream and downstream business activities gives the railway network manager (DB Nezt AG) a  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  77
motive to discriminate against the competition that has open access to the railway network in 
favour of the rail operators which belong to the DB holding company (DB Reise & Touristik AG, DB 
Regional AG and DB Cargo AG - see 3.1. Freight transport). 
 
Figure 5:  Organisation structure of Deutsche Bahn AG and DB Mobility Logistics in 2010 
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2009. 
 
Alongside the complete restructuring of the rail company, three other measures turned out to be of 
importance for the whole rail sector. Firstly, in 1994, a federal railway agency (Eisenbahn-
Bundesamt) was set up as regulatory body; secondly, from 1996 onwards, there was a move 
towards regionalisation under which the German Länder were responsible for local train services; 
and, thirdly, the entire railway network was opened up to third parties. 
 
6.1.1.1. The regulator 
 
In 1994, the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA) was set up as regulator responsible for oversight within 
the rail sector. The EBA is a sub-agency of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Construction and 
Housing. Its main tasks are granting licences to rail companies, inspecting safety of the technical 
equipment and planning and financing the infrastructure. Since the federal government is still 
involved in funding the railway infrastructure, the EBA is responsible for oversight and allocation of 
government contributions for investment in infrastructure by rail companies that are owned by the 
Federal Republic of Germany (NEA, OGM et al., 2007). In 2009, an attempt was made to merge 
the EBA with the BEV but this fell through. 
 
In 2006, the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA)107 was put in charge of regulating access to the rail 
infrastructure and supervising access fee charging. This decision was preceded by discussions as 
to whether this task should have been given to the EBA or to two separate agencies. The rail 
authorities opted for BNetzA because this agency operates independently from the government. 
Moreover, in this way, all general provisions for regulating a network can be applied in the different 
                                                   
107  BNetzA is the German regulator for electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal services and the railways. 
It is an independent federal government body under the supervision of the Federal Ministry for the 
Economy and Technology. This body was set up as regulator for telecommunications and postal services 
in 1998 with the title of Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) as a result of 
liberalisation of this sector. When, in 2006, it was decided to open up the energy and rail sectors to 
competition, the government took the view that the experience of RegTP as far as free access to network 
infrastructure is concerned could be usefully applied here and the regulator's name was changed to 
BNetzA.  
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  78
sectors in an identical and logical manner. Nevertheless, the BNetzA's work is hampered by the 
fact that it does not have wide enough powers. The possibilities of requesting information in 
disputes over access to the infrastructure or the access fees charged are very limited. Moreover, 
the EBA is responsible for a number of tasks that also have an impact on competition and on the 
chances for potential competitors to gain access to the market. This leads to a sort of duality and 
rivalry between the EBA and BNetzA. As a result of this, since 2006, the EBA has been acting 
more independently than before in a bid to improve its reputation as regulatory agency.  
 
6.1.1.2. Regionalisation 
 
As part of the winding down of universal service provision obligations, in 1996 responsibility for 
organisation of regional short-haul passenger transport (Schienengebunden Personen-Nahverkehr 
or SPNV) was passed on from the federal government to the different Länder (Regionalisierung). 
Previously, the federal States and local authorities had sole responsibility for public transport by 
road (bus and tram), while DB was competent for both regional and long-distance transport.  
 
With the adoption of the regionalisation law (Regionalisierungsgesetz), the ordering principle 
(Bestellerprinzip) was introduced, which allows the buyer to specify the service level itself, so each 
federal State fixes the routes and the scope of regional rail transport supply. Regional short-
distance passenger transport was only allowed to be offered when ordered and financed by a 
federal State. The transport contracts that are consequently concluded between a federal State 
(Aufgabenträger) and the operator set the scope of the services to be delivered (number of train-
kilometres), the amount due and the quality criteria. The duration of contracts varies between 5 
years and a maximum of 15 years. Ticket revenue goes mostly to the operator and thus forms an 
incentive to raise performance (Seidel, 2002). Roughly 30% of the costs are covered by revenue 
from ticket sales. 
 
The federal States have set up special bodies for organisation of regional passenger transport 
(Aufgabentrager) which are responsible for the planning, management and acquisition of regional 
rail transport. The Aufgabentraeger award service contracts to DB Regional AG or to other public 
or private rail operators (see figure 3). In Germany, there are around 33 Aufgabentraeger which 
cause wide diversity as regards the domain for which they are responsible. Some federal States 
have more Aufgabentraeger than others, while Berlin and Brandenburg have established a joint 
agency (Brenck et al., 2007).  
 
The system of regionalisation funds gives the federal States wide freedom of choice as regards 
contract and service provision which can vary from highly detailed to very general. This makes it 
possible to organize passenger transport not only for a whole network, but also for one specific 
route. The federal States are totally free to conclude a contract directly with DB AG or with one of 
the competitors. The services may also be obtained via public tender.  
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Figure 6:   Regional short-distance passenger transport in Germany 
 
 
Source: Benedikt P. (2008). 
 
6.1.1.3. Opening up the market to competition 
 
In the framework of the reform of the railways, access to the rail infrastructure was opened up for 
so-called third-party companies (foreign railway enterprises108,  private rail  companies 
(Nichtbundeseigene Eisenbahn or NE-bahn) and international rail groupings) with the objective of 
allowing non-discriminatory competition to be introduced in Germany. To make this possible, 
railway companies must distinguish between the operational part and infrastructure, whether or not 
within one and the same corporate entity. Furthermore, the rail company must hold a valid licence 
to be able to supply transport services. A licence is only granted to an applicant that meets specific 
criteria as regards reliability, financial resources and technical competence.  
 
In 2005, non-discriminatory access to the rail network was laid down by law in a decree concerning 
the use of the railway infrastructure (Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung or EIBV). 
Besides general trading conditions, this decree also contains qualitative restrictions on access 
(obligations concerning both trains and staff employed) which comply with the Railway 
Construction and Operational Regulations (Eisenbahn- Bau- und Betriebsordnung or EBO). It was 
further stipulated that the BNetzA would act as supervisory body alongside the German anti-trust 
authority (Bundeskartellamt or BKartA) and the European Competition Authority. The law does not 
foresee any ex-ante provisions that must guarantee a non-discriminatory cost price for the use of 
the rail tracks or the issue of a railway licence. Only trains that run regularly get an unspecified 
priority in route allocation. Enterprises that are responsible for the infrastructure are obliged to treat 
all requests from rail operators for the use of a certain route in the same way, to draw up and 
                                                   
108  In accordance with the principle of reciprocity, foreign railway companies only have the right to access  
the German railway network whenever the network is also accessible for German rail enterprises in the 
country of origin. In actual fact, under the principle of freedom of establishment within the European 
Community, every foreign railway company hailing from an EU country has the possibility to move into the 
German rail market by setting up a rail company in Germany.  
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publish transaction conditions including an overview of the cost price for the use of a route or 
specific facilities, and lastly, to limit the technical and professional obligations for the use of the 
railway infrastructure to the extent that this enables the rail operators to operate reliably (Booz 
Allen Hamilton, 2006). 
 
6.1.2. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GERMAN RAIL MARKET 
 
6.1.2.1. Freight transport 
 
Cargo transport in Germany is still dominated by road haulage (see chart 54). In 2008, only 17.4% 
of total goods transport carried by rail despite the European Commission's efforts to improve the 
performance of the railways. In 2009, rail freight transport was hit badly by the global financial and 
economic crisis. As a result, its market share fell for the first time since 200 to 16.3%. This drastic 
decline in volumes handled by the rail sector is mainly attributable to a collapse of production in the 
iron and steel, motor vehicle and chemicals industries. The railways and inland waterways were hit 
much harder by this loss of production than road haulage, which by pursuing an aggressive pricing 
policy managed to expand its market share by 1.2 percentage point. 
 
Chart 54:  Market share of freight transport by rail in 2008-2009 (based on tkm) 
 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2009. 
 
Because Germany was one of the first countries to have opened up access to its railway 
infrastructure for third-party firms in order to put an end to the virtual monopoly enjoyed by 
Deutsche Bundesbahn (West Germany) and Deutsche Reichsbahn (East Germany), it now 
accommodates the largest number of rail companies in Europe. In December 2010, no fewer than 
341 different railway companies hold a licence that allows them to operate freight trains on the 
German railway infrastructure (Federal Railway Office, 2010). Despite the fact that new entrants 
have been able to offer their services in Germany for a relatively long time now, 75.4% of freight 
transport is still in the hands of DB Schenker Rail (see chart 56) and the market share of new 
entrants is growing only slowly. In the period from 2002-2009, it barely managed to expand its 
market share by 2.8 percentage points a year on average  
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Chart 55:  Rail freight transport performance (in billion tonne-kilometres)  
 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2006 and 2010. 
 
Chart 56:  Market share of DB and other rail enterprises (in %) 
 
Source: Deutsche Bahn AG, 2006 and 2010. 
 
In spite of the high number of licences issued, only 59 rail companies have actually started 
competing with DB AG (Holzhey et al., 2009). By their sheer number, these operators which are 
running trains on the German railway infrastructure entirely for their own account give the 
impression that, as far as freight transport is concerned, intensive competition has been 
established. Table 13 gives an overview of the number of competing firms in the freight transport 
field (see annex 3 for a list of abbreviations), broken down by product category. In 11 of the 14 
product groups, at least five competing firms are recorded. In four product categories (containers, 
chemical products, mineral oils and biodiesel, steel and aluminium), there is a choice between 
more than ten competing rail companies. The number of rail companies operating in a product 
category is a useful indicator but is no real evidence for a fiercely competitive market. In only four 
market segments (containers, chemical products, mineral oils and building materials) is there any 
sign of a completely open market with brisk competition. The main explanation for the openness of 
this sub-market is the ready availability of rolling stock. Tank wagons and car transporters are in 
fact always rapidly available but difficulties mainly arise in the other sub-markets as regards 
wagons for bulk transport which can only be obtained from DB Schenker Rail. 
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Table 13:  Rail companies competing for freight transport, by goods category 
 
Containers 
 
 
Chemical 
products 
 
 
Mineral oils/ 
Biodiesel 
 
Building 
materials 
 
Wood/ 
Cellulose 
 
Waste 
 
Motor 
vehicles 
 
- BCB (Veolia) 
- boxXpress 
- Crossrail 
- CTL 
- DE (Veolia) 
- duisport rail 
- ERS 
- EVB 
- HGK 
- HSL Logistik 
- IntEgro 
- ITL 
- Kombiverkehr 
- LOCON 
- Lokomotion 
- NRS 
- OHE 
- RTB 
- SBB Cargo 
- TX Logistik 
- VPS 
- WLC 
- WLE 
 
 
- BASF 
- Chemion 
- duisport rail 
- HGK 
- ITL 
- MKB 
- MTEG 
- MWB 
- rail4chem 
- TX Logistik 
- Veolia Cargo 
 
- Bocholter 
  Eisenbahn 
- CTL 
- HGK 
- HSL- 
  Logistik 
- hvle 
- Infraleuna 
- ITL 
- rail4chem 
- RBB (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- SBB Cargo 
- Stock 
 
- Ei.L.T. 
- Eivel 
- HHPI 
- hvle 
- ITL 
- MWB 
- OHE 
- RTB 
- SBB Cargo 
 
- AL 
- LOCON 
- OHE 
- PRESS 
- RAN 
- Rennsteig- 
  bahn 
- RTB 
 
- AVG 
- EEB 
- hvle 
- OHE 
- rail4chem 
- Rennsteig- 
  bahn 
- TX Logistik 
- Wincanton 
  Rail 
 
- Crossrail 
- HGK 
- ITL 
- Lokomotion 
- MTEG 
- OHE 
- PCT 
- SBB Cargo 
- TX Logistik 
 
 
 
Grain 
 
 
Limestone 
 
Steel/ 
Aluminium 
 
Cement 
 
Earth 
 
Coal/ 
Coke 
 
Sand/Sodium 
 
 
 
- ITL 
- MWB 
- Rail4chem 
 
 
- BASF 
- BCB (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- hvle 
- energy rail 
- LOCON 
- Neusser 
  Eisenbahn 
- VPS 
- WLE 
 
- CFL Cargo 
- Brohltal- 
  bahn 
- DE (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- EKO Trans 
- HGK 
- ITL 
- Lokomotion 
- MWB 
- RTS 
- SBB Cargo 
- SWT 
- TWE (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- TX Logistik 
- VPS 
 
 
 
- CFL Cargo 
- CTL 
- EGP 
- LEG 
- Neusser 
  Eisenbahn 
- WAB/ 
  energy rail 
 
 
 
 
- EKO Trans 
- CFL cargo 
- DE/RBB 
  (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- HGK 
- HHPI 
- NIAG 
- TWE (Veolia 
  Cargo) 
- RTB 
 
 
- HGK 
- Neusser 
  Eisenbahn 
- RBB/BCB 
  (Veolia  
  Cargo) 
 
 
The other sub-markets cannot yet be considered to be generally open to competition since the 
third-party entrants are confronted with various problems associated with the dominance of the DB 
group which gives preferential treatment to firms from its own holding company structure over 
private train operators. This discriminatory behaviour can be seen in various forms under the 
following aspects (Zauner, 2004): 
 
•  Infrastructure fees: the railway network is a necessary facility for private train operators for 
which there is no alternative. The network must therefore be opened up to competition in 
exchange for an acceptable fee. Through the vertical integration of the infrastructure and 
transport within a single holding, DB Netz is in a position to obstruct access by the level and 
composition of the infrastructure fees it charges. When considering that the costs for the use of 
the rail network account for 25% of all transport service-related costs, this is an instrument of 
discrimination that cannot be underestimated. Another thing that goes against DB Netz is the 
fact that it has failed to set up a pricing system with which it can allocate network capacity in an  
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economically feasible manner. When its rail network was opened up to competition in 1994, DB 
Netz had already applied various systems; a two-tier rate that is composed a fixed part and a 
variable part linked to the number of train-kilometres, elasticity-bound price-setting (Ramsey 
tarif109) and a linear system. Discrimination against the private train operators takes various 
forms depending on the pricing system applied (Link, 2004). This varies from large reductions 
granted to DB enterprises because they are the biggest users of rail network to degressive 
effects associated with the two-part rate which has the same effect. Both BKartA and the EBA 
have begun various inquiries after complaints were lodged about the two-tier rate. These 
complaints referred to the disadvantages that competitors are faced with in this pricing system 
when only small numbers of train-kilometres are purchased.  
 
•  Regional factors: because infrastructure fees charging is very carefully monitored by the 
BKartA, DB Netz has limited scope to discriminate against its competitors by means of access 
pricing. So, the introduction of regional factors (Regionalfaktoren) in 2003 can be regarded as 
the umpteenth instrument for driving up competitors' costs. This price rise, which is a set factor 
by which the infrastructure fees are multiplied, is only charged on the rail lines intended for 
regional passenger transport and which have a particularly low cost-to-income ratio. The 
regional factors relate to 14,000 km (37%) of the total railway network. DB Netz justifies the 
surcharge on the grounds that the revenue derived from it is used exclusively for maintenance 
of these railway lines. Given the vertical integration of the DB group, the regional factors can be 
seen as a means of squeezing out private train operators from certain routes. They can then be 
run by DB Regional, the regional train operator from the DB holding company. DB Regional 
can offset any potential increase in its costs as a result of the regional factors from profitable 
routes. Private train operators mostly tend to offer their services on a particular line and are 
thus hit much harder by these regional supplements. Moreover, the higher costs for DB 
Regional are the equivalent of extra revenues for DB Netz and this gives a neutral result on DB 
Holding's balance sheet. 
 
•  Traction charges: the transmission system for locomotive power is a necessary facility 
because some transport services can only be supplied by electric power and no substitute is 
available. These traction costs can come to as much as 17% of total transport costs 
(Handelsblatt, 2003). From 2004 onwards, DB Netz Energie has had to open up its electricity 
grid to other energy producers as a result of which private train operators have the choice of 
taking their entire electricity requirements from DB Netz Energie or to share out their demand 
between a private energy producer for feeder power and DB Netz Energie for the electric 
power transmission. When they opt for a combination of power producers, DB Netz Energie 
charges electricity grid access costs because the producer's power must be passed on to the 
buyer. These extra charges considerably restrict the advantage that can be reaped from 
competition in the power supply market. Generally speaking, private rail companies have 
discovered that the price DB Netz Energie charges is too high both for power supply and for 
transmission (Zauner, 2004). DB Netz Energie charges a price that only gives bulk buyers a 
structural advantage. The reductions are applied upwards of volumes over 500 GWh/year. In 
practice, it appears that such large quantities are only purchased by rail companies from the 
DB holding structure.  
 
                                                   
109  Where there are high fixed costs (as in the case of a rail company that is also in charge of managing and 
running the railway infrastructure), a firm with marginal cost pricing cannot finance its activities. The 
Ramsey-type pricing model advocates that the deficit is financed by a rate higher than marginal costs. 
The Ramsey rule puts in general that the difference between the price of a product and the marginal costs 
should be higher as the elasticity of the demand for this product is lower.   
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•  Slot requesting and allocation110: third-party companies find access to slots awfully difficult 
(Slack et al., 2007). Scheduled transport services must be booked at least eight months in 
advance with DB Netz before the first train programmed can actually run. Because some 
locomotive services are supplied on the basis of spot contracts (e.g. oil transport), private rail 
companies have a need for a much faster booking system via DB Netz and this seems to be 
difficult in practice. German law stipulates that the infrastructure operator must answer a 
request for access to a rail route within one month. In 2007, DB Netz sent out guidelines 
specifying that every request must be answered within 73 hours. Owing to this change in the 
administrative procedure, rail companies that want to be granted a slot at short notice (<72 
hours) can nevertheless have their access refused by DB Netz. Besides these difficulties with 
slot allocation, third-party operators are also confronted with various obstacles that can be 
interpreted to mean that DB Netz is not fully complying with its obligations. These hindrances 
range from delays (several years) and frequent interruptions in repairs on the railway network 
to speed limits on certain sections of the network and temporarily cancelled slots. The 
temporary or geographically limited nature of these obstacles tends to suggest that DB Netz is 
trying to protect its associated train operators from the chill winds of competition. 
 
•  Siding tracks: private freight operators also find that access to the sidings is uncertain. Under 
the pressure of overcapacity, DB AG cut back its network infrastructure by 3,300 km between 
1994 and 2006 (BMVBS, 2009). This has led to a drop in the number of tracks and reduced 
capacity on the national railway infrastructure considerably. After a rail operator has reserved a 
particular slot, it regularly appears that there is no siding track free or being freed up. With the 
cut-backs on the network infrastructure, DB Netz mainly seems to take account of the demands 
of the DB holding company and not so much what small rail operators want (Slack et al., 2007). 
 
•  Auxiliary services: intervention on the part of the infrastructure operator in the event of 
unexpected incidents is a highly necessary service. It is hard for private rail companies to 
provide an active and effective replacement for this. Certain third-party companies have 
actually taken the initiative to set up a private assistance network to counteract the dominant 
position of DB AG in the event of train disruptions arising (Netzwerk Privatbahnen). However, 
the majority of private companies are still dependent on DB Netz to repair a breakdown or 
technical failure. Through its position, DB Netz can resort to discriminatory behaviour towards 
the competition. There is not normally any delay in providing assistance because a 
malfunctioning or broken-down train has a major impact on the punctuality of the rest of the rail 
traffic. DB Netz nevertheless puts the rail operators at a disadvantage by exacting high prices 
from them for auxiliary services that it supplies. Generally speaking, no ex ante contracts are 
actually concluded between rail operators and the network manager. Rail operators may in fact 
count on a general right to assistance by virtue of Directive 2001/14/EC. Besides driving up 
costs, DB Netz treats its competitors unfairly by requiring a broken-down locomotive to be put 
in a siding until it is collected by the private rail operator. And extra charges have to be paid to 
DB Netz for this. 
 
The above-mentioned problems facing private freight operators in one of the most liberalised 
countries as regards rail  transport presents a sobering image of the future for freight transport by 
rail in the European Community. After 15 years of free access to the rail market, new rail operators 
in Germany find themselves confronted with major obstacles, even just to be able to win a small 
share of the market. The fundamental inequality within the rail market seems to be fully attributable 
to the dominant position of the DB Groep and the presence of a railway company and an 
infrastructure manager within the same holding group. One possible solution would be to set up an 
infrastructure agency that is owned by the federal government. 
 
                                                   
110   The allocation of a slot on the railways is the right to be able to use a particular part of the railway 
infrastructure within a specific time slot.   
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6.1.2.2. Passenger transport 
 
6.1.2.2.1. Short-distance passenger transport 
 
The German railway reform (1994) and more specifically the regionalisation law (1996) has led to 
radical changes in the organisation of regional passenger transport by shifting responsibility for the 
financing, planning and receiving rail services from the federal level to the level of the German 
Länder. To be able to organise this short-distance passenger transport, the federal States receive 
annual financial resources (Regionalisierungsmittel) that come out of federal tax revenue from 
mineral oils. The size of the regionalisation funds was estimated on the basis of the average cost 
per train-km of the SPNV for the year 1993/1994. So, when the regionalisation began in 1996, a 
sum of € 4.5 billion was transferred by the federal State to the Länder (see chart 57). In 1997, the 
federal subsidies were raised to the tidy sum of € 6.2 billion. In 2002, the legislation governing the 
granting of regionalisation resources was overhauled and it was decided to apply an annual 
increase of 1.5% (stimulation of the regionalisation resources). This resulted in an subsidy worth € 
6.7 billion in 2002. The German Parliament and the Bundesrat111 then decided in the spring of 
2006 to limit the scope of the regionalisation resources for budgetary reasons. For the three years 
from 2006 to 2008, the federal States received about €1.4 billion less than had been originally 
estimated. The end result was that the size of the regionalisation resources from 2007 onwards 
remained below the 2002 level (Deutsche Bahn AG, 2007). Since 2009, the subsidy has once 
again risen on an annual basis by 1.5%.  
 
Chart 57:  Regionalisation resources 1996 - 2009 (in billion €) 
 
Source:  Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 
 
Chart 58 shows trends in prices for short- and long-distance passenger transport from 1996 
onwards. What is striking is that although both figures have increased, it is fares for the heavily 
subsidised short-distance passenger transport that have risen faster (58.1%) than prices for long-
distance passenger transport (34.7%).  
 
   
                                                   
111  The Bundesrat is the responsibility of the 16 German federal State governments. 
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Chart 58:  Price index for short- and long-distance passenger transport over the period 
     1996-2008  (price  index  1996  =  100) 
 
Source:  BMVBS,  2009. 
 
Following the regionalisation of the SPNV, the Länder set up authorities (Aufgabentraeger) that are 
responsible for the planning, management and procurement of regional rail transport. In this way, 
they have considerable freedom of choice as regards both the contract type and the service 
specifications. An application to provide regional passenger transport can be made for the entire 
network of a federal state or just for a specific route. The duration of the contract can vary 
considerably and the desired service provision ranges from very detailed to quite general. The 
Länder have the choice between various contract-awarding procedures. They can enter into direct 
negotiations with DB AG or a private rail operator, or request a quote. In addition, they can opt for a 
public tender in which either all the rail operators can put in bids or just a small number of them 
who are contacted previously by the federal States.  
 
Through the regionalisation policy and the use of public tenders, there is a lack of any form of 
standardisation with respect to both contract type and definition of desired service provision for 
short-distance passenger transport. Seeing that, even within the same federal state, there is often 
no uniformity at all, this can drive up costs considerably for rail operators that want to put in a bid. 
Yet there are also several common factors in the contracts. Most of them give rail operators hardly 
any scope at all for operational decisions (routes, travel time, frequency, first and last service). This 
may be due to the introduction of synchronised scheduling by some of the German federal states. 
This coordination of bus networks and intercity rail traffic with short-distance passenger transport 
limits the possibilities for rail operators to take individual decisions. Moreover, this synchronised 
timetabling reduces the available capacity as regards infrastructure because it makes it difficult to 
bring in additional trains. As regards pricing decisions as well, the rail operators have little space to 
move owing to the use of "one-stop shops" in Germany. Through this system, the public transport 
user has the possibility to use just one ticket on the different local public transport modes. As a 
result, rail operators have very few chances to introduce commercially attractive fare systems.   
 
Regional passenger traffic is a market that is entirely dependent on demand from the federal 
states. Despite the wide freedom of choice and full market opening, a lot of big contracts are 
awarded directly by the federal states to DB AG (see table 14). Over the period from 2003 to 2005 
in particular, the federal states appeared to be genuinely distrustful of any competition. Besides, 
the contracts that are concluded have a lasting influence on potential competition since the majority 
of contracts were signed for a period of at least ten years and only very small segments of regional 
rail services were outsourced to private rail operators. Up until 2007, services covering only 184.7 
million train-kilometres out of a total 630 million (29.3%) were granted by means of a public tender 
(European Commission, 2010). On this point, it should be noted that contracts which have been 
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given directly to DB AG contain the most extensive parts of the regional rail services to be provided 
so that the above-mentioned figure tends to overstate the importance of public tenders in Germany. 
In practice, it turns out that public tenders mostly concern individual routes or smaller networks. 
 
Table 14:  Contracts granted directly to DB AG  
 
State 
 
Date of contract 
 
Million train-
km  
 
Value (in 
billion €) 
 
Length of 
contract 
Berlin/Brandenburg  December 2002  35.0  1.9  10 years 
Lower-Saxony  January 2003  27.8  2.5  10 years 
Saxony-Anhalt  March 2003  16.2  2.5  12 years 
Hessen (Rijn-Main-gebied)  April 2003  33.0  4.4  11 years 
Baden-Württenberg  July 2003  49.0  4.6  13 yearsr 
Hamburg (S-bahn)  July 2003  12.5  0.7  6 years 
Rhineland-Palatinate  January 2003  29.5  2.4  11 years 
North-Rhine-Westphalia  July 2004  44.0  6.0  15 years 
Saarland  July 2004  6.3  0.8  14 years 
Berlin (S-bahn)  August 2004  32.4  3.0  15 years 
Bavaria  November 2004  98.1  8.0  10 years 
Lower-Saxony  January 2005  5.3  -  12 years 
Saxony  April 2005  2.6  -  10 years 
North-Rhine-Westphalia  June 2005  12.7  1.1  11 years 
Bremen  November 2005  2.4  0.02  10 years 
Hessen  November 2005  2.4  -  5 years 
Bavaria  November 2005  0.5  -  12 years 
Source:  Brenck et al., 2007. 
 
Out of all the contracts that were awarded via public tender, DB AG won around 48.2% up to the 
year 2007 inclusive (see chart 59). The first international rail operator that gained a foothold in  
Germany’s regional rail market was Veolia Verkehr GmbH. It scooped 14.7% of the rail services 
put out to tender and consequently is now DB AG’s main competitor. Yet, it only controls 2.5% of 
the total volume of short-distance passenger transport - a very small market share. It can be seen 
from chart 60 that, in 2008, DB AG’s share of the market had reached 89.8% of the total number of 
passenger kilometres. The limited role of third-party companies can be attributed to both reluctance 
of the regional authorities to put out contracts to public tender and the rail operators' reticence to go 
into specific markets or to expand their activities. It is exceptional for an Aufgabentraeger to award 
a contract directly to a private rail operator. Nevertheless, some regional authorities have been 
found to pursue an underlying strategy in favour of third-party companies so as to ensure that there 
are more alternatives in the future. 
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Chart 59:  Number of train-kilometres secured by rail operators in public tenders in the period  
    1995-2007  (in  %) 
 
Source:  DB AG, 2005 and 2007. 
 
 
Chart 60  Passenger-kilometres (in billion pkm) and market share of DB AG (in %) 
 
Source:  DB AG, 2005 and 2007 
 
Chart 61 reflects the trend in passenger-kilometre numbers and the number of passengers for 
short-distance travel from 1991 onwards. Since the reform of the railways, the number of travellers 
on regional rail transport has increased almost every year by 3.4% on average. Transport 
performance has also risen from 29.9 billion passenger kilometres in 1993 to 47 billion passenger 
kilometres in 2008. De considerable amounts of subsidies are the main reason behind this positive 
development. Even DB AG’s decision to scrap several long-distance routes has ensured growth of 
regional transport. Better service and quality levels and the introduction of modern rolling stock 
have also played a role here. Finally, the introduction of new pricing, ticket and passenger 
information systems and renovation of railway stations have contributed to this process. 
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Chart 61:  Passenger-kilometres (in million pkm) and number of passengers (in million) in short-
   distance  passenger  transport 
 
Source:   DIW, 2010. 
 
6.1.2.2.2. Long-distance passenger transport 
 
In comparison to short-distance passenger transport, it had been emphasised in the rail reform that 
long-distance passenger transport had to function without subsidies. It was assumed that this was 
feasible from a financial point of view with revenue coming exclusively from fares charged to 
passengers. It was also assumed that opening up the market to competition would lead to lively 
competition which in turn would ensure a financially sustainable long-distance rail transport sector 
without public intervention. In reaction to the opening of the market in 1994, DB AG immediately cut 
back its long-distance passenger transport services. Despite the negligible competition in this 
market segment so far, DB AG is still considering scrapping a number of other connections 
between big German cities. 
 
Long-distance passenger transport within the DB holding is supplied by DB Long-Distanceverkehr 
AG and comprises two main train categories: the Intercity-Express (ICE) high-speed trains and the 
Intercity (IC) and Eurocity (EC) trains. The ICE system comprises around 180 stations in Germany 
and the neighbouring countries and the IC/EC-network links up to even more cities. However, 
several big cities (with more than 100 000 inhabitants) are not connected by the ICE/IC-network 
(bv. Leverküsen). Up until the beginning of the 1990s, DB AG had an additional category of trains, 
such as the Interregiotreinen (IR), that called in at these cities. DB cancelled these connections 
because they were losing money. On top of that, some federal states decided to replace these 
former IR services with subsidised short-distance transport. So, the distinction between short-
distance and long-distance passenger transport is no longer always quite as clear. 
 
It is not so easy for private rail operators to get a foothold on the market for long-distance transport 
because, to do so, they have to compete directly with the dominant operator DB AG or run a route 
on which DB AG offers a weak service. Over the last decade, several third-party firms have entered 
the market, but there are still very few of them. The biggest private rail operator in long-distance 
transport is InterConnex, a trade name of Ostseeland Verkehr GmbH which is a subsidiary of 
Veolia Verkehr. It was under this trademark that, in 2002, the private long-distance train was 
brought into service in Germany. Interconnex runs a daily service on the Gera-Leipzig-Berlin-
Rostock route. The service offered by DB AG on this route does not really appeal to travellers 
owing to the long journey times and the fact that they have to change trains twice. InterConnex 
acknowledged the value of this route put itself forward as a price-conscious alternative to DB AG. 
Consequently, none of DB AG's tickets or rail passes can be used on InterConnex. At the end of 
2002, the connection between Dresden and Stralsund was also brought into service, followed in 
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mid-2003 by the InterConnex Cologne-Rostock connection. Another private rail operator that is 
active in the long-distance rail transport sector is a joint venture between the Swedish national rail 
company SJ (Statens Järnväger) and the German GVG GmbH (Georg Verkehrsorganisation). 
Since September 2000, they have been running the Berlin Night Express; a night train link between 
Berlin and Malmö. And lastly, there is the Vogtland-Express which has been providing a connection 
between Plauen and Berlin since June 2005. This route is served by a private rail company called 
Vogtlandbahn GmbH which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Arriva group. Up until 2001, the 
route had been part of DB AG's service. But, now, the big advantage of the Vogtland-Express is 
that it is a direct connection so travellers do not have to change trains. 
 
Despite the opening up of this section of the rail market, DB AG is still the most dominant firm and 
in practice a monopolist. In this segment, too, new entrants are confronted with a whole host of 
problems linked to the dominance of the DB group. In 2002, InterConnex applied for a temporary 
injunction against DB AG because it had not announced the long-distance connection between 
Stralsund and Zwickau in its travel information given out to the public. After several lawsuits, the 
court ordered DB AG to include the necessary information about long-distance routes served by 
private rail operators in all its data carriers (timetables, advertising boards, Internet, telephone).  
 
A look at the number of passenger-kilometres (see chart 62) shows that they are stagnating and, in 
2008, were 2% lower than when the railways were reformed in 1994. The slump in 2002 and 2003 
was caused by the introduction of a new fare pricing system that was not accepted by the general 
public and subsequently withdrawn. Passenger volumes rose by 10.8% in the period from 1994 to 
2008, an increase that can be explained by DB AG's scrapping of the InterRegio connections (long-
distance transport) which were replaced by short-distance passenger transport links. 
 
Chart 62:  Passenger-kilometres (in million pkm) and passenger numbers (in million) in    
    long-distance  passenger  transport 
 
Source:  DIW,  2010. 
 
Opening up the market for long-distance passenger transport has not led to any growth in this 
segment and no competition has developed as it has in the other segments (freight and short-
distance transport) where a market share of 10 to 20% has been reached. This can be explained 
by a number of different reasons (European Commission, 2010): 
x  in the early years after the railway reform, new entrant third-party firms were confronted 
with several problems: availability of slots, the way they were treated by the stations and 
availability of rolling stock were all unsatisfactory. As a pioneer and subject to the 
necessary legal interventions, InterConnex has since brought about an improvement in all 
these areas; 
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x  the difficulty of obtaining rolling stock: at the start of the railway reform, DB AG refused to 
sell its surplus passenger carriages and international leasing companies had no 
experience on the German market; 
x  from the outset, the remaining rail market segments (freight and regional) were more 
attractive than the market for long-distance transport: as a result of regionalisation, there is 
no shortage of budgets available for short-distance transport and access to the market for 
freight transport is much easier owing to the use of block trains (a goods train that is put 
into service specifically for one particular client). Furthermore, freight transport enjoyed 
unprecedented growth on account of the trend towards globalisation which brought a sharp 
increase in freight traffic from the North Sea ports. 
 
6.1.3. EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE GERMAN RAILWAYS 
 
The trend in employment at DB AG has clearly been influenced by the railway reform and, more 
specifically, by the need to scale down staff numbers after amalgamation with the East-German rail 
company. As can be seen from chart 63, over the period 1994-2001, the number of employees at 
DB AG shrank by an average of 6% a year. From the year 2002, this trend was reversed and staff 
numbers started rising again (+16.9%) as a result of the takeover of the rail telematics division of 
Arcor AG and the logistics service provider Stinnes AG112. In the following years, further efforts 
were made to cut back the number of employees. But from 2006, this no longer appeared to be 
possible because of DB AG's active takeover policy as it endeavoured to become Europe's biggest 
railway enterprise. Through the acquisition in 2006 of the Hangartner Group, a Swiss forwarding 
company and logistics supplier, staff numbers went up by 5.9%. Employee numbers expanded 
again in 2007, this time by 7.9%, as a result of the takeover of the biggest British rail freight 
company (English Welsh & Scottish Railway Holdings Limited or EWS). In 2008 as well, staff 
numbers increased by 3.2% through the acquisition of an internationally active logistics service 
provider from Spain (Transportes Ferroviarios Especiales SA (Transfesa)). 
 
Chart 63:  Number of employees at Deutsche Bahn AG since the rail reform 
 
Source:   Deutsche Bahn AG, 2010 and 2004 
 
                                                   
112  By taking over the rail telematics division of Arcor AG, DB AG wanted to reassert itself as market leader in 
telematics so as to improve the interoperability between the European railway network 
telecommunications systems (i.e. through the introduction of "GSM-R", a standardised platform for mobile 
rail telecommunications). So, the takeover of the logistics service provider Stinnes AG once again fits in 
with the trend towards offering a broader transport concept. The rail freight forwarder is not limited to just 
locomotives but also presents itself as a provider of logistics services that also takes care of carriage 
services before and after shipping. 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of employees at Deutsche Bahn AG 
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  92
Since the reform of the railways, the sector has shown remarkable growth in productivity. This is 
illustrated in chart 64 by changes in the ratio of passengers and tonne-kilometres113 to employees 
for the period from 1994 to 2009. Between 1994 and 2001, this indicator rose by 82% on the back 
of growth in passenger transport and freight and as a result of cut-backs in staff numbers. In 2002, 
productivity fell (-18%) for the first time owing to a combination of an increase the workforce 
following the acquisition of Arcor AG and Stinnes AG and the economic recession which had a 
significant impact on the development of both passenger and freight transport. The second major 
drop in productivity (-10.8%) which occurred in 2009 was fully attributable to the collapse of the 
freight transport market as a result of the severe economic and financial crisis. The initial decline in 
German goods transport had already been gaining momentum over the last few months of 2008 
but picked up pace in 2009, which led to an unprecedented collapse in sales volumes in the case 
of all possible modes of transport. Weak foreign trade meant that international goods transport was 
hit particularly hard. Cargo transport by rail suffered the biggest loss of market share, down by 
17.3% (DB Group: 20.8% and non-DB rail companies: 4.4%), compared to 10.2% for freight 
haulage by road and 16.2% for the waterways (Deutsche Bahn AG, 2010). 
 
Chart 64:  Productivity developments (ptkm per employee) 
 
Source:   Deutsche Bahn AG, 2010 and 2004. 
 
A study by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes takes an in-depth look at the influence of rail reform in the 
different European countries on the productivity of national passenger transport by means of a 
model based on the production probability curve114. It shows that, in spite of a different degree of 
deregulation in each country, all reforms have exerted a positive influence on productivity of 
passenger transport. It can be seen from the model that Germany was even more productive than 
the other countries in 1999. Relative productivity enjoyed a period of growth between 1993 and 
1999, only to fall back afterwards in 2000. This does not mean that Germany has become less 
productive but simply that other countries are seeing productivity growth rates that are stronger 
than Germany's. 
 
                                                   
113  In goods transport, a tonne-kilometre is used as a uniform unit of measurement for the volume of goods 
shipped and is the equivalent of shipping a tonne load weight over a distance of one kilometre. 
114   When two items can be produced using a given production technology two, the production possibility 
frontier gives the maximum quantity of one item that can be produced when a given quantity of the other 
is a produced. Moreover, all possibilities within the curve are inefficient. The convex side of the production 
probability curve shows the increasing alternative costs of expanding production of a good. Economic 
growth results in a shift outside the curve. 
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6.2. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
6.2.1. REVENUES AND SUBSIDIES 
 
The rail reform's main objective was to lighten the financial burden on the German budget by 
bringing down expenditure flowing to railway traffic. As mentioned above, in the early 1990s, both 
railway companies were in a precarious economic situation. According to certain models calculated 
by the Regierungskommission Bundesbahn (RKB), without any reform, the federal government's 
demand for financial resources for the railways would amount to € 32.5 billion on an annual basis 
by the year 2000. However, the reform measures would ensure that the Federal Republic of 
Germany would by 2000 manage with a budgeted amount of €12 billion on an annual basis.  
 
Looking at Germany's actual joint expenditure development (including regionalisation resources) 
for the railways in chart 65, these amounts average out at €16.8 billion per year or 40 % more than 
originally budgeted. The total joint expenditure for the railways amounts to €262.1 billion for the 
period 1994 up to and including 2009. However, in this case it is an upper limit, as the federated 
entities are not accountable to the federal government about the use of the regionalisation 
resources; in reality, the latter are not always used exclusively for the railways but also for other 
expenditure related to public passenger transport. 
 
Chart 65:   Federal expenditure on the German railways, including regionalisation resources (in € 
billion) 
 
Source:   Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 
 
But for a number of years, joint expenditure shows a rather static development during the period 
1994-2005. A first expenditure dip occurred in 1997 and 1998 and can be attributed completely to 
infrastructure investment being reduced by about a quarter in relation to 1996, as a result of which 
these amounted to € 2.92 billion in 1997 and to € 2,83 billion in 1998 (see annex 2). A second dip 
can be noted in 2001 as a result of a 40  % cut in the contribution to the BEV 
(Bundeseisenbahnvermögen) to € 3.46 billion. Only from 2006 onwards does joint expenditure 
clearly start its downward trend. Up until 2008, this trend can be explained by the German 
parliament's decision to limit the extent of the regionalisation resources (see. 6.3.2.1. Short-
distance passenger transport). As of 2009, regionalisation resources are again index-linked (annual 
increase of 1.5 %) and the drop in expenditure is to be attributed completely to an almost 60 % 
drop in infrastructure investment to € 1.44 billion. This is the lowest amount ever invested in 
German railway infrastructure since the beginning of the rail reform.  
 
A comparison of total federal expenditure for the German railways with the number of passengers 
per year in short-distance and long-distance passenger transport shows that this ratio declined by 
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39.5 % from 1994 to 2008. At the start of the rail reform in 1994 the subsidy cost per passenger 
amounted to € 10.95 per passenger and to € 6.63 per passenger in 2008.  
 
Maintaining a high-performing railway system in Germany requires considerable expenditure from 
the federal government. Over the past decade, joint expenditure including regionalisation resources 
amounted to some 8 % of the German Federal Republic's total budget. Chart 66 shows that 40 % 
of railway expenditure serves to meet past obligations (€ 87.76 billion for the BEV and € 17.28 
billion charges from the past). Only 21 % of all means spent in the last 16 years are intended for 
rail infrastructure investment, whereas 35 % goes to the federal States for organising the regional 
short-distance passenger transport (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2006). 
 
Chart 66:  Accumulated German federal railway expenditure including regionalisation resources 
during the period 1994-2009 according to scope (in € billion) 
 
Source:   Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 
 
Since the rail reform, DB AG has depended on both indirect subsidies (regionalisation resources 
and BEV) and direct subsidies. From 1996 until 2009, each year an average of € 4.3 billion of 
federal resources flowed directly to the railway company (€59.7 billion in total). These resources 
are destined both for investment measures (new constructions, replacement and maintenance) and 
for meeting liabilities inherited from East Germany in the past concerning staff and material 
expenditure. Chart 67 shows a declining trend in direct federal subsidies to DB AG (an average 
annual change of -9 %) and a strong dependence of these subsidies of the overall budgetary 
situation in Germany. A comparison with the corporate revenues of DB AG shows that not only the 
nominal value, but also the proportion of the federal subsidies is declining annually. 
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Chart 67:  Corporate revenues of and federal subsidies to DB AG for the period 1996-2009 (in € 
    billion) 
 
Source:   Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 
 
The investment resources DB AG is entitled to show a fluctuating development (see chart 68). 
Since the rail reform, on average € 3.53 billion of public resources are made available for rail 
infrastructure investment. After a low in 1997 and 1998 the average revenues increased 
consistently until 2004. From 2001 onwards, investment resources increased because of the so-
called future investment programme, as a result of which a maximum value of € 4.35 billion was 
reached in 2002. The following years, federal expenditure for rail infrastructure investment again 
show a downward trend, hitting an absolute low in 2009 with an investment budget limited to € 1.44 
billion. 
 
Chart 68:  Federal investment resources for DB AG for the period 1994-2009 (in € billion) 
 
Source:   Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 
 
Over the years, the form of the investment financing structure changed repeatedly. Originally, 
mainly interest-free loans were granted for improvements, new constructions and infrastructure 
replacements for which DB AG itself was requesting party. They were then refunded according to 
the rhythm of the annual write-downs. Another form of subsidy was the construction cost 
contribution without refunding obligation, which was only applied for investment measures for which 
DB AG itself showed no interest, but for which the decision had been taken within the federal 
transport policy. In 1998, the federal government and the rail companies reached an agreement to 
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convert these aforementioned financing forms. The construction cost contribution became the 
standard rule for investment in infrastructure improvements and new constructions. This meant a 
considerable relief for DB AG because there was no refunding obligation attached to this. Interest-
free loans could only be used for replacement measures. The next investment financing 
modification occurred in 2001, when the federal government created a number of additional 
financing instruments (for instance, the future investment programme and partnership for traffic 
infrastructure financing of the railways) (Benedikt, 2008). 
 
The actual size of DG AG's contribution to investment in new constructions and infrastructure 
improvements is debatable. The federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof or BRH) talks of 2 % 
and DB AG claims it is 10 %. On the other hand, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and 
Public Housing argues that it does not have sufficient reliable statistics at its disposal concerning 
DB AG's contribution to railway investment (Böttger, 2004).  
 
The high amount of public resources received annually by DB AG can not be found in the annual 
accounts. The company does not enter investments financed by subsidies as assets. This makes it 
difficult to trace the amount of subsidies flowing to railway infrastructure and the use that is made of 
them. Furthermore, the amount of DB Netz AG 's write-down costs is considerably lower compared 
with other enterprises that invest heavily in tangible fixed assets. From the start of the rail reform 
until 2007 and despite the artificially low write-downs, DB Netz AG closed each financial year with a 
loss (Benedikt, 2008). 
 
6.2.2. OPERATING COSTS 
 
Chart 69 shows movements in the consolidated corporate costs115 of all independent corporate 
sub-divisions within the management holding company DB AG. In order to put these business 
costs into  perspective, the associated corporate revenue is also reflected. 
 
Chart 69:  Corporate revenue and costs of the Deutsche Bahn Group (in billion €) 
 
Source:  Deutsche Bahn AG, 1994 to 2009 inclusive. 
 
The railway reform set as a target two basic objectives that had to be achieved within a 10-year 
time span, namely an improvement in DB AG's transport performance and a reduction of 
government expenditure on the railways. Because of these targets, from the start of liberalisation in 
1994, DB AG had to invest heavily each year in modernising and improving the performance of the 
railway system. On top of that, it also had to set off the technical and organisational deficits of the 
                                                   
115  In the annual report from Deutsche Bahn AG and DB Mobility Logistics AG, no information is given about 
individual business costs of each independent corporate sub-division within the management holding 
company.  
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former DR. For this purpose, DB AG received annual state aid under the terms of a federal law of 
23 December 1994. These subsidies were run down according to a fixed schedule and phased out 
completely in 2002. This federal government support had to be matched by annual productivity 
growth achieved by DB AG. From chart 68, it appears that the rail company did not manage to do 
that up until the year 2000. Both corporate revenue and costs remained roughly at the same level 
over the period 1994-2000.  
 
By the end of 1999, implementation of the reform process was half way through and it was decided 
to appint a new chairman of the board (Hartmut Mehdorn) who was given the task of preparing the 
DB group for a stock market flotation by the end of the originally foreseen reform period. In order to 
attain this objective, a "value management"116 concept was implemented to enable the DB group's 
corporate performance to be measured. A target figure for the Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
of at least 10% by the year 2005 was assumed. 
 
A new restructuring programme ("Fokus") was then introduced with the aim of further increasing 
efficiency. This programme had to deliver visible improvements in performance for both passenger 
and goods transport. One of the most important measures was the planned cooperation with 
Stinnes AG from 2001 onwards. Alongside that, considerable cost savings also had to be made  in 
both operational and administrative functions. The programme also included approval of an 
intensive investment programme that sought to speed up modernisation of the infrastructure and 
rolling stock by 2005 for a hefty sum of €40 billion.  
 
In 2001, an operational loss (EBIT117) of €98 million was recorded as a consequence of this 
modernisation process and the associated intensive capital investments. In both 2002 and 2003, 
an operating profit was booked to start with but, after deduction of the financial results, this 
eventually turned into a pre-tax loss (2002: - €438 million and 2003: - €133 million). It was not until 
2004 onwards that the tough Fokus restructuring programme bore fruit and once again a positive 
pre-tax result was posted. 
 
The year 2003 brought a remarkable 41.5% increase in corporate revenue. This was the first full 
accounting year in which the Stinnes group results were consolidated with those of the DB group. 
Since DB AG held almost all the share capital of Stinnes AG by October 2002, the results were 
consolidated on a pro rata temporaris basis in the 2002 accounting year, which produced a 19% 
rise in corporate revenues. Total operating expenditure increased by 39.6% in 2003 to €33.1 billion. 
Purchases of equipment and services in particular saw huge growth of 65.3% (€15.8 billion in total) 
entirely attributable to the consolidation with Stinnes AG. Its portfolio includes various subsidiaries 
that have much more to do with purchases of goods and services than the conventional railway 
business. 
 
Once the merger was fully rounded off, DB AG decided to sell off two non-transport-related 
companies in the Stinnes AG portfolio. The first was Brenner AG, a firm that is active in the trade 
and distribution of chemical products, and the second a company specialised in steel products and 
raw materials, Interferer AG. Owing to this change in the scope of the merger, corporate revenue 
fell in 2004 by 14.4% to €28.8 billion. When this figure is adjusted to take account of the hive-off of 
Brenner/Interferer, corporate revenue of all the other entities within DB AG is seen to rise by 4.1%.  
 
                                                   
116  Value management is a project management technique that should enable the progress with a project to 
be measured as objectively as possible. It involves control over (timely) application of methods and 
techniques that are used during the project development phase so as to follow the efficiency of the 
development process and to lead to the best possible outcome. 
117   EBIT, which stands for Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, is the equivalent to so-called operational 
profits or losses. This is a measure of performance that takes no account of the effects of the capital 
structure of the enterprise, nor of the various aspects of the corporate tax system where were included in 
the profit-and-loss account.  
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This appeared to be growth which was to continue into the following years and 2006 was thus the 
most successful financial year to date in the history of Deutsche Bahn. Favourable trends in 
performance in rail transport and logistics together with a number of mergers led to a massive 
19.6% rise in corporate revenue to €34.8 billion. The most important transaction that was behind 
this increase was the 100% takeover in November 2005 of BAX Global Inc., an American listed 
company that supplies worldwide air, sea freight and transport services out of the United States. 
For DB AG, this was not only a big step forward in its endeavours to further expand logistics 
activities, but also fell within its long-term strategy to become market leader in this sector in 
combination with a strong, global position in all growth regions. If corporate revenue per region is 
examined, a major shift appears through the takeover of BAX Global Inc. The income generated in 
Germany in 2006 still only came to 66% of the total revenue compared with 74% in 2005. The rest 
of Europe remained roughly unchanged with 20%. By contrast, North America accounted for 7% of 
corporate revenue in 2006 compared with 3% in 2005 and the Asia-Pacific region represented the 
same amount. 
 
The 4.8% growth of corporate income in 2007 was not due to the takeovers but mainly to the 
continuing positive performance by rail transport, global freight transport and logistics services. All 
the independent entities within DB AG without exception were on an upward curve and contributed 
to the increase in revenue. The biggest increases were recorded by Energy (+25.4%) and Track 
Infrastructure (+12.6%). It is worth noting that this is mainly thanks to higher demand for train paths 
and traction by rail companies that do not belong to the DB group. 
 
The positive trend of the previous year also continued in 2008 with a 5.2% increase in corporate 
income. This can be explained, on the one hand, by the continued favourable developments on the 
rail market and, on the other, by several new corporate takeovers by DB AG. The most important 
acquisitions were DB Schenker Rail UK, DB Regional UK, Spain-Tir and Transfesa. DB Schenker 
UK was formerly known as English, Welsh and Scottish Railways Ltd and is the biggest British rail 
freight transport company. DB Regional UK sprang out of the takeover of British operator Laing 
Rail. Through this, DB Regional is now owner of Chiltern Railways (a British private train operator 
that runs the Chiltern Main Line commuter trains between London and Birmingham) and joint 
operator of London Overground (private commuter transport in London) and Wrexham & 
Shropshire (a private rail operator that provides a direct connection between London and 
Shropshire). With the takeover of Spanish freight forwarders and logistics service providers Spain-
Tir and Transfesa, DB Schenker gained an important foothold in Spain and Portugal and further 
consolidated its leading position in the European market for overland transport. 
 
In 2009, there was a marked drop (-8.4%) in corporate revenue compared to the previous year that 
can mainly be attributed to greatly reduced freight carriage volumes and the logistics market 
caused by the global economic crisis. In addition, income from long-distance passenger transport 
was also reduced by the limited availability of ICE high-speed trains. Following a number of 
incidents, metal fatigue was detected in these trains. Technical inspections therefore had to be 
stepped up and, consequently, the number of operational trains available was sharply reduced 
especially during the winter months. Expenditure was down by the same amount (8%). There was 
a particularly sharp drop in purchases of equipment on account of a scaling-back of corporate 
activities at DB Schenker Logistics. Then again, this was partly offset by the increase in staff costs 
resulting from negotiated pay rises and restructuring costs. 
 
6.2.3. DEBT 
 
Despite the active acquisitions policy and the global economic crisis, DB AG managed to run down 
its financial debts considerably over the period 2004-2009118 (-18.6%). The financial debt refers to 
                                                   
118  Statistical data for DB AG's financial debt up to 2004 have been compiled in accordance with the German 
GAAP standards. After that, the group switched over to International Financial Reporting Standards for 
drawing up its consolidated annual accounts.  
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all interest-bearing debts, including the federal loans used for funding infrastructure projects. The 
net financial debt is calculated on the basis of the gross financial liabilities exclusive of liquid assets 
and financial claims. Chart 70 shows the various components (with the exception of interest-free 
loans worth a total of € 3 276 million) that make up DB AG's financial debt position. 
 
Table 15:  Financial debt of Deutsche Bahn Group (in € million) 
   
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
Financial debt  20,276  19,974 19,881  18,062  16,853  16,510 
- Outstanding claims  - 765  - 305  - 295  - 1.549  - 910  - 1.499 
Net financial debt  19,511  19,669 19,586  16,513  15,943  15,011 
Source:  Deutsche Bahn AG, 2010. 
 
Chart 70:  Structure of the financial debts (as at 31 December 2009) 
 
Source:   Deutsche Bahn AG, 2010. 
 
6.2.4. ANALYSIS OF THE RATIOS 
 
The Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) (see table 16) is the ratio of Earnings before Interest and 
Tax (EBIT) to the difference between total assets and short-term debts. It is a gauge of efficiency 
and profitability of the investment made by DB AG over the period 2004-2009. Up to 2008, the 
ROCE was on an upward path, a trend attributed to the rising corporate profits, only to fall back 
again to 5.9% in 2009 under the impact of the global economic crisis. This is considerably lower 
than the yield of 10% that DB AG itself had assumed it would reach. 
 
The cover ratio is the relationship between the operational cash flow and the net financial debt and 
indicates the likelihood of a firm to meet its fixed debt commitments. DB AG is aiming for a ratio of 
30%. In 2008, the highest cover ratio was recorded (22.5%) but this was below the target figure. 
Nevertheless, the cover ratio is on a positive trend and DB AG is clearly in a position to pay off its 
debts contracted under the intensive investment programme.  
 
Table 16:  Financial ratios of the Deutsche Bahn Group (in percentages) 
   
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
ROCE  3.8%  5.0%  7.5%  8.7%  8.9%  5.9% 
Cover ratio  12.7%  14.7% 18.6%  21.1%  22.5%  19.4% 
Source:  Deutsche Bahn AG, 2009. 
MLT bons
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6.3. CONCLUSION 
The German situation differs from the other European countries, where the changes within the 
railway sector sprang out of Directive 91/440/EEC. The basic principle of the German rail reforms 
was a combination of unfavourable economic developments on the one hand and the German 
reunification on the other, as a result of which the East German railways were joined up with the 
DB. In 1989, a public railway committee was established whose proposals led to a thorough reform 
of the railway system in 1994. This committee concluded that the problems from the past could 
only be solved by subjecting the State monopoly to the free market economy and by allowing free 
access to the railway infrastructure.  
 
Both railway companies were merged and transformed into a public limited company with separate 
departments for passenger transport, freight transport and railway infrastructure. In an ulterior 
phase, these entities were transformed into separate partnerships under DB AG that acted as a 
holding company. This was meant to prevent public resources intended for the infrastructure from 
being used for transport. The German railway company operates as a vertically integrated group 
structure which the company itself indicates as the most important factor of its successful 
development. 
 
In 1996, when the universal service obligation was removed, responsibility for the organisation of 
short-distance passenger transport was passed on to the different federal States. This 
regionalisation allows for more freedom concerning contracts and services. In order to enable the 
Länder to organise the short-distance passenger transport, they receive on an annual basis 
financial resources coming from the federal State's tax proceeds. However, the lack of 
standardisation, both concerning the form of the contract and the definition of the requested 
services, leads to substantially higher costs for rail operators that are willing to make a bid. 
Moreover, despite the broad freedom of choice for the federal States and the full market 
liberalisation, a large number of big contracts still seem to be attributed directly to DB AG. Its 
biggest competitor is Veolia Verkehr GmbH which has secured 14.7 % of the railway services on 
offer, but only 2.5 % of the total short-distance passenger transport volume. DB AG clearly holds 
the biggest contracts and as the majority of them have been concluded for at least a ten-year 
period, this has a long-term impact on the functioning of competition. 
 
Because Germany was one of the first countries to liberalise access to the railway infrastructure for 
third-party companies, it has the largest number of freight rail companies within Europe. 
Nevertheless, DB Schenker Rail still holds 75.4 % of freight transport and the market share of 
newcomers is only growing slowly. Moreover, new third-party entrants experience various problems 
linked with the DB Group's dominance. Owing to the vertical integration of infrastructure and 
transport within DB, DB Netz hinders rail network access by the extent and composition of the 
infrastructure user charges it imposes. These problems faced by private freight operators in one of 
the most liberalised countries with regard to rail transport offer an eye-opening picture. After 15 
years of free access to the rail market, rail operators are still faced with big impediments caused by 
the DB Group's dominance in order to be able to acquire only a limited market share. Furthermore, 
the complex and varying approach of the liberalisation process in Europe allows for historic players 
from big countries (like DB) to actively take over. This raises the question whether ultimately, this 
concentration phenomenon is not to the consumer's disadvantage. 
 
The rail reform's main objective was to limit the financial burden on the German budget. Without a 
reform, the federal government's demand for financial means for the railways would amount to € 
32.5 billion on an annual basis by the year 2000. However, the reform measures would ensure that 
by 2000 a budgeted amount of € 12 billion would be sufficient. In reality, joint expenditure averages 
€ 16.8 billion per year or 40 % more than originally budgeted. Because of this, federal expenditure 
including regionalisation resources amount to about 8 % of the Federal Republic's total budget.  
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The financial analysis of DB AG shows that, in the period 1994-2000, the railway company failed to 
realise an annual production growth that must compensate for the cut-back in government support. 
In 2000, a new management board chairman was appointed with the task of preparing the DG 
group for a stock market flotation by the end of the original reform period. A restructuring 
programme was introduced that, besides an intensive investment programme, also foresees 
considerable cost-cutting. As from 2004, this programme clearly appeared to be paying off and it 
turned out to be the start of continuing growth over the following years. DB AG also conducts an 
active takeover policy in its aim to become Europe's biggest railway company. Corporate revenue 
grows annually owing to a combination of takeovers and continuing favourable performances 
delivered by rail transport, overall freight transport and logistic services. Due to the many 
takeovers, staff costs also rise, but always at a slower rate than the revenues, so each year a 
positive result is recorded. In 2009, corporate revenue declined remarkably, although this was 
largely attributed to the worldwide economic crisis. Expenditure fell proportionally, so that in this 
year, too, a positive result was recorded. Despite the active takeover policy and the worldwide 
economic crisis, DB AG has managed to cut back its financial debt substantially.  
 
Along with a productivity increase owing to the implementation of an intensive restructuring plan, 
the rail reforms in Germany turned DB AG in 2010 into the European market leader for freight 
transport by rail. The German company intends to dethrone the SNCF and to become the 
European market leader for passenger transport, too. DB has a bigger domestic market and better 
balance sheet figures, making its position more suitable for foreign acquisitions and further 
expansion. 
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7. THE REFORM OF THE RAILWAYS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
7.1. REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCUMBENT RAILWAY COMPANY 
7.1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
De Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) [Dutch Railways] was established in 1938 as a private legal 
entity (NV) with the Dutch State as the sole shareholder. NS was licensed by the government to 
manage the rail infrastructure, the rolling stock, the staff and the transport process. Until 1970, NS 
was largely independent, both financially and in regard to day-to-day operations. Only the 
installation of new infrastructure was funded entirely by the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management, after which NS acquired ownership and had full responsibility for the management 
and maintenance costs. 
 
By around 1970, NS was facing serious financial problems as a result of the expansion of road 
transport and the loss of the profitable work of transporting coal from South Limburg. The Dutch 
government provided support measures as payment for certain services associated with the term 
"public service". Under Regulation 1191/69 EEC, compensation for the provision of such public 
services is exempt from the obligation concerning prior notification to the Commission. However, 
this meant that NS lost much of its independence, because its deficits were from then on adjusted 
by the Ministry of Transport and Water Management. From 1987 onwards, the government's role in 
regard to NS policy was greater still because the Minister had power to draw up the budget, amend 
tariffs and adjust the schedules.  
 
In the early 1990s, there was increasing dissatisfaction about the annual financial support in the 
form of subsidies because of the resulting heavy burden on the budget, and people had the 
impression that NS did not always use the money efficiently. This gave rise to a number of 
significant public transport reforms. The government wanted to expand the available services, 
increase efficiency and cut the public contributions. The formal reason for the structural changes at 
NS was Directive 91/440/EEC which stipulated that the infrastructure must be separated from the 
operations. For the purpose of implementing this European Directive in national law and 
establishing the future administrative and financial relationship between the government and NS, 
the Minister of Transport and Water Management set up the independent Wijffels Commission. 
 
In 1992, this Commission issued its recommendation in the form of a report entitled "Sporen voor 
straks" [Travelling by train in the future] (Wijffels et al. 1992). The recommendation focused mainly 
on breaking the link between the government and NS by vertical separation between the 
installation and maintenance of the infrastructure and the operation of the transport services. 
Another recommendation was that there should be horizontal separation in order to end the 
complex interconnections between the operating activities of NS. The Wijffels Commission 
identified four core functions of NS which could be transferred to separate business units: the 
operation of passenger transport, the operation of freight transport, management of the 
infrastructure and capacity management119. In future, only the infrastructure would be funded by 
the government (Infrastructure Fund) in exchange for the phasing out of the operating subsidies to 
NS. This privatisation120 would mean that the railway company would again be able to decide its 
own tariffs, schedules and investment policy. According to the Commission, a key condition was 
the termination of the traditionally major influence of the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management on the business aspects of railway operation. 
 
                                                   
119  This is the allocation of railway capacity according to objective rules between users (passengers, freight, 
infrastructure management, potential third parties) in regard to both planning (scheduling) and execution 
(traffic control).  
120  In strict legal terms, privatisation was not possible because NS had already been a private organisation 
since 1938. Privatisation primarily refers to the limitation of government involvement in the management 
of the business, and the phasing out of public funding.  
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In 1995, an agreement under private law known as "Over de wissel tussen markt en overheid" [on 
cooperation between the market and the government], was drawn up between the government and 
NS on the reorganisation of responsibilities. The government remained responsible for the policy 
relating to the infrastructure and the quantity, planning, costs and charges for the use of the railway 
infrastructure. The operation of rail transport services had to take place on a commercial basis and 
the NS subsidies would be phased out completely by the year 2000. For routes where certain 
transport services were not viable, but were desirable for social reasons, the government could 
conclude specific contracts with a transport operator. In 1994, the McKinsey consultancy 
conducted a survey on behalf of the government and NS into the losses per line (train series) and 
per route (routes). This survey identified 30 lines as unprofitable, laying the basis for the separation 
of the Dutch railway network into a main rail network (see figure 7) and other lines which could be 
outsourced in the short or long term (contract sector train services or decentralised train services).  
 
Figure 7:  The main rail network 
 
Source: Main Rail Network Decree, 20 December 2004. 
Following privatisation of NS, creating a public limited company without government subsidies, NS 
focused more on passenger transport because rail freight in the Netherlands was not sufficiently 
profitable. Rail freight was hived off since the market share was considered too small to become a 
sound, independent NS division. In 2000, NS Cargo was sold to Raillon. The holding company,  
Raillon GmbH, is a subsidiary of DB Logistics and was set up following this merger of the freight 
  Main rail network 
-----  Illustration of (inter)regional rail 
  links (not part of the main rail network)  
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divisions of the Dutch (NS cargo) and German railways (DB Cargo). In 2009, the name was 
changed to DB Schenker Rail. 
 
Though the general subsidies for passenger transport ended, NS had greater freedom in regard to 
tariffs and schedules. As a result, the company tapped new markets and encouraged off-peak 
travel by its fare structure. Since peak traffic is not so lucrative as off-peak traffic, peak-time fares 
were raised. This led to social protest and political debate. 
 
NS was divided into a market sector and a government-commissioned sector (see figure 8). The 
market sector comprised the elements which had to operate on a commercial basis: NS Vastgoed 
(site development and running of buildings, shops and sites in and around stations), NS Stations 
(station operating), NS Cargo (freight transport) and NS Reizigers (passenger transport). These 
business units were to remain with NS. The government-commissioned sector comprised the units 
regarded as the government's responsibility: Railinfrabeheer (installation and maintenance), 
Railned (capacity planning, allocation and safety) and Verkeersleiding (traffic control, signalling and 
technical adjustments). These 'task organisations' (executive agencies) remain part of the NS 
group and were fully funded by the Ministry of Transport and Water Management. Any surplus or 
deficit remained in the agencies so that there could be no financial connections with the market 
units. The task of the NS holding company was confined to running the executive agencies. The 
reason for this was that staff were against leaving NS. A transitional period was agreed for the 
implementation of the arrangements under "Over de wissel tussen markt en overheid"; that period 
was to run until 31 December 1999. 
 
Figure 8:  Organisation chart for Dutch Railways (NS) from 1995 
 
NS Reizigers
NS Cargo
NS Stations
NS Vastgoed
Other NS units and subsidiaries
NS Group
(Market Sector)
NS Verkeersleiding
NS Raininfrabeheer
Railned
Government-commissioned sector
NV NS
(holding company)
 
Source: Lower House of the States General, 1998-1999. 
 
After 1995, a complicated situation arose in practice because of the loss of the coordination 
mechanism between NS transport and the infrastructure. The executive agencies have to apply to 
the Ministry of Transport and Water Management and adopt a more formal attitude towards NS, 
while the latter remains a shareholder and as such is involved in the accountability process of the 
executive agencies. In the first few years after 1995, the new organisations were rearranged and 
the executive agencies were separated from the NS group. NS concentrated on privatisation and 
the new commercial opportunities. The cost structure also underwent close scrutiny because the 
business operated on the assumption that it would ultimately be floated on the stock market. The 
costs of the executive agencies, in particular, were subject to strict limits. In those years, the 
relationship between Railinfrabeheer and the Ministry of Transport and Water Management was 
also very bad, with constant conflicts. Since the Ministry of Transport and Water Management had 
previously only been concerned with the finance and administration of NS, there was a major lack 
of expertise with regard to the specialist executive agencies.   
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In the period 1997-2000, there was much government debate about the desired market system, 
and the most varied models were considered. This process crippled the rail sector because it 
implied great uncertainty over a long period. In addition, there were some instances where the 
future was anticipated, such as the licensing of Lovers Rail. This was the first private rail operator 
for passenger transport in the Netherlands, and was part of Compagnie Générale d'Entreprise 
Automobiles121. In 1997, the government granted the company a concession for the Amsterdam-
Haarlem, Leiden-The Hague and Utrecht-Hilversum routes, so that – for the first time – NS had a 
direct competitor "on" the track122. On the first route, a train concept called  "Optio" was introduced. 
This was a luxury train with extra services and a lower ticket price which sought to tempt 
passengers away from NS. In September 1999, all Lover Rail train services were abruptly 
terminated. The reason given was that the lines were not a commercial success because NS had 
systematically refused to cooperate, among other things in setting up an integrated fare and  ticket 
system. 
 
In 1999, the report "De derde eeuw spoor" [The third railway age] finally presented a model for the 
future of the rail sector. In view of the experience with Lovers Rail, it was decided to permit 
competition "for" the track. In the case of the main rail network, it was decided to grant NS a 
concession by private contract up to 2015. In the case of freight, competition "on" the track was 
permitted in accordance with Directive 91/440/EEC. The report also proposed that the three 
executive agencies together with Railinfratrust (legal owner of the railway infrastructure) should be 
removed from NS by 1 January 2000 and placed with Verkeersleiding and Railned in a single 
independent public authority123 (ZBO or Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan). The report contained no 
proposals on the legal form of Railinfrabeheer. Nevertheless, the executive agencies eventually 
remained part of the NS holding company until 1 July 2002.  
 
The report also drew attention to the fact that the goal of creating competition between different rail 
operators does not chime well with a government which is the sole shareholder of NS. For that 
reason, it was said that the ultimate plan was to dispose of the shares via sale or flotation. In the 
Netherlands, privatisation by floating NS on the stock market was seen as the logical conclusion to 
privatisation and the introduction of market forces. 
 
In the spring of 2001, the railways encountered serious operating problems. There were several 
instances of major disruption due to defects in the infrastructure and strikes124 which affected the 
entire rail network. There was a noticeable deterioration in the performance of NS, so that people 
realised that the proposed aims for the railways were too ambitious. The Minister of Transport and 
Water Management responded by submitting a review document to the Parliament, setting out the 
basis for the ultimate design of the relationships within the railway sector. The changes announced 
in the review document were implemented by the Spoorwegwet  (Railway Act) and the 
Concessiewet (Concession Act). The starting point was a recovery plan intended to restore the rail 
                                                   
121   Compagnie Générale d'Entreprise Automobiles is a French transport firm which operated under that 
name until 2000 and was then renamed Connex, and from 2006 Veolia Transport.  
122  There are two ways of allowing competition on the railways: competition "on" the track, in which multiple 
train operators use the same routes so that passengers can choose the cheapest option, and competition 
"for" the track in which the government arranges a public tender for all or part of the rail network and the 
chosen operator acquires exclusive rights for a specified period. 
123   An independent authority is an entity which provides a public service and therefore comes under the 
government, but is not subordinate to a Minister in the hierarchy. The competent minister is therefore not 
responsible for the authority's decisions but does have a limited range of powers (e.g. appointing 
members of the executive board or approving the budget). 
124  NS wanted to introduce a new production model to boost efficiency and make the trains more reliable. 
Train drivers and ticket collectors went on strike because they would not agree to work on fixed routes 
because this would make their job too monotonous ("Rondje om de kerk").   
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sector's performance within five years without the need for irreversible, radical changes to the 
structure.  
 
It was decided to drop the proposal put forward in the report "De derde eeuw spoor" whereby the 
three executive agencies Railned, Railinfrabeheer and Verkeersleiding would be set up as 
independent authorities. Instead it was decided to go for a single private organisation responsible 
for operating the railway infrastructure (ProRail). Officially, ProRail is a subsidiary of Railinfratrust. 
The subsidiary is the beneficial owner. In July 2002 the executive agencies were split from the NS 
holding company, and the government became the sole shareholder of Railinfratrust. From January 
2003, the three executive agencies operated unofficially under the joint name ProRail. On 1 
January 2005, they were legally merged to form ProRail BV, and the Railway Act and the 
Concession Act concerning rail passenger transport entered into force, together with the underlying 
legislation.  
 
The removal of the executive agencies changed the NS organisation chart (see figure 9). The NS 
group is run by the NS executive board, and the supervisory board exercises supervision. NS NV 
comprises four segments consisting of one or more business units, each headed by a management 
team. The segments are: 
x  Passenger transport: covers all transport activities comprising Reizigersvervoer binnenland 
(holder of the concession for the operation of the main rail network and the regional tenders 
won by NS), NS Internationaal (in 2006 this became NS HiSpeed) and NedRailways (in 2010 
changed to Abellio, responsible for the operation of the British, German and Czech 
concessions of NS). 
x  Hub development: NS Poort is an amalgamation of NS Stations and NS Vastgoed. NS Stations 
is responsible for the commercial operation of stations, including via the subsidiary Servex. NS 
Vastgoed develops building projects in and around stations and manages the land surrounding 
the railway network. 
x  Rail infrastructure & building: Strukton is an NS subsidiary which carries out maintenance and 
building work in the sphere of civil engineering throughout Europe, specialising in railways and 
tramways. 
x  Support companies and participating interests: this covers NS Projectconsult (consultancy 
which was sold in 2009 to DHV Group), NS Opleidingen (vocational training in the rail sector, 
absorbed by the new NS Academy in 2010), NS Insurance (insurance), NS Financial Services 
(leasing of equipment to NS Reizigers and other operators) and RegioLinq (NS alliance with 
bus operator Haagse Tramweg Maatschappij). 
 
Figure 9:  Organisation chart for Dutch Railways  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NS, 2006. 
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The management and maintenance of the railway infrastructure was specified in the Main Rail 
Infrastructure Management Concession which, together with the Main Rail Network Transport 
Concession, forms part of the Railway Act. Within the railway sector, there are now various players 
(ProRail, government and rail operators) who have to work closely together. That cooperation is 
known as the "institutional triangle" (see figure 10). The Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management grants the operating and transport concessions to ProRail and NS respectively. Both 
parties draw up a management and transport plan each year which has to be approved by the 
Ministry. ProRail and NS agree arrangements between themselves which are spelt out in the 
Network Statement (e.g. the allocation of the infrastructure capacity and the expected quality). 
Independent supervision of the relationship between the infrastructure manager and the rail 
operators is assigned to the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) while the Transport and 
Water Management Inspectorate (IVW) supervises rail safety. 
 
Figure 10:  Institutional triangle in the railway sector 
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Source: Lower House of the States General 2005-2006. 
 
As a result of the entry into force of the Passenger Transport Concession Act (Concessiewet 
personenvervoer), which supplements the Passenger Transport Act 2000 (Wet personenvervoer 
2000]125), the concession system126 has also applied to rail passenger transport since 1 January 
2005. The provinces are formally authorised to grant, modify or withdraw concessions for the 
regional train services, so that there is competition on the railways; this does not include the 
ownership and management of the railway infrastructure concerned, which remains the 
responsibility of ProRail. The powers concerning the operation of regional train services are less 
extensive than in the case of urban and district transport. Changes to the schedules such as 
increases in frequency have to be submitted for approval to ProRail, which checks them against 
the available capacity and the impact on rail safety.  
 
                                                   
125  In 1998, the management of Dutch urban and district transport was devolved from the government to the 
provinces. When the Passenger Transport Act 2000 was passed, market forces were introduced. Since 
then, public transport in the Netherlands has been subject to public tenders per region or per service for a 
specified period. The transport company that wins the contract gains the exclusive but temporary right to 
operate public transport services in a particular region. 
126  A railway concession is a package of routes which a 'public transport' authority (in reality, it is usually a 
province) grants exclusively to a transport operator subject to certain conditions.  
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The train services which were decentralised were all routes which NS had indicated as unprofitable 
in 1996 (see figure 11). In principle, these contract sector routes do not have close links with the 
main rail network. Nevertheless, they were selected primarily on financial grounds, with transport 
service criteria playing a much smaller role. Up to 2005, the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management concluded a temporary contract with NS each year for the use of the main rail 
network. As a result of the Concession Act, NS and ProRail together won a ten-year concession 
giving them exclusive rights to operate passenger trains on the main rail network up to 2015.  The 
regional concessions were awarded to NS, Arriva, Syntus, Connexxion and Veolia. 
 
Figure 11:  Summary of decentralised railway lines 
 
Source: Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeheer (Mobility management research institution), 2008. 
 
The concession for the main rail network comprises a number of performance standards which 
both NS and ProRail must meet. Both must be able to achieve improved figures for these 
standards. To that end, they have to draw up an annual transport and infrastructure plan capable of 
allowing speedy adjustments if circumstances change. If certain standards cannot be met, NS and 
ProRail must explain the reasons. During a transitional period up to 2007, both undertakings were 
able to learn how to work with this new system. Since 2008, fines have been imposed if either of 
them fails to achieve the set standards. 
 
The new railway legislation which came into force on 1 January 2005 stipulated that the Minister of 
Transport and Water Management would report to the States General in 2006 on the effectiveness 
and practical impact of the law. At the request of the Lower House, this evaluation was postponed 
until 2008. The end conclusions of the Final Report on the Evaluation of the Railway Legislation 
(Ministry of Transport and Water Management, 2008) were as follows: 
 
x  The responsibilities and obligations of the government, manager, transport operators and other 
parties involved in rail transport were clearly laid down in the railway legislation. The European 
legislation was correctly implemented in national law. The public interest in the management of 
the railway infrastructure is broadly safeguarded, and access to the public rail transport market 
was arranged by the introduction of a concession system.  
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x  People are making more use of the railways. The quality of passenger and freight transport and 
the quality of the infrastructure both improved during the 2005-2007 period. 
x  Power over the day-to-day operations rests entirely with the transport operators and the 
manager (self-direction). The government establishes the legal framework but does not always 
succeed in distancing itself from the concession holders, and sometimes becomes involved in 
the operational details. In addition, the Ministry of Transport and Water Management and 
ProRail differ in their understanding of one another's tasks and roles. 
x  Not all the instruments provided for by the law are applied. The legislative system could 
operate better. This is due partly to a lack of clarity in the law but also to the transitional 
process in which the various parties involved have to get used to their new role and 
responsibilities. 
 
The government decided that the railways no longer required radical restructuring, but that they 
could be better organised. The framework for user charges and the allocation of capacity had to be 
tightened up, improved and rendered more transparent. In addition, the position of the regional 
authorities in the management of the stations needed to be improved, and the position and role of 
the management of both ProRail and NS must become much more transparent. 
 
7.1.2. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DUTCH RAIL MARKET 
 
7.1.2.1. Freight 
 
During the period from 2000 to 2008, there was little change in the share of total freight transported 
by road, rail, inland waterways and pipeline in the Netherlands (see chart 71). The share of rail 
freight increased from 4.3% in 2000 to 6.6% in 2008. Despite the European Commission's efforts to 
improve the performance of the railways, the share of rail freight is very small in the Netherlands. 
The main reason for this modest role of the railways in total freight transport is due to the 
topography of the Netherlands. Owing to the high start-up costs, rail is [only] attractive for carrying 
freight over long distances. Since the Dutch territory is relatively small, there is considerable cross-
border rail traffic. In addition, the Netherlands has a good alternative for carrying heavy bulk goods, 
namely inland waterways, an option to which other countries have more limited access 
(Ramaekers et al., 2009). 
 
Chart 71:  Market share of rail freight in 2000 and 2008 (based on tkm) 
 
Source: Rail Cargo, 2009. 
 
The rather limited growth of rail freight is attributable mainly to international transport. Between 
1995 and 2006, this increased by 18.3 million tonnes per annum (see table 17). Domestic transport 
grew by 2.6 million tonnes over the same period. A key reason for this development is economic 
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growth in general and the globalisation of both the production and the consumption of goods. 
However, the expansion of international transport is not evenly distributed. While transport across 
the Dutch-German border more than tripled between 1995 and 2006, transport across the Dutch-
Belgian border declined by 0.7% over the same period. One very specific development which 
explains this is the closure of the German coal mines. This led to an increase in German imports of 
coal from abroad. Finally, there has been transit traffic (between Germany and Belgium via the 
Netherlands) for a number of years, and that flow is estimated at 1 million tonnes in 2006. A key 
reason for this transit flow is the high user charge on the German network compared to the charge 
imposed in the Netherlands (Project Group on the Evaluation of Railway Legislation, 2008). 
 
Table 17:  Rail freight in the period 1995-2006 (in million tonnes) 
   
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
Domestic  4.3  4.7  5  4.6  4.6  5.2  4.4  5.7  5.7  6  6.5  6.9 
Germany   8.2  8.3  9  10.7  11.8  14.9  14.9  16.6  18.8  22.5  25  27.2 
Belgium  7.2  8  9  9.9  8.9  8.2  7.1  6  5.2  5.7  6  6.5 
Transit                    0.5  1  1 
Total  19.7  21  23  25.2  25.3  28.3  26.4  28.3  29.7  34.7  38.5  41.6 
Source: Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, 2007. 
 
Apart from the economic reasons for the expansion, ProRail also mentions the opening up of the 
market as a significant factor (ProRail, 2004). Since 1998, when competition was permitted on the 
Dutch railways, the number of market players has risen strongly. In freight transport, the number of 
foreign firms has increased particularly in the last few years. The reason is that they focus very 
strongly on transport to and from the port of Rotterdam. As a result, there are only two active freight 
transport operators which are entirely Dutch (ACTS Nederland BV and Rotterdam Rail Feeding BV) 
(see table 18). The internationalisation of the rail freight sector has resulted in the (virtual) 
disappearance of Dutch rail freight operators, although many firms do have a branch in the 
Netherlands (except for Häfen- und Güterverkehr Köln AG and Dillen & Lejeune Cargo NV). 
 
In order to become a rail freight transport operator, a rail operator needs to obtain an operating 
licence from the IVW. All foreign firms holding a European licence can operate in the Netherlands 
provided they have an appropriate safety certificate. This certificate is also issued by the IVW 
following a thorough inspection. In addition, rail operators have to conclude an access agreement 
with ProRail and/or Keyrail which entitles the transport operator to a basic access package.  
 
DB Schenker Nederland accounts for most of the rail freight traffic (see chart 72). In 2006, the new 
entrants had a market share of 25% between them (see chart 73). This puts the Netherlands in the 
leading group of European Union countries in terms of market forces. Germany is home to the 
largest number of railway firms in Europe, but in 2006 their market share was only 16%.  
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Table 18:   Freight  transport  operators  in  the  Netherlands  
 
Transport operator 
 
Licensed 
 
Shareholder 
 
Markets 
DB Schenker Nederland NV  1938  DB Logistics (100%)  all freight 
Bentheimer Eisenbahn  AG  1990  Landkreis Grafschaft 
Bentheim (93.99%), Stadt 
Nordhorn (6%), Stadt 
Neuenhaus (0.01%) 
combined transport 
from/to Coevorden 
ACTS Nederland BV  1998  HUSA  Capital BV  everything, initially 
mainly domestic but now 
also international 
Shortlines (stopped in 2004)  1998     
ERS Railways BV  2002  European Rail Shuttle BV 
(100% Maersk) 
containers mainly 
international 
Dillen & Lejeune Cargo NV  2003  Jeroen lejeune, Ronny Dillen, 
Hupac (40%) 
block trains, mainly 
international 
Rail4Chem Benelux BV  2003  BASF, Hoyer, Bertschi, VTG 
Lehnkering (25% each) 
mainly international 
Häfen- und Güterverkehr Köln 
AG 
2004  Stadtwerke Köln GmbH 
(54.4%), Kreis Köln (39.2%), 
Kreis Erft (6.3%) 
only international 
Rotterdam Rail Feeding BV  2005    started in the Rotterdam 
port area but steadily 
moving further inland 
Veolia Cargo Nederland BV  2006  Veolia Transport (100%)  coal, steel, oil, gas, 
containers/intermodal 
B-Cargo  2007  NMBS, Belgian State   
SNCF-fret  2007  SNCF, French State   
Ruhrtalbahn GmbH  2007  Kreis Düren (25.1%), 
R.A.T.H. GmbH 
 
ITL Benelux  2007  ITL Dresden   Germany, Czech 
Republic, Poland 
Source: Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, 2007. 
 
Chart 72:  Transport performance, rail freight (in million tkm)  
 
Source: Rail Cargo, 2009. 
 
 
   
21.0 21.0 23.0 24.5 23.0 25.5 24.4 24.4 26.4 27.2 29.3 31.5
0.5
2.0
2.5 1.6 3.6
4.7 6.8
8.7
10.5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Former NS freight New entrants 
NBB WORKING PAPER No. 221 - MARCH 2012  112
Chart 73:  Market share of former NS freight and new entrants (in %) 
 
Source: Rail Cargo, 2009. 
 
7.1.2.2. Passenger transport 
 
7.1.2.2.1. Regional passenger transport 
 
Between 2000 and 2010, there was an 11.5% rise in train use on NS routes from 14.7 to 16.4 
billion passenger-kilometres (see chart 74). During this period, responsibility for tenders for a 
number of regional routes was gradually decentralised to provinces and municipalities. 
Nonetheless, NS remained the biggest rail transport operator with a 95% market share in 2010. In 
the majority of cases, there are now rail companies other than NS operating on these routes. 
During the same period, the volume of traffic carried by those other operators more than doubled to 
0.8 billion passenger-kilometres in 2010, causing total train use to increase from 15 to 17.2 billion 
passenger-kilometres, representing 14.7% growth over the period as a whole. 
 
Chart 74:  Rail passenger traffic in the period 2000-2010 (in billions of passenger-kilometres) 
 
Source: Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeheer, 2010. 
 
This growth was uneven. Between 2000 and 2003, rail use declined by 9% as a result of the weak 
economic growth in those years, deteriorating punctuality and fare increases. The years 2004-2007 
were a boom period so that the performance of the railways improved again. This led to an 11.5% 
rise in rail use. That growth was attributable not only to an improvement in the economic climate 
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but also to an increase in the number of student travel cards
127 and rising fuel prices. In addition, 
businesses were increasingly turning to NS for train journeys, cards and/or season tickets. 
Turnover in this segment grew by 9% in 2006 and 10% in 2007. In 2008, despite the financial 
crisis, passenger traffic increased for the fifth year running, with growth of 4.6%. According to NS, 
extra trains and the new schedules and refurbished stations promoted the rise in passenger 
numbers (NS, 2008). In 2009, as a result of the economic recession, the growth of passenger 
traffic was weaker than in previous years. though the impact was slight, so that the number of 
passenger-kilometres still increased by 1.4%. In 2010 the growth virtually came to a halt (+0.8%). 
According to NS, part of this slowdown was due to the severe weather at the beginning of 2010. 
The wintry conditions revealed the vulnerability of the crowded rail infrastructure in the Netherlands 
and caused equipment breakdowns leading to many delays. 
 
Table 19:    Regional rail service transport concessions in 2010 
 
Contracting 
authority 
 
Concession area 
 
Transport 
operator 
 
Start date 
 
End date 
Groningen  Groningen-Delfzijl  Arriva  11/12/2005  10/12/2020 
Groningen  Groningen-Nieuweschans-Leer  Arriva  11/12/2005  10/12/2020 
Groningen  Groningen-Roodeschool  Arriva  11/12/2005  10/12/2020 
Groningen/Friesland  Groningen-Leeuwarden  Arriva  11/12/2005  10/12/2020 
Friesland  Leeuwarden-Harlingen  Arriva  11/12/2005  10/12/2020 
Overijssel  Zwolle-Kampen  NS  10/12/2006  08/12/2012 
Overijssel/Flevoland 
Lelystad 
Zwolle-Lelystad  NS  12/12/2012  08/12/2018 
Overijssel/Drenthe  Zwolle-Emmen  NS  10/12/2007  09/12/2012 
Regio Twente  Almelo-Mariënberg  Connexxion  01/06/2007  10/12/2013 
Overijse/Drenthe/ 
Regio Twente 
Vechtdallijnen (Zwolle-Emmen; 
Almelo-Mariënberg) 
Arriva  09/12/2012  31/12/2027 
Gelderland  Doetinchem-Winterswijk  Syntus 
Arriva 
12/12/2009 
12/12/2010 
11/12/2010 
11/12/2020 
Gelderland  Zutphen-Winterswijk  Syntus 
Arriva 
12/12/2009 
12/12/2010 
11/12/2010 
11/12/2020 
Gelderland   Zutphen-Apeldoorn  NS 
Arriva 
13/12/2009 
12/12/2010 
11/12/2010 
11/12/2020 
Gelderland  Arnhem-Tiel  Syntus 
Arriva 
01/04/2005 
12/12/2010 
11/12/2010 
11/12/2020 
Gelderland/Regio 
Twente 
Zutphen-Hengelo-Oldenzaal  Syntus  14/12/2003  13/12/2013 
Gelderland/South 
Holland 
Geldermalsen-Dordrecht  Arriva  10/12/2006  09/12/2018 
Gelderland/Utrecht  Eed/Wageningen-Amersfoort  Connexxion  10/12/2006  09/12/2021 
South Holland  Gouda-Alphen a/d Rijn-Leiden  NS  10/12/2006  14/12/2018 
Limburg/Stadsregio 
Arnhem Nijmegen 
Roermond-Nijmegen  Veolia  10/12/2006  09/12/2016 
Limburg  Maastricht-Kerkrade  Veolia  10/12/2006  09/12/2016 
Stadsregio 
Rotterdam 
Rotterdam-Maassluis-Hoek van 
Holland 
NS  10/12/2007  09/12/2012 
Source: Koninklijk Nederlands Vervoer, 2010. 
 
Since the introduction of the Passenger Transport Act 2000, concession areas have been 
introduced for regional passenger traffic. In the process, responsibility for regional, unprofitable 
train services was transferred to the provinces and municipalities which now have the task of 
granting licences for these routes to transport operators (see table 19). Meanwhile, these 
decentralised routes have not only become synonymous with unprofitable routes, but their function 
has also changed. The primary function of the unprofitable routes was to open up rural areas and 
                                                   
127  Students can obtain not only a grant but also a student travel pass entitling them to free travel on public 
transport.  
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provide transport facilities for them. A number of the decentralised routes now also have the 
function of linking regional economic centres or sub-centres and maintaining their accessibility 
(Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, 2008). 
 
Decentralisation, tendering and the grant of concessions for regional rail transport were intended to 
achieve various goals. The aim was to increase the number of passengers and improve the 
integration of public transport. The regional and local authorities were encouraged to take account 
of economic and social criteria in deciding whether trains or buses should be used on certain 
services, permitting more rational use of resources. In addition, the extra revenue from the rail 
traffic could be used to improve the regional traffic and transport policy.  
 
As a result of decentralisation, the new rail operators and regional and local authorities took certain 
measures which would never have been taken in the past: increase in the number of early and late 
trains and weekend trains, integration with bus services, elimination of duplicate bus services, 
increase in frequency both at peak times and in off-peak periods, renovation of the equipment and 
improvements to station environments and stations. This led to an increase in the number of 
passengers on most of the routes awarded by tender. According to the KiM (Kennisinstituut voor 
Mobiliteitsbeleid), the effect of decentralisation can be estimated at a 20% increase in passengers. 
A quarter of these came from buses that formerly duplicated the service, and the rest were new 
regional rail service users (Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, 2008). Another significant effect of 
the decentralisation is that existing train services were maintained. In addition, the provinces have 
become more involved in the provision of regional rail transport, permitting a speedy and 
appropriate response to local requirements and problems. Yet in practice, it seems that the 
regional and local authorities are unable to achieve substantial reductions in operating costs, and 
the administrative costs have increased. There is a strong temptation for regional and local 
authorities to turn to the government to fund certain requirements because the provinces can only 
generate modest resources of their own. However, there is little chance of success because the 
government rejects most of the applications. 
 
In reality, it seems that – after all – the conditions for successful decentralisation and market forces 
have not been entirely fulfilled. This is partly because of NS, which has a strong position on the 
national rail transport market and can assert its power in the regions on that basis. For instance, 
there have been problems with the coordination of service schedules and with keeping sales 
outlets open. In addition, the external companies feel obliged to follow the NS strategy on fares. 
Funding of the sector has also proved to be cause for concern. This is due to the "WROOV" 
method128 used in the Netherlands to allocate the public transport revenues among all the 
transport operators. As a result, additional revenues earned by attracting more passengers or 
changing the services available do not automatically accrue to the operator concerned. This 
prompted a number of rail operators to introduce their own types of ticket because the revenues 
from them were not distributed according to the "WROOV" method. The nationwide introduction of 
the public transport smart card129 could solve this problem.  
 
Another sticking point is the availability of the necessary rolling stock for which there is no second-
hand market. This means that NS is in fact the only supplier of used rolling stock that meets the 
Dutch licensing requirements. In addition, external companies are dependent on NS not only for 
                                                   
128   In Dutch, WROOV stands for the Working Group on Passenger Numbers and the Volume of Sales 
(Werkgroep Reizigers Omvang en Omvang Verkopen). The "WROOV" system is used to allocate the 
revenues from national tickets. The actual use in a particular period is ascertained by various methods 
and that forms the basis for determining the formula for allocating the revenues per ticket group for a 
given year. The formulas for year n+1 are decided in November of year n. 
129   The public transport smart card is an electronic travel card which can store a credit balance for public 
transport in the Netherlands. The card was phased in from 2005. The system permits a combination of 
card integration (the same card can be used with different transport operators) and fare differentiation (the 
fare depends not only on the distance but also on the transport operator and possibly also the time of 
day).   
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the availability of used rolling stock but also for its maintenance. NS Nedtrain has a monopoly on 
the maintenance market. Finally, the obligation to take over staff limits the room for manoeuvre 
available to train operators when tendering. In practice, problems arise mainly in connection with 
taking over ticket collectors. Transport operators running regional train services often choose not to 
have a conductor on the train as standard practice. This means that the conductors who have to be 
taken on need to be given a different job in the new company. 
 
7.1.2.2.2. International passenger transport 
 
In the Netherlands, two concessions have been granted for international passenger transport. One 
is the 10-year concession granted to NS in 2005 for the operation of the main rail network. This 
was supplemented by a second concession for trains running on the high-speed link HSL-South 
between Amsterdam, Schiphol Airport, The Hague, Rotterdam and Brussels. This concession was 
granted via a public tender to High Speed Alliance (HSA) for a period of 15 years. HSA is a 
consortium of NS (90%) and Air France-KLM (10%).  
 
NS Internationaal is the NS unit that operates international trains and concentrates mainly on the 
major international traffic flows to major cities in neighbouring countries. At the beginning of 2000, 
NS Internationaal was accumulating losses year after year. Turnover growth was only modest, 
averaging 3% per annum. It was decided to take a number of steps to improve the operating 
results in the short term. Operation of the Ardennen Expres, AutoSlaapExpres, AlpenExpres and 
the night trains to Germany, Austria and Switzerland was terminated. It was also decided to 
develop a new system jointly with SNCB/NMBS whereby tickets were sold on-line or through travel 
agencies. Despite this move, the cost of selling international train tickets was still too high, so it was 
decided to close 17 of the 27 sales outlets over a 3-year period.  
 
Despite these economy measures, the turnover generated by NS Internationaal in 2003 and 2004 
was disappointing. After years of growth, there was a sharp decline in sales accompanied by a 
substantial loss. The main reasons were the increased competition from cheap flights and the 
economic downturn. To deal with the poor operating result and the competition, it was decided to 
launch a "Business Process Redesign130" to ensure sound future prospects for NS Internationaal. 
 
Passenger numbers have risen since 2005, giving NS Internationaal more commercial clout. 
International travel revenues have risen again after years of decline, with 4% growth due to the 
success of a number of advertising campaigns and on-line sales. In 2006, this growth was 
reinforced with a 6% increase in passengers and a 12% rise in the volume of traffic. To ensure that 
the future prospects remain sound, it was decided that the costs must be reduced by efficient, 
streamlined organisation. In the same year, NS Internationaal and HSA therefore merged to form a 
single company operating under the name of NS Hispeed; its principal task was to prepare for the 
operation of HSL-South. 
 
In 2007 and 2008, there was a further increase in NS Hispeed's commercial strength, with 
passenger numbers up by 2.3% and 10.3% respectively. This was combined with a fall in the sales 
costs per passenger, attributable entirely to the rising sales of tickets on the internet or at ticket 
machines. Owing to difficulties in the construction of the complex Europe-wide safety system 
ERTMS (European Railway Traffic Management System), it was not possible for the HSL (High-
Speed Line) to be brought into service in 2008 as originally planned. It was September 2009 before 
passengers could use the Fyra, the high-speed train service running on HSL-South. In 2010, the 
introduction of the high-speed train led to a 14% increase in the number of passengers using 
international  services, compared to 2009. 
 
Nevertheless, that growth fell short of expectations and sales were significantly lower than 
estimated, primarily because of the low number of passengers. This caused serious financial 
                                                   
130  Business Process Redesign (BPR) is the fundamental rethinking and redesign of business processes in 
order to achieve improvements in critical performance criteria such as costs, quality, service and speed.   
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problems for HSA, and heavy losses were incurred on the operation of the HSL-South concession 
(€ 105 million in 2009 and € 123 million in 2010). NS Hispeed decided on a temporary cut in Fyra 
fares from February 2011. The results were very promising, namely a quadrupling of the monthly 
season ticket sales. In addition, there were talks with the government on reducing the price of the 
concession in order to safeguard the continuity of HSA (NS Annual Report, 2001-2010). 
 
7.1.2.2.3. Foreign passenger transport 
 
At the beginning of 2000, NS tried to acquire one or two concessions in other countries to gain 
experience in international competition with modest investment and effort. NS focused on countries 
which appeared to offer the best opportunities at that time: Britain, Germany and Poland. In 2003, 
the NS subsidiary NedRailways and the British service company Serco Group PLC together won 
the Merseyrail concession for rail transport in the Liverpool area for a period of 25 years. he next 
year, the same joint venture won the Northern concession in Britain for 6
3/4  years with the option of 
a 2-year extension. Northern Rail serves the whole of Northern England, operating municipal 
transport in major cities (Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle) and regional services. In 2005, 
the joint venture Serco-NedRailways was the seventh biggest player on the liberalised British 
railway market. Both concessions are profitable and their operational and financial performance 
has exceeded expectations. By the end of 2005, Northern Rail had seen a 12.5% rise in passenger 
numbers compared to the start of the concession. The number of Merseyrail passengers was up by 
6% in 2005. 
 
NedRailways put bids in for new tenders in Britain (for the North London Railways concession in 
2006 and jointly with Serco for the West Midlands concession in 2007) but did not succeed in 
winning any new concessions. In 2008 they took over the Czech bus company Probo Trans Beroun 
which operates bus services west of Prague, and the German passenger transport operator Abellio 
with bus and train services in Hessen, North Rhine Westphalia and Saxony. In June 2009, 
NedRailways acquired a stake in the London bus market by taking over Travel London. This 
company operates bus services in Central and South London. From 2010, these expanding 
activities led to the adoption of the name Abellio for all the activities of NedRailways.  
 
In the future, Abellio aims to strengthen its position in the countries where it is already active, both 
by tendering and by targeted acquisitions. It also wants to enter new markets, particularly in 
Scandinavia. Sweden and Denmark are the most attractive markets because bus transport is 
almost totally liberalised. In addition, Swedish regional train services are all put out to tender, as is 
the subsidised long-distance transport (NS Annual Report, 2001-2010). 
 
7.1.3. EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE DUTCH RAILWAYS 
 
The number of NS employees fluctuated little up to the year 2004 (see chart 75). In 2005, the 
average number of staff increased over the year as a whole by 1 628 full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
from 23 084 in 2004 to 24 712 FTE in 2005. This was due to the takeover of Northern Rail (see 
3.2.3.) which increased the average number of FTEs by 2 110. This means that the average 
number of staff employed on other activities declined by 482 FTEs. In the ensuing year, the 
average number of staff contracted over the year as a whole by 378 FTEs to 24 334 FTEs. One 
reason is the large number of employees who retired at the end of 2005, plus the sale of NedTrain 
Consulting to Lloyd's Register Group. Since the NS subsidiary NedTrain aims to concentrate on its 
two core activities, maintenance and repair of passenger trains and locomotives, it was decided to 
sell the technical consultancy division so that it could reinforce its position on the European rail 
market.  
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Chart 75:  Number of employees at NS in the period 2000-2010 (in FTEs) 
 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
In both 2007 and 2008, the number of employees increased again owing to the recruitment of 
service trainees and maintenance fitters combined with acquisitions by Strukton. The subsidiary, 
Strukton, specialises in installing and maintaining railway infrastructure and aims to become one of 
the market leaders in the European railway construction market. The takeover of Georg Reisse 
GmbH & Co KG was Strukton's first venture in the German railway market. By acquiring Betonmast 
Bane AS and increasing its stake in Jernbaneservice AS, Strukton aims to further expand its 
position in the northern European market (Norway, Sweden). In 2009, the acquisition of Travel 
London by NedRailways and the award of the bus concessions at QBuzz increased the number of 
staff by 3 235 FTEs. At NS Reizigers, NedTrain and NS Poort, the average number of employees 
declined by 424 FTEs in that year. 
 
In 2010 the average number of employees was down by 6 526 FTEs, restoring it to the 2002 level. 
The bulk of this striking decline (6 059 FTEs) is attributable to the sale of Strukton plus a fall in the 
average number of employees at NS Reizigers, NedTrain and NS Poort. In regard to Strukton, it 
was decided that this was no longer one of the NS group's core activities. Consequently, on 29 
October 2010 NS sold the Strukton Group and with it the entire rail infrastructure & construction  
segment to Oranjewoud NV. 
 
7.2. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
7.2.1. REVENUES AND SUBSIDIES 
 
It is not a simple matter to state the financial flows received by the railways in the Netherlands. In 
2010 the Dutch Audit Office tried to draw up a statement of the cash flows in the rail sector from 
source to target (see Annex 4). This shows that rail expenditure is highly fragmented, and there is a 
lack of transparency regarding the available rail budgets. The cash flows indicated comprise a 
minimum of € 3 374 million in total for 2011. The Audit Office was unable to trace all the cash flows 
exactly. One reason was that it does not always have the power of inspection. Another reason is 
that it is not clear for all the cash flows which element is directed towards the rail sector. This 
applies, for instance, to the amounts originating from the targeted State subsidy131 (BDU).  
 
                                                   
131   The BDU is a financial contribution which the provinces and municipalities receive each year from the 
Ministry of Transport and Water Management for implementing the traffic and transport policy at local and 
regional level. 
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The principal sources of funding for railway expenditure are: the government (contributions from 
the budget of the Ministry of Transport and Water Management (VenW)), the Infrastructure Fund, 
the Municipal Fund, the Economic Structure Reinforcement Fund132 (FES), the Ministry of Housing 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)), NS One-Off Contribution Fund133 (FENS), the 
private sector (fees from rail operators) and the lower tiers of government. In 2011, of the various 
sources of funding, a minimum subsidy of € 2 392 million came from the central government. The 
money is channelled from the funding source to the various operating entities: Infraspeed, Keyrail, 
NS, ProRail and the regional authorities/transport operators. The size of the rail subsidies per 
operating entity is discussed below. 
 
7.2.1.1. Infraspeed 
 
Infraspeed is the rail infrastructure manager for the HSL-South section of the Schiphol-Antwerp 
high-speed line in the Netherlands (there is also the HSL 4 section in Belgium). In 2001 the Dutch 
government concluded the biggest ever Public Private Partnership contract with this company. 
Infraspeed is responsible for installing the HSL-South superstructure (2001-2006) and, following 
delivery, will manage and maintain the line for 25 years for the railway manager ProRail (2006-
2031). Since 2006 the Dutch State has paid Infraspeed an annual amount of roughly € 105 million 
for making the HSL-South infrastructure available. That figure is included in the Infrastructure Fund 
budget under "Integrated forms of contract/PPP" (see chart 2). Infraspeed is to use this to cover its 
costs and recoup its investments. However, this payment depends on availability, which must be at 
least 99 %. If that is not achieved, the payment is reduced. 
 
7.2.1.2. NS 
 
Chart 76 summarises the operating revenues of NS from the year 2000. In 2001 income declined 
by 3.4% owing to major operating problems concerning the rail infrastructure and shortages of staff 
and equipment (see 1.1). Nevertheless, there was a 2.1% rise in turnover in the passenger 
transport segment, due entirely to fare increases, as the total number of passenger kilometres 
dropped by 2% from 14.7 billion in 2000 to 14.4 billion in 2001. Turnover in the "Hub development 
and operation" segment (comprising NS Stations and NS Vastgoed) also increased (36.8%) as a 
result of reorganisation within the group, in which a number of activities were transferred from NS 
Reizigers to NS Stations. However, in the "Other activities" segment there was a decline of 69.7%. 
Apart from the group management, this segment also comprises support units. Elimination of intra-
group transactions between the various segments led to a negative balance. 
 
In the ensuing years, operating income followed an upward trend averaging 7.4% per annum. The 
biggest increase (18.2%) occurred in 2005 because this was the first time that the revenues from 
the share acquired by NedRailways in Northern Rail were included for a full year (see 7.1.2.2.3). In 
addition, within the "Rail Infrastructure & Construction" segment there was a strong rise in 
revenues in 2006 and 2007 (2006: 16.6% and 2007: 21.6%), attributable entirely to acquisitions 
with which Strukton aims to become a full service provider by offering comprehensive solutions in 
the infrastructure and accommodation sphere. 
 
   
                                                   
132  The FES is a fund financed out of part of the proceeds from the sale of natural gas from the Slochteren 
gas field. The fund is intended to strengthen the Dutch economic structures. A large part of the money 
spent by the FES comprises contributions to the budget via the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management, used for infrastructure projects (Betuwe line and High-Speed Line). 
133  At the end of 2000, the Ministry of Transport and Water Management and the Lower House decided that 
€ 1.3 billion of the € 1.9 billion from the sale of the telecom company Telfort should be placed in a fund for 
improving the railways. This NS One-Off Contribution Fund made available € 340 million for infrastructure 
projects.  
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Chart 76  Operating revenues at NS during the period 2000-2010 (in € million) 
 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
In 2010, operating revenues were down by 23.4% owing to the loss of the income from the Rail 
Infrastructure & Construction segment. NS decided that Strukton was no longer part of the NS 
Group's core activities, and sold the entire Rail Infrastructure & Construction segment to 
Oranjewoud NV for € 168 million. The proceeds from that sale were paid out to the government in 
the form of an extra dividend. If the sale of Strukton Groep NV is taken into account, the revenues 
in 2010 were 7.6% higher than in the previous year (2009: € 3 271 million in 2010: € 3 520 million). 
 
At the time of the 1995 privatisation, it was decided that the general financial contribution from the 
government to NS for operating the public rail transport services would be phased out by the year 
2000. Since then, NS has not received any subsidies and is profitable purely on the basis of the 
revenues from selling tickets to passengers. 
 
However, it should be noted that the charge for use of the infrastructure in the Netherlands is 
relatively low in comparison with other European countries. The amount is not in line with Directive 
2001/14/EC. This permits differential pricing in order to achieve an efficiency-driven demand for 
capacity. Until the year 2000, there was no charge for use of the track in the Netherlands. After 
that, the Ministry of Transport and Water Management set a tariff each year on the basis of the 
number of train-kilometres and stops combined with the level of the marginal costs of the 
infrastructure manager for the use of the existing infrastructure network. Until 2005, that was 
subject to a transitional arrangement134 with an additional discount for freight transport operators, 
so that the usage fee was well below the European level. In 2005, 20% of the expenditure on the 
infrastructure (including loans and guarantees) was covered by the user fees and the remainder 
was paid for by the government (ECMT, 2005). From 2006, the user fee was gradually increased 
so that the infrastructure levy now covers the whole of the infrastructure maintenance costs and the 
traffic management costs.  
 
In addition, NS did not have to pay anything for the transport concession for the main rail network 
until 2008. Financial forecasts revealed that the likely results were not sufficient to justify a 
concession price. Moreover, only a small tariff increase would be acceptable and a further 
improvement in transport performance was necessary. The main purpose of the concession price 
                                                   
134  From 2000 to 2004, only a certain percentage of the budgeted costs (per train kilometre and per station) 
was taken into account: 15% in the year 2000 (85% discount for the transport operator), 30% in 2001 
(70% discount for the transport operator), 45% 2002 (55% discount for the transport operator), 60% in 
2003 (40% discount for the transport operator) and 80% in 2004 (20% discount for the transport 
operator). 
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would be to give NS an additional incentive to remain steadfast in the pursuit of more efficient 
operation. An assessment of the concession indicated that a concession price could be set from 
2009 onwards. NS could pay a concession price for the exclusive right because the results were 
better than originally expected. In practice, this meant that NS owed the Ministry of Transport and 
Water Management the following amounts: € 10 million in 2009, € 10 million in 2010, € 20 million in 
2011, € 20 million in 2012, € 30 million in 2013 and € 30 million in 2014. The current transport 
concession expires in 2015. 
 
With regard to the former contract sector routes which were added to the main rail network, it was 
agreed in 2005 that, during the subsequent years, NS would receive a subsidy declining to zero for 
these unprofitable routes. 
 
7.2.1.3. ProRail 
 
According to the Railway Act, the Minister of Transport and Water Management is responsible for 
the installation, management and maintenance of the railway infrastructure. Via a management 
concession, the Minister chose to transfer responsibility for the performance of these tasks to 
ProRail. The financial resources made available to the rail sector via the budget of the Ministry of 
Transport and Water Management are provided on the basis of the Infrastructure Fund Decree 
which only grants one-year subsidies for the maintenance and repair of the infrastructure. ProRail 
draws up a management plan each year containing proposals regarding the performance targets. 
Those proposals are decided in consultation with the rail operators and local authorities.  
 
The performance that ProRail can achieve depends on the financial resources made available to 
ProRail via the Infrastructure Fund contribution from the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management, amortisation of the amounts invested135, user fees, NS framework agreement 
contributions136 and any other income sources137. When the State contribution is determined, 
income from the user charges is taken into account. The user fee payable to ProRail is deducted 
from the expenditure to be subsidised by the government.  
 
Chart 77 shows the trend in operating revenues from 2003, the year in which the three executive 
agencies Railinfrabeheer, Railned and Railverkeersleiding began operating under the joint name 
ProRail. This shows that in 2010 Prorail depended on the government contributions for 76.6% of its 
income. That is slightly better than in 2003, when government subsidies represented 83.6% of the 
revenues. This development is attributable both to the increase in other revenues (from € 82 million 
in 2003 to € 180 million in 2010) and to a rise in income from user fees (from € 86 million in 2003 to 
€ 232 million in 2010) due to both a volume effect and a price effect. A transitional arrangement for 
the user fees was agreed with the freight transport operators, so that the price effect was kept 
down until 2006.  
 
   
                                                   
135  The payments received from the central government for the installation of fixed assets and replacement of 
the superstructure are deducted from the central government contributions and presented as "Investment 
amounts in accrued liabilities". This item is paid off in line with the depreciation of the assets. In the profit 
and loss account, this appears under the heading "Amortisation of investments". 
136  The framework agreement contributions are amounts originating from the NS One-Off Contribution Fund 
(FENS); they were intended for improvements to the railway infrastructure and were paid until 2005. 
137  The other operating revenues consist of "Capitalised production in house" (work done by in-house staff 
concerning the production of tangible fixed assets) and the "Other operating revenues" (revenues 
generated by work done by third parties).  
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Chart 77:  ProRail operating revenues, 2003-2010 (in € million) 
 
Source: ProRail 2003-2010. 
 
Chart 78 shows the budgetary expenditure in the Dutch budget intended for the railways 
(Infrastructure Fund contribution). It is noticeable that the amounts which ProRail spends on 
maintenance and installation do not tally precisely with the figures in the budget of the  Ministry of 
Transport and Water Management. In 2007, the budget included € 1 367 million for the 
management and maintenance of the existing rail infrastructure,  whereas Prorail states a figure of 
€ 783 million in its management plan. This discrepancy is due partly to differences in the 
accounting system. In addition, in the budget the contribution to ProRail is not recorded as a 
separate amount but is fragmented among various sub-items which also include other minor items 
of expenditure which do not accrue to ProRail. (Lower House, 2005-2006). The Lower House has 
difficulty in discerning the public funds spent by ProRail, and that makes it impossible to exercise 
supervision. In 2010, a parliamentary committee was set up to resolve this issue so that the way in 
which the rail subsidies are used will be clear in the future. 
 
Chart 78:   National Budget Infrastructure Fund, 2004-2009 (in € million) 
 
Source: Lower House of the States General, 2006-2011. 
 
7.2.1.4. Regional authorities 
 
Decentralisation and the introduction of tendering procedures in passenger transport were intended 
to make public transport better and more efficient. In that connection the Dutch government 
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decided that, when decentralisation was introduced, the level of subsidies to the regional 
authorities should remain unchanged. This system was meant to encourage the regional authorities 
to conduct their tendering procedures with the aim of achieving a better quality of service or lower 
costs for the same standard of quality. For example, if the regional authority could cut the costs of 
rail transport in this way, the savings could be used for other transport facilities.  
 
The BDU which the regional transport entities receive each year is used for the concessions put 
out to tender, which cover buses, trams and trains. This makes it impossible to separate the 
subsidies which accrue to the railways. Every year the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management pays an average of € 1.6 billion to 12 provinces and 7 municipalities as a contribution 
for the implementation of the local and regional mobility policy. Of this, roughly € 1 billion is spent 
on the operation of urban and district transport, and the rest on infrastructure (Hilferink et al., 2010). 
 
7.2.2. OPERATING COSTS 
 
Chart 79 shows the trend in the consolidated operating expenses138 of all the independent 
business units at NS in the period from 2000 to 2010. To place the operating expenses in 
perspective, the corresponding operating revenues are also shown. 
 
Chart 79:  Operating revenues and expenses of NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen (in € billion) 
 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
In 2001, the reputation of NS reached a low point. As a result of the EU legislation which stipulated 
a sound financial position as well as separation of the accounting between the railway 
infrastructure and rail operations, NS placed too much emphasis on cutting costs. Measures were 
introduced to streamline processes, and they led to industrial unrest and strikes. Also, the company 
was not prepared for the rapid growth in passenger numbers caused by the economic boom, 
resulting in a shortage of equipment and staff in a number of crucial functions. Punctuality dropped 
to 79.9% in 2001. This situation prompted the departure of the chairman/managing director and the 
director of internal and external relations, and the dismissal of the entire supervisory board (NS, 
2001). 
 
The ensuing years were dominated by the restoration of quality, industrial harmony and 
management stability at NS. Thanks to a plan for investing almost € 2 billion in new trains over a 
                                                   
138   The NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen Annual Report contains no information on the individual operating 
expenses of each independent business unit. 
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five-year period, passengers could be offered an additional 2 100 seats, on average, each day. A 
number of recruitment campaigns also reduced the shortages of conductors, engineers and fitters, 
restoring industrial harmony. All these efforts to improve quality entailed high costs which seriously 
depressed the operating results.  
 
In 2001, the difference between operating revenues and expenses came to € 38 million, which was 
77% down against the previous year (see chart 79). In 2002, the operating result declined for the 
second successive year, dropping by 55% to € 17 million. Yet in view of the new investment, it was 
necessary to achieve an adequate return (ROI) on the capital invested. In 2002 and 2003, the ROI 
achieved came to 0.6% and 1.7% respectively. NS therefore launched an efficiency drive, in order 
to make structural savings. The measures taken in this connection included the termination of 
catering on trains in 2002 and a fare increase averaging 4.9% (NS, 2002-2003). 
 
In 2004, the impact of the measures taken in the preceding years was already apparent. Total 
operating revenues were up by 8% from € 2 729 million to € 2 949 million. The increase was seen 
mainly in the domestic passenger transport segment (in the season-ticket passengers category), 
reversing the downward trend in the volume of passengers evident since 2001. Total operating 
expenses increased by 4.5% owing to a pay increase under the new collective labour agreement. 
The rise in other operating expenses is attributable to the restructuring of the loss-making 
international passenger services (see 7.3.2.2). 
 
In 2005, there was a marked rise in revenues (18%), a key factor being that the operating revenues 
of the Northern Rail concession were included in a full year for the first time. In addition, the 
revenues generated by domestic passenger services also rose as a result of a fare increase 
(3.25%) and unexpected passenger growth. The operation of the Northern Rail concession by 
NedRailways also entailed a rise in expenses. Furthermore, there were increases in the 
infrastructure usage fee and in energy prices. Nevertheless, according to NS the expenses would 
have been even higher without the impact of the cost-cutting plan. The operating result climbed to 
€ 292 million, which was double the previous year's figure.  
 
2006 brought a further 11% rise in NS operating revenues, which were up from € 3 474 million to € 
3 846 million. Turnover in the passenger transport segment increased by 8% as a result of a rise in 
the volume of traffic on domestic passenger services (6%) plus an increase in foreign passenger 
transport and cross-border transport (12%). Account must also be taken of a number of exceptional 
revenue items such as the profit on the sale of NedTrain Consulting (€ 32 million) and the 
government compensation (€ 45 million) for the lengthy period during which the Thalys could not 
run on a high-speed line in the Netherlands. Operating expenses, too, were 11% higher than in  
2005. NS attributes this almost entirely to the Strukton Group which, as a result of three takeovers, 
incurred higher costs for work contracted out and other construction-related expenditure. However, 
the departure of a large group of expensive employees who took retirement did have a moderating 
effect on costs in that year.  
 
In the years that followed, the operating revenues continued to grow but not as rapidly as before. In 
2007 operating revenues increased by 5%, making this the last year in which they exceeded the 
operating expenses. NS attributes the 7.6% fall in the operating result in 2008 to rising staff 
expenses and automation costs. In 2009, operating expenses rose by 13%, far outpacing the 
growth of operating revenues (8%), and the operating result was down by € 328 million to € 161 
million. Once again, this was due mainly to an increase in the average labour costs, owing to the 
expansion of the workforce by 3 253 FTEs as a result of the NedRailways acquisitions and a bus 
concession obtained by Qbuzz (see 7.3.2.3). Other operational expenses also increased sharply 
owing to the additions to provisions resulting from the loss-making contract for the operation of the 
high-speed train. 
 
In 2010, the sale of Strukton Groep NV to Oranjewoud NV led to a fall in both operating revenues 
and expenses. The Strukton group had 6 000 employees. In 2009, turnover came to € 1.4 billion  
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with an operating profit of € 13 million. If the figures are adjusted to take account of the sale of 
Strukton, the operating profit increased by € 84 million in 2010. Nevertheless, the outlook for NS 
remains uncertain, partly because of the worrying financial situation relating to the high-speed train, 
and partly because of the question mark over the extension of the concession for the main rail 
network after 2015.  
 
7.2.3. DEBT 
 
The financial liabilities of NS139 in 2002 increased strongly (82.8%) compared to the previous year 
(see table 20). The shares in the executive agencies (Railinfrabeheer, Railned, Railverkeersleiding 
and Railinfratrust) were transferred to the government on 1 July 2002. In conjunction with that, the 
government effected early repayment to NS of the third-party loans re-lent to Railinfrabeheer. This 
put the loans back on the NS balance sheet.  
 
Table 20:  Financial liabilities of NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen (in € million) 
   
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Long-term 
loans 
459  444  844  770  800  750  786  794  839  785  315 
Short-term 
loans 
36  26  15  6  3  3  248  232  244  292  387 
Total Fin. 
Liabilities  
495  470  859  776  803  753  1  034  1  026  1  083  1  077  702 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
Chart 80:  Structure of the financial liabilities (on 31 December 2009) 
 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010 
 
In the ensuing years the financial liabilities of NS initially declined before rising sharply again in 
2006 against the previous year (37.3%). This was due mainly to the growth of short-term 
borrowings which increased to 24% of total financial liabilities in 2006. In its annual report, NS 
explains this by saying that solvency declined in 2006 as a result of the strong rise in short-term 
liabilities. This mainly concerns the amounts received in advance on the student travel pass, 
instalments claimed on work in hand, and the increase in debts to credit institutions (NS, 2006). 
 
                                                   
139  Figures for the financial liabilities of NS were compiled in accordance with the Dutch GAAP standards up 
to 2005. Since 2006 there has been a switch to IFRS standards for preparing the consolidated accounts.  
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In the period 2006-2009, the financial liabilities of NS varied little before declining by 34.8% in 2010 
as a result of the sale of Strukton. This fall exceeded the decline in the operating income (23.4%) 
due to the disposal of the business segment (see 7.2.1.2). While this put the operating revenues at 
their 2005 level, the financial liabilities were at their lowest since 2002.  
 
7.2.4. ANALYSIS OF THE RATIOS  
 
So that the NS results for the period 2000-2010 can be assessed, table 21 shows the ratio between 
revenues and investments (Return On Investment or ROI) and table 22 shows the solvency of the 
railway operation. 
 
While the return on investment (ROI) was positive up to 2003, it was fairly low. In 2004 this ratio 
stood at 5.5%, which was considerably better than in 2003 but still not enough to carry on investing 
and guarantee the long-term continuity of the business. NS itself states that an ROI of at least 7% 
is necessary in order to continue investing in growth and quality (NS, 2004). The only year in which 
the ratio approached this target was 2007 with an ROI of 6%. According to NS, the ROI was 
considerably higher than its 2006 level because of a reduction in the rate of corporation tax from 
29.6% in 2006 to 25.5% in 2007. In subsequent years, the return declined again because rising 
costs constantly eroded the profits on ordinary operations. In 2010, NS tried to reverse this trend by 
hiving off the business segment Rail Infrastructure & Construction, boosting the ROI above the 
2009 figure.  
 
Table 21:  NS profitability ratio  
   
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
ROI  3.8%  0.8%  0.6%  1.7%  5.5%  4.2%  3.7%  6.0%  4.9%  2.2%  3.4% 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
NS has a very high solvency ratio. In 2006, the ratio of capital to balance sheet total dropped by  
6% owing to the sharp rise in short-term liabilities. Solvency declined again in 2009, dropping to its 
lowest level for the period 2000-2010 (48%). This was due to an extra dividend of € 1.4 billion paid 
to the Dutch government as a result of a survey of the NS asset structure. In 2010, solvency again 
reached 53%, thus increasing against the previous year. The main factor here was the sale of 
Strukton. 
 
Table 22:  NS solvency ratio  
   
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Solv.  54%  71%  67%  68%  67%  64%  58%  58%  58%  48%  53% 
Source: NS, 2001 to 2010. 
 
7.3. CONCLUSION 
The formal reason for reforming the Dutch railways was the European Directive 91/440/EEC which 
stipulated separation of the infrastructure from operations. But the Dutch government had already 
been working for some years on preparations for major reforms of public transport. The growth of 
road traffic and the loss of the profitable coal transport business had led to serious problems for the 
Dutch railways by around 1970. From the early 1990s, in particular, the public had been unhappy 
about the annual financial support to the railway company because these subsidies placed a heavy 
burden on the budget. 
 
In 1992, the Wijffels Commission recommended that the links between NS and the government 
should be dismantled via vertical separation of the infrastructure from the operation of transport 
services. It also recommended horizontal separation between passenger and freight transport, 
infrastructure management and capacity management. Only the infrastructure was to continue to  
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receive funding from the government, which also became totally responsible for policy. Rail 
transport services were to be operated on a commercial basis, and the NS subsidies would be 
phased out by the year 2000. This privatisation led NS to concentrate mainly on passenger 
transport, because freight services in the Netherlands generated too low a return. In 2000 the 
freight transport segment was hived off and sold to Deutsche Bahn group.  
 
In 1999 a model was proposed for the future situation of the rail sector, in which competition on the 
track was permitted for both passenger and freight services. It was decided to allow competition 
"for" the track in the case of passenger transport, and competition "on" the track in the freight 
sector. The installation and maintenance of the infrastructure were vertically separated from NS by 
removing them from the holding company and transferring them to a legal entity, ProRail BV, in 
which the government is the sole shareholder. 
 
In addition, the Dutch railway network was divided into a main rail network and decentralised train 
services. These were routes which NS had classed as unprofitable and which were to be 
contracted out. In the case of the main rail network it was decided to award the concession by 
private contract up to 2015. The concession comprises a number of performance standards which 
NS must meet. Fines are imposed if the set standards are not achieved. In addition, the provinces 
were formally authorised to grant, modify or withdraw concessions for regional train services. The 
regional concessions were granted both to NS and to a number of outside companies. 
 
Examination of the effect of opening up the market in freight transport shows that the introduction 
of competition has led to growth, although the growth is rather modest because the railways only 
carry a small proportion of freight traffic in the Netherlands for topographical reasons. Moreover, 
the Netherlands has a good alternative for transporting bulk goods, namely inland waterways. 
Since competition was first permitted in 1998, the number of market players has grown strongly; 
this applies particularly to foreign companies. They concentrate heavily on transport to and from 
the port of Rotterdam. Nevertheless, DB Schenker Nederland still carries most of the rail freight. 
The new entrants have a combined market share of 25%. This puts the Netherlands among the 
leading group of European Union countries in terms of market forces. 
 
In the case of regional passenger transport, the number of passengers increased by 11.5% 
between 2000 and 2010. NS remains the biggest rail transport operator with a market share of 95% 
in 2010. In the same period, the volume of traffic carried by the other operators on the 
decentralised regional lines more than doubled. The effect of decentralisation is estimated at a 
20% increase in passengers. Decentralisation has also led to better integration with other public 
transport services, and regional and local authorities have taken measures which would never have 
happened in the past (increase in the number of late and early trains, higher frequency, renovation 
of equipment and stations). But the regional rail operators also encountered a number of problems 
owing to the strong market position of NS.  For instance, there have been problems with the 
coordination of service schedules and with keeping sales outlets open. In addition, the external 
companies feel obliged to follow the NS strategy on fares. Another sticking point is the availability 
of the necessary rolling stock for which there is no second-hand market. 
 
Examination of the financial flows accruing to the railways in the Netherlands reveals not only that 
they have increased but also that there is no easy way of recording them. Rail expenditure is highly 
fragmented, and there is a lack of transparency regarding the available rail budgets. Furthermore, 
the amounts which ProRail states for infrastructure maintenance and installation in the annual 
reports do not tally with the figures shown in the budget. This makes it difficult for the Lower House 
to see how ProRail has spent the government funds, rendering it impossible to exercise 
supervision. 
 
A financial analysis of NS shows that the decisions taken in 2001, the year in which the company's 
reputation was at a low ebb, produced definite, positive results. On the one hand, a large-scale 
investment plan together with a number of specifically targeted recruitment drives brought about an 
improvement in quality. This entailed high costs which in the first few years thereafter seriously  
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depressed the operating profits. In 2002 and 2003 it was decided to launch an efficiency drive in 
order to achieve structural savings. The impact of the cost-cutting measures was already apparent 
in 2004. Year by year increases in operating expenses were much lower than the rise in operating 
income. Moreover, the increase in operating expenses was attributable mainly to the active 
acquisitions policy pursued by NS, which acquired a number of concessions in other countries, 
including Britain. Only in 2009 was the steep rise in operating expenditure due to the increase in 
provisions on account of the loss-making contract for the operation of the high-speed train. The 
sale of the business segment Rail Infrastructure & Construction (Strukton) in 2010 in turn had a 
very beneficial effect on the operating results, also reducing the financial liabilities to their lowest 
level since 2002. Nevertheless, the outlook for NS remains uncertain, partly because of the 
worrying financial situation relating to the high-speed train, and partly because of the question mark 
over the extension of the main rail network concession after 2015. 
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8. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The European Union tried, by means of its railway Directives, to break up a number of natural 
monopolies with a view to creating a more efficient railway system. It was found that, throughout 
Europe from 1960 onwards,  the growth of road traffic was accompanied by a steady decline in the 
share of the railway sector in both freight and passenger transport. In addition, the financial 
situation of the national railway companies constantly deteriorated, so that from the 1970s onwards 
the income was no longer enough to cover all the costs. This obliged the various national 
governments to apply support measures. In the early 1990s, there was growing public 
dissatisfaction because the annual subsidies were placing ever heavier burdens on the budget. 
With the Directive 91/440/EEC, Europe initiated the liberalisation of the railway market by abolition 
of the natural monopolies accompanied by the introduction of competition and separation of the 
infrastructure and operation in order to make better use of public money and to cut costs. 
 
The driving force behind this fundamental reform of network industries is the economic theory 
relating to transaction costs and the vertical integration of businesses. In practice, however, it 
seems that the assumptions made in this connection are difficult to support, and that there is no 
simple answer to the question which organisational model will produce the biggest consumer 
surplus.  For that it is necessary to quantify the transaction costs. This is a difficult process, and 
most models only provide an indirect indication of the total transaction costs. 
 
The study on the implementation of the European legislation in the Member States shows that 
there are still considerable variations in the way in which the directives are applied; this is 
attributable to the complexity of the subject and the associated circumstances. It is reflected in the 
way in which the separation of the infrastructure and the transport services within the railway 
companies was carried out, and in the degree of opening of the market in freight and passenger 
transport. The Netherlands opted for a railway undertaking with full vertical separation, in which two 
separate companies deal with the infrastructure and operations. In France, there is a legal 
separation between infrastructure and operations but not a de facto one. The other countries 
studied adopted a form of holding company structure. And that type of structure was also 
implemented in varying forms, ranging from a holding company which operates purely as a 
controlling company, as in Germany, to the Belgian holding structure which is not only the group's 
parent company but is also responsible for building, maintaining and managing the stations, and is 
the employer of all the railway workers. Some countries have also gone much farther than others in 
regard to opening up the railway market to private rail operators. For instance, Dutch and German 
passenger transport has long been accessible to outside companies, allowing keen competition to 
develop. The advantages for consumers cannot be entirely measured and demonstrated. Research 
on customer satisfaction in the Netherlands has shown that while opinions have become more 
favourable, that does not apply to ticket prices which have continued to rise despite the introduction 
of competition. 
 
Will the measures imposed by Europe for liberalising the railway market lead to the desired level 
playing field? On the one hand, the dominance of the former monopolist means that private rail 
operators face major obstacles, even just to gain a small share of the market. On the other hand, 
the financial analysis of the railway companies reveals wide variations in economic performance. 
The combination of better balance sheet figures and a bigger domestic market means that some 
major players such as DB AG are financially better off, giving them superiority over the smaller 
railway companies. This raises the question whether these circumstances will ultimately lead to 
distortion of competition. If DB AG and SNCF persist in their present acquisitions policy, that could 
lead to greater concentration and reduce the chances of a competitive market. 
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ARAF:  Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires 
BEV:  Bundeseisenbahnvermögen 
BKartA:  Bundeskartellamt 
BNetzA:  Bundesnetzagentur 
BR:  British Railways 
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COTIF:  Convention concerning international carriage by rail 
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DR:  Deutsche Reichsbahn 
EBA:  Eisenbahn-Bundesamt 
EBIT:  Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
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EIBV:  Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung 
EPIC:  Etablissement public industriel et commercial 
EPSF:  Etablissement public de sécurité ferroviaire 
ERTMS:  European Railway Traffic Management System 
EU:   European Union 
EWS:  English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited 
FENS:  NS One-Off Contribution Fund 
FES:  Economic Structure Reinforcement Fund 
FPS:  Federal Public Service 
FTE:  Full-time equivalent 
GDP:  Gross domestic product 
GVG GmbH:   Georg Verkehrsorganisation 
HSA:  High Speed Alliance 
HSL:  High-speed line 
IC:  Intercity 
ICE:  Intercity-Express 
IR:  Inter-regional trains 
IT:  Information Technology 
IVW:  Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat 
KiM:  Kennisinstituut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid 
NE-bahn:  Nichtbundeseigene Eisenbahn 
NMa:  Netherlands Competition Authority 
NS:  Dutch Railways 
NV:  Naamloze vennootschap 
OECD:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OV-chipkaart:  Public transport smart card 
pkm:  passenger-kilometres 
PPP:  Public-Private Partnership 
PPP:  Purchasing Power Parity 
ptkm:  passenger-tonne-kilometres 
RegB:  Regierungskomission Bahn  
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RENFE:  Red nacional de los ferrocarriles españoles 
RER:  Réseau express régional 
RFF:  Réseau ferré de France 
RIF:  Railway Infrastructure Fund 
RKB:  Regierungskommission Bundesbahn 
ROCE:  Return on capital employed 
ROI:  Return on investment 
SA:  Société anonyme 
SAAD:  Service annexe d'amortissement de la dette 
SJ:  Stätens Järnväger 
SNCB:  Belgian National Railway Company 
SNCB:  Belgian National Railway Company 
SNCF:  Société nationale des chemins de fer français 
SPNV:  Schienengebunden Personen-Nahverkehr 
TGV:  Train à grande vitesse 
tkm:  tonne-kilometres 
TOC:  Train Operating Company 
Transfesa:  Transportes Ferroviarios Especiales SA 
UK:  United Kingdom 
VenW:  Ministry of Transport and Water Management 
VROM:  Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 
WROOV:  Working Group on Passenger Numbers and Volume of Sales 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1: Formulas for the ratios used 
 
1.   SHARE OF STAFF COSTS IN VALUE ADDED 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Wages and salaries, social security expenditure and pensions 
Pension provisions: net allocation or net use and write-backs ..........................................................  
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Sales and service activities 
Operating subsidies and compensatory amounts obtained from government ..................................  
Supplies and goods .............................................................................................................................  
Services and miscellaneous goods 
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
Positive staff costs and value added 
 
 
 
 
+ 62 
+ 635 
 
 
 
+ 70/74 
- 740 
- 60 
- 61 
 
 
2.   SHARE OF ALLOCATIONS TO DEPRECIATION, IMPAIRMENTS AND PROVISIONS FOR CONTINGENCIES IN 
  VALUE  ADDED 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Allocations mentioned above, charged to the operating account 
 
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Sales and service activities 
Operating subsidies and compensatory amounts obtained from government ..................................  
Supplies and goods .............................................................................................................................  
Services and miscellaneous goods 
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
Positive value added 
 
 
 
 
+ 630 + 631/4 + 635/7 
- 635 
 
 
 
+ 70/74 
- 740 
- 60 
- 61 
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3.   LEVEL OF BORROWING COSTS IN RELATION TO VALUE ADDED 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Borrowing costs ...................................................................................................................................  
Amount of discount charged to undertakings on debt trading ...........................................................  
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Sales and service activities 
Operating subsidies and compensatory amounts obtained from government ..................................  
Supplies and goods .............................................................................................................................  
Services and miscellaneous goods 
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
Positive value added 
 
 
 
 
+ 650 
+ 653 
 
 
 
+ 70/74 
- 740 
- 60 
- 61 
 
 
 
4.   NET RETURN ON CAPITAL AFTER TAX 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format) 
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Profit (loss) for the year (after tax) ......................................................................................................  
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Equity ...................................................................................................................................................  
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
Positive capital base 
12-month financial year 
 
 
 
 
+ 9904 
 
 
 
+ 10/15 
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5.   NET RETURN ON TOTAL ASSETS BEFORE TAX AND DEBT CHARGES 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Profit (loss) for the year (after tax) ......................................................................................................  
Debt charges........................................................................................................................................  
Interest subsidies granted by the government and imputed to the profit and loss account ..............  
Tax on the result for the year ..............................................................................................................  
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Total assets..........................................................................................................................................  
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
12-month financial year 
 
 
 
 
+ 9904 
+ 650 + 653 
- 9126 
+ 9134 
 
 
 
+ 20/58 
 
 
 
6.   SOLVENCY 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Capital base 
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Total liabilities 
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
+ 10/15 
 
 
 
+ 10/49 
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7.   ACQUISITIONS OF TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS IN PROPORTION TO VALUE ADDED 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Tangible fixed assets acquired during the year (including capitalised production) ............. ............  
Capital gains on tangible fixed assets acquired from third parties 
Depreciation and impairments on tangible fixed assets acquired from third parties 
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Sales and service activities 
Operating subsidies and compensatory amounts obtained from government ..................................  
Supplies and goods .............................................................................................................................  
Services and miscellaneous goods 
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
Positive value added 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 8161 à 8166 
+ 8221 à 8226 
- 8291 à 8296 
 
 
 
+ 70/74 
- 740 
- 60 
- 61 
 
 
 
8.   ACQUISITIONS OF TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS IN PROPORTION TO TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS AT THE END OF 
  THE PREVIOUS YEAR 
 
 
 
 
Heading codes (full format)  
 
Numerator (N) 
  
Tangible fixed assets acquired during the year (including capitalised production) ............. ............  
Capital gains on tangible fixed assets acquired from third parties 
Depreciation and impairments on tangible fixed assets acquired from third parties 
 
Denominator (D) 
 
Acquisition value of tangible fixed assets at the end of the previous year ........................................  
Capital gains on tangible fixed assets at the end of the previous year .............................................  
Depreciation and impairments on tangible fixed assets at the end of the previous year  ..................  
 
Ratio = N/D x 100 
 
Constraints(s) on calculation of the ratio: 
 
12-month financial year 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 8161 à 8166 
+ 8221 à 8226 
- 8291 à 8296 
 
 
 
+ 8191P à 8196P 
+ 8251P à 8256P 
 
- 8321P à 8326P 
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ANNEX 2: Federal expenditure for DB AG and the railway system as a whole (in € million) 
Source: Boss A. et al., 2009 and Federal Ministry of Finance, 1998 to 2009. 
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ANNEX 3: List of abbreviations of competing rail freight companies in Germany 
 
ARAF:  Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires 
AVG     Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft  mbH,  Karlsruhe 
BASF     Badische  Annilin-  und  Sodafabrik  (BASF)  SE,  Ludwichshafen 
BCB     Bayerische  CargoBahn  GmbH,  Neu-Ulm,  een  dochteronderneming  van  Veolia 
      Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH 
BE      Brohltal-Eisenbahngesellschaft  mbH,  Niederzissen 
boxXpress    boxXpress.de  GmbH,  Hamburg 
EC:  European Commission  
CFF:  Chemins de fer fédéraux 
CFL  Cargo    CFL  Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH,  Niebüll 
Chemion    Chemion  Logistik  GmbH,  Leverkusen 
COTIF:  Convention concerning international carriage by rail 
CPRP:  Caisse de prévoyance et de retraite du personnel 
Crossrail    Crossrail  GmbH,  Duisburg 
CTL     Car  Transport  Logistics  GmbH,  Mainz 
DB:  Deutsche Bahn 
DCF:  Direction de la circulation ferroviaire 
DE      Dortmunder  Eisenbahn  GmbH,  Dortmund,  a  subsidiary  of      
      Veolia  Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH 
duisport  rail    duisport  rail  GmbH,  Duisburg 
EEB     Emsländische  Eisenbahn  GmbH,  Meppen 
EGP     Eisenbahngesellschaft  Potsdam  mbH,  Potsdam 
Ei.L.T.     Ei.L.T.  GmbH,  Eisenbahn,  Logistik  und  Transporte,  Teltow 
Eivel     Eichholz  Eivel  GmbH,  Berlin 
EKO  Trans    EKO  Transportgesellschaft  mbH,  Eisenhüttenstadt 
EPIC:  Etablissement public industriel et commercial 
EPSF:  Etablissement public de sécurité ferroviaire 
ERS     ERS  Railways  GmbH,  Frankfurt  am  Main 
FTE:  full-time equivalent 
EVB     Eisenbahnen  und  Verkehrsbetriebe  Elbe-Weser  GmbH  Zeven 
RIF:  Railway Infrastructure Fund 
HGK     Häfen  und  Güterverkehr  Köln  AG,  Cologne 
HHPI     Heavy  Haul  Power  International  GmbH,  Erfurt 
HSL     HSL  Logistik,  Hamburg 
hvle     Havelländische  Eisenbahn  AG,  Berlin 
ICE:  Inter-City-Express 
Infraleuna    InfraLeuna  GmbH,  Leuna 
IntEgro     IntEgro  Verkehr  GmbH,  Reichenbach  im  Vogtland 
IT:  Information Technology 
ITL      ITL  Cargo  GmbH,  Dresden 
Kombiverkehr   Kombiverkehr Deutsche Gesellschaft  für  kombinierten  Güterverkehr  GmbH  & 
      CO.  KG,  Frankfurt  am  Main 
LEG     Leipziger  Eisenbahnverkehrsgesellschaft  mbH,  Leipzig 
LOCON     LOCON  Logistik  &  Consulting  AG,  Oberuckersee 
Lokomotion    Lokomotion  Gesellschaft  für  Schienentraktion  mbH,  Munich 
MKB     Mindener  Kreisbahnen  GmbH,  Minden 
MTEG     Muldental-Eisenbahnverkehrsgesellschaft  mbH,  Meerane 
MWB     Mittelweserbahn  GmbH,  Bruchhausen-Vilsen 
NE      Neuss-Düsseldorfer  Häfen  GmbH  &  Co.  KG,  Neuss,  Neusser  Eisenbahn 
NIAG     Niederrheinische  Verkehrsbetriebe  AG,  Moers 
NRS     Nordic  Rail  Service  GmbH,  Lübeck 
OHE     Osthannoversche  Eisenbahnen  AG,  Celle 
PCT     PCT  Private  Car  Train 
GDP:  Gross domestic product 
pkm:  passenger-kilometres 
PRESS     Eisenbahnbau-  und  Betriebsgesellschaft  Pressnitztalbahn  mbH,  Jöhstadt 
ptkm:  passenger-tonne-kilometres 
rail4chem    rail4chem  Eisenbahnverkehrsgesellschaft  mbH,  Essen  
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RAN      Railservice  Alexander  Neubauer  GmbH,  Karlsruhe 
RBB     Regiobahn  Bitterfeld  Berlin  GmbH,  Bitterfeld,  a  subsidiary  of      
      Veolia  Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH 
RENFE:  Red nacional de los ferrocarriles españoles 
RER:  Réseau express régional 
RFF:  Réseau ferré de France 
RTB     RegioTram  Betriebsgesellschaft  mbH,  Kassel 
RTS     RTS  Rail  Transport  Service  Germany  GmbH,  Munich 
SA:  Société anonyme 
SAAD:  Service annexe d'amortissement de la dette 
SBB  Cargo    SBB  Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH,  Duisburg 
SNCB:  Belgian national railway company 
SNCF:  French national railway company 
FPS:  Federal Public Service 
SWT     Stahlwerk  Thüringen  GmbH,  Unterwellenborn 
TGV:  High-speed train 
tkm:  tonne-kilometres 
TWE     Teutoburger  Wald-Eisenbahn  AG,  Gütersloh,  a  subsidiary  of     
       Veolia  Cargo  Deutschland  GmbH 
TXL     TX  Logistik  AG,  Bad  Honnef 
EU:   European Union 
UK:  United Kingdom 
VPS     Verkehrsbetriebe  Peine-Salzgitter  GmbH 
WAB     Westfälische  Almetalbahn  GmbH 
WLC     Wiener  Lokalbahnen  Cargo  GmbH 
WLE     Westfälische  Landes-Eisenbahn  GmbH  (WLE) 
WRS     Wincanton  Rail  GmbH 
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ANNEX 4: Overview of railway expenditure in the Netherlands in 2011 (in € million) 
Source: Adapted from Dutch Audit Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) (2010).    
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